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About the Cover
Bicycles	are	a	means	of	transportation	in	the	Nether-
lands	and	people	do	not	stop	using	their	bike	when	
they	become	a	parent.	Consequently,	there	are	many	
sorts	of	bike	seats	available	 that	enable	parents	 to	
take	their	infant	or	toddler	with	them	on	their	bike.	
Around	the	age	of	4,	children	learn	to	ride	a	bicycle.	
Of	 course,	 they	 start	 out	with	 short	distances,	 and	
hence	will	for	some	time	still	be	transported	on	their	
parent’s	bike	for	the	more	purposeful	trips.
There	was	a	day,	when	my	oldest	daughter	had	just	
learned	how	 to	 ride	her	bicycle,	on	which	 I	had	 to	
bring	her	younger	brother	and	sister	to	daycare.	On	
our	way	back,	my	daughter,	sitting	on	the	bike	seat	
right	behind	me	commented	when	I	had	to	ride	up	
a	 small	 (small	 small)	 hill:	 “Now	you	need	 to	pedal	
harder.	Here	we	are	going	uphill.”	Several	days	later,	
I	went	to	the	supermarket,	again,	the	oldest	sitting	
in	her	bike	seat.	She	said:	“This	 is	hard,	because	of	
the	wind.”	For	almost	 four	years,	she	had	regularly	
been	 transported	 by	 us	 as	 parents,	 on	 our	 bikes.	
Never	 had	 she	 mentioned	 the	 circumstances	 that	
affected	the	biking	difficulty.	But	now	that	she	was	
able	 to	 ride	 a	 bicycle	 herself,	 she	 showed	 that	 she	
was	 aware	 of	 the	 action	 context.	 Only	 anecdotal	
evidence	of	course,	but	experience	might	matter.
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General	Introduction
Being	 able	 to	 understand	 and	 predict	 what	 other	 people	 are	 doing	 has	major	
benefits	in	everyday	life.	If	I	understand	that	your	action	of	filling	ground	coffee	
into	the	coffee	maker	will	lead	to	a	pot	of	coffee	that	we	can	share,	then	I	can	save	
my	energy	and	do	not	need	to	get	up	to	make	coffee	myself.	If	you	can	predict	my	
walking	action,	you	can	adjust	your	pace	and	direction	to	avoid	unwanted	colli-
sions.	If	a	child	nagging	for	lemonade	sees	her	mother	picking	up	the	lemonade	
bottle,	the	child	can	(in	principle…)	stop	nagging	once	she	recognizes	that	mother	
has	started	the	action	sequence	that	will	lead	to	the	desired	end	product.
The	question	for	the	cognitive	researcher	is	how	we	get	to	understand	and	predict	
others’	actions.	Which	mechanisms	underlie	action	prediction	and	action	under-
standing?	The	question	for	developmental	research	is	when	these	capacities	come	
into	 place,	 and	more	 intriguing	 even,	what mechanism	 drives	 the	 development	
of	action	understanding	and	action	prediction?	These	questions	 form	the	heart	
of	 the	 current	 thesis,	which	 focuses	 on	 action	prediction	 and	 the	development	
thereof.
Action understanding and action prediction
What	does	 it	mean	 to	understand	an	action?	A	detailed	 theoretical	 analysis	by	
Uithol	and	colleagues	(Uithol,	van	Rooij,	Bekkering,	&	Haselager,	2011)	showed	that	
action	researchers	use	multiple	definitions	of	action	understanding	interchange-
ably.	What	is	meant	by	the	term	action	understanding	can	go	from	rudimentary	
forms	 as	 action	 classification	 (“This	 is	 grasping	 a	 cup”),	 to	 action	 anticipation	
(“Preparing	 a	 hand	 action	 to	 grasp	 the	 offered	 cup”)	 to	more	 complex	matters	
such	as	 recognition	of	 the	action	purpose	 (“The	 cup	 is	 grasped	 to	drink”).	The	
latter	assumes	that	observers	can	read	the	intention	of	the	actor	from	the	action	
itself.	Although	it	would	be	very	beneficial	for	the	development	of	social	cognition	
if	infants	were	capable	of	doing	this,	it	is	a	matter	of	debate	whether	they	actually	
can.	Some	scholars	claim	that	infants	can	indeed	grasp	the	intention	underlying	an	
action	from	an	early	age	on	through	reasoning	(Gergeley	&	Csibra,	2003).	Accord-
ing	to	such	accounts,	14-month-old	infants	are	believed	to	be	capable	of	relatively	
complicated	 reasoning.	For	 instance,	 infants	might	 judge	 it	more	sensible	 for	a	
model	to	use	her	head	to	turn	on	a	light	when	her	hands	are	occupied	compared	
to	when	her	hands	are	free,	because	then	she	might	as	well	have	used	her	hands	
to	turn	on	the	light	(Gergely,	Bekkering,	&	Király,	2002).	In	an	empirical	test	of	this	
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hypothesis,	 a	 higher	 proportion	 of	 infants	 imitated	 turning	 on	 a	 light	with	 the	
head	(rather	than	using	their	hands)	when	they	had	previously	observed	a	model	
switching	the	light	on	with	her	head	who	had	her	hands	free	compared	to	a	model	
acting	similarly,	but	with	occupied	hands.	Recent	studies	have	provided	low-level	
explanations	to	explain	this	finding	(Paulus,	Hunnius,	Vissers,	&	Bekkering,	2011d,	
2011e).	One	should	thus	be	cautious	to	avoid	the	over-interpretation	of	infant	data	
(Haith,	1998;	Schöner,	&	Thelen,	2006;	Heyes,	2014),	and	it	seems	safer	to	not	draw	
strong	conclusions	about	the	potential	intention	reading	abilities	of	infants	who	
cannot	verbally	 report	on	 their	 interpretation	of	other’s	 intentions	 (Hunnius	&	
Bekkering,	2014).
Action	 prediction,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 more	 directly	 measurable.	With	 ac-
tion	 prediction,	 I	mean	 that	 the	 observer	 has	 an	 expectation	 about	 the	 future	
state(s)	of	an	observed	action.	For	 instance,	an	observer	might	predict	 the	end	
location	of	an	action	or	make	a	prediction	about	which	object	in	the	scene	will	be	
grasped	by	an	actor.	Predictions	can	be	measured	explicitly,	by	asking	observers	
where	an	action	will	 end	before	 it	has	actually	ended,	but	predictions	can	also	
be	measured	more	 implicitly	 by	 analyzing	where	 observers	 look	while	 the	 ac-
tion	is	still	unfolding	(Flanagan	&	Johansson,	2003).	If	an	infant	observes	an	actor	
grasping	a	cup	and	looks	to	the	cup	before	the	hand	arrives	there,	this	indicates	
that	 the	 infant	predicted	what	would	happen.	Hence,	gazing	at	 locations	where	
the	actor	will	move	next	 is	an	 indication	of	action	prediction.	Visually	 tracking	
an	action	also	indicates	action	prediction.	The	sensory	system	is	relatively	slow	
and,	therefore,	tracking	a	moving	target	requires	predictions,	otherwise	the	eyes	
would	constantly	lag	behind	(Rosander	&	von	Hofsten,	2002).	In	contrast	to	most	
other	definitions	of	action	understanding,	the	necessary	step	from	the	concept	of	
action	prediction	to	its	operationalization	is	small.	An	observer	has	predicted	an	
action	if	she	has	expectations	about	when	and	where	the	action	will	end	before	
the	action	is	completed.	Measuring	the	quality	of	this	prediction	can	be	done	by	
investigating	where	 the	observer	 looked	during	 the	action	and	when.	The	abil-
ity	to	predict	actions	is	based	on	skills	and	knowledge	acquired	throughout	the	
life-span,	but	is	likely	to	develop	fast	in	the	first	years	of	life.	Investigating	social	
cognitive	development,	by	studying	action	prediction	in	infancy	is	therefore	the	
core	aim	of	the	current	thesis.
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What types of information can potentially be used to predict 
others’ actions?
It	is	clear	from	previous	research	that	infants	and	adults	are	capable	of	predicting	
others’	actions	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010;	Falck-Ytter,	Gredebäck	&	von	Hofsten,	
2006;	Ambrosini	et	al.,	 2013).	However,	 it	 is	 less	clear	what	 types	of	observable	
information	 present	 in	 the	 action	 are	 used	 for	 action	 prediction.	 Actions	 are	
thought	to	contain	several	elements:	1)	an	agent,	2)	a	target	or	goal,	3)	movements	
of	the	agent,	4)	a	context	or	environment.	Next,	the	role	of	these	action	aspects	for	
action	prediction	will	be	reviewed,	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	development	
and	mechanisms	that	allow	these	aspects	to	become	a	basis	for	action	prediction.
The agent
Naturally,	an	action	is	carried	out	by	an	agent.	An	agent	is	an	entity	that	can	act	
on	its	own	(Leslie,	1995).	The	identity	of	the	agent	can	affect	action	prediction	in	
multiple	ways.	First	of	all,	agency	ascription	may	play	a	role	in	action	prediction.	
In	other	words,	agents	must	display	certain	properties	-	agency	cues	-	to	be	iden-
tified	as	agents.	For	 instance,	objects	normally	cannot	move	out	of	 themselves,	
self-propelledness	is	therefore	a	clear	agency	cue	(Premack,	1990).	According	to	
the	naïve	 theory	of	rational	action,	only	 the	movements	of	objects	or	people	 to	
whom	the	observer	ascribes	agency,	can	be	predicted	(Gergely,	&	Csibra,	2003).	
The	 issue	of	 agency	 and	 its	 effect	 on	 action	prediction	 is	 briefly	 touched	upon	
in	 the	 experiments	 reported	 in	 Chapter	 5	 of	 this	 thesis.	 There,	 the	 objects	 are	
either	 self-propelled	 (Exp.	 1),	 or	 their	movement	 are	 externally	 triggered	 (Exp.	
2).	Second,	having	prior	knowledge	about	the	agent	affects	the	interpretation	of	
an	action	and	predictions	resulting	from	the	interpretation.	For	example,	a	hand	
moving	a	scalpel	 is	more	likely	to	be	perceived	as	“to	cure”	 if	 the	hand	belongs	
to	someone	identified	by	the	observer	as	a	doctor,	compared	to	when	the	hand	
seems	to	belong	to	a	criminal	(Kilner,	Friston,	&	Friston,	2007;	Jacob	&	Jeannerod,	
2005).
The action target
Many	studies	in	action	perception	research	emphasize	the	role	of	action	goals	or	
targets	(Grafton	&	Hamilton,	2007).	The	term	“goal”	can	refer	to	a	specific	location	
(a	cup	can	for	instance	be	brought	to	the	mouth),	to	a	specific	object	(for	instance	
a	ball	which	is	being	grasped;	see	also	Uithol	et	al.,	2011),	or	even	to	mental	states	
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(Gallese,	Rochat,	Cossu,	&	Sinigaglia,	2009;	 Iacoboni	et	al.,	2005).	 In	 the	current	
thesis,	the	term	“target”	is	adopted,	which	refers	to	the	object	an	action	is	directed	
at	(examples	can	be	found	in	Chapters	3,	4,	and	6)	or,	more	broadly,	the	location	
where	 the	 action	will	 end	 (examples	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Chapters	 2	 and	 5).	Many	
authors	have	expressed	the	idea	that	targets	are	more	important	than	means,	as	
there	might	be	an	infinite	amount	of	means	to	achieve	the	same	outcome	(Wolp-
ert,	1997;	Kilner	et	al.,	2007).	Identifying	the	potential	target	of	an	observed	action	
allows	 the	 observer	 to	 narrow	 down	 her	 predictions	 concerning	 the	 potential	
movements,	but	in	theory	only	to	a	limited	extent	because	of	the	possibly	unlim-
ited	ways	to	achieve	the	same	outcome.	To	test	whether	the	presence	of	a	poten-
tial	target	indeed	leads	to	more	accurate	predictions,	a	series	of	experiments	was	
conducted,	which	can	be	found	in	Chapter	3.	There,	the	presence	of	a	target	was	
manipulated	to	investigate	how	this	affects	predictions	of	the	movements	of	the	
actor.	Many	infant	prediction	studies	only	include	one	potential	target.	In	Chapters	
4	and	6	we	therefore	investigated	whether	observers	are	capable	of	predicting	the	
actual	target	of	an	action	when	multiple	but	distinct	targets	are	present.
The movements
To	what	extent	movements	are	useful	as	a	basis	for	action	prediction	is	debatable.	
As	many	different	movements	can	be	used	to	reach	the	same	target,	movements	
seem	 not	 very	 helpful	 at	 first.	 The	 view	 that	 targets	 are	more	 important	 than	
movements	 for	 action	 perception	 has	 been	 prominent	 in	 the	 last	 few	 decades	
(Woodward,	1998;	Jovanovic	et	al.,	2007;	Bekkering	et	al.,	2000;	Umiltà	et	al.,	2008).	
Behaviorally,	children	were	shown	to	prioritize	goals	over	means	by	imitating	the	
goal	rather	than	the	means	of	an	action	(Bekkering,	Wohlschläger,	&	Gattis,	2000),	
and	action	targets	were	shown	to	bring	about	more	 interference	 in	responding	
to	action-related	questions	than	means	(van	Elk,	van	Schie,	&	Bekkering,	2008).	
Mirror	 neuron	 research	 with	 macaque	 monkeys	 seemed	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	
action	 target	 and	 not	 primarily	 the	means	 to	 achieve	 the	 target	 is	 encoded	 by	
mirror	neurons,	as	these	neurons	were	shown	to	fire	for	object-directed	actions	
only	(Rizzolatti,	Fadiga,	Gallese,	&	Fogassi,	 1996;	Gallese,	Fadiga,	Fogassi,	&	Riz-
zolatti,	1996).	Furthermore,	monkeys	were	trained	to	grasp	objects	with	normal	
and	reversed	pliers.	The	movements	necessary	for	handling	the	reversed	pliers	
are	the	opposite	of	those	needed	with	the	regular	pliers	in	order	to	achieve	the	
same	goal.	The	mirror	neurons	of	these	trained	monkeys	responded	in	the	same	
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phase	of	the	action,	indicating	that	mirror	neurons	encode	goals,	not	movements	
(Umiltà	et	al.,	2008).
This	research	stands	in	contrast	with	recent	empirical	work	that	illustrates	that	
movements	do	have	a	clear	impact	on	action	perception.	For	instance,	observers	
can	 judge	based	on	 the	kinematics	of	 lifting	movements	whether	an	actor	held	
false	beliefs	 about	 the	weight	of	 the	 lifted	object	 (Grèzes,	 Frith,	&	Passingham,	
2004a).	When	intending	to	cooperate	with	an	interaction	partner,	the	kinematics	
of	a	grasping	action	are	different	compared	to	when	intending	to	compete	(Bec-
chio,	Sartori,	Bulgheroni,	&	Castiello,	2008),	and	observers	are	indeed	capable	of	
dissociating	 these	 actions	 from	 each	 other	 (Sartori,	 Becchio,	 &	 Castiello,	 2011).	
Due	to	this	clear	tension	between	different	views	on	the	role	of	movements,	the	
current	thesis	addresses	the	role	of	movements	for	action	prediction	in	many	of	
the	chapters.	In	Chapter	2,	the	relative	impact	of	movements	on	action	prediction	
is	contrasted	to	the	impact	targets	may	have	on	action	prediction.	In	Chapters	5	
and	6,	the	quality	of	action	prediction	based	on	movements	is	investigated.
The action context
Another	element	of	an	action	is	the	environment	or	context	in	which	the	action	
takes	place.	The	action	context	may	shape	action	predictions	(Kilner	et	al.,	2007).	
This	is	illustrated	by	an	fMRI	(functional	Magnetic	Resonance	Imaging)	study	by	
Iacoboni	and	colleagues	(2005)	that	tested	whether	the	action	context	changes	ac-
tivation	of	the	mirror	neuron	system	(activation	of	premotor	areas)	in	observing	
adults.	The	participants	viewed	a	table	with	objects	that	were	related	to	drinking	
a	cup	of	tea.	The	objects	where	either	positioned	such	that	they	were	representa-
tive	of	a	situation	before	drinking	tea	compared	to	just	after	drinking	tea.	Though	
the	context	itself	did	not	evoke	a	different	response	in	the	targeted	brain	areas,	
in	combination	with	a	hand	grasping	a	cup,	different	brain	responses	were	found.	
The	observers’	 premotor	mirror	neuron	 areas	 responded	more	 strongly	 to	 the	
grasping	action	 if	 the	 context	 indicated	 “before	having	 tea”,	 compared	 to	 “after	
having	 tea”,	 which	 according	 to	 the	 authors	 meant	 that	 observers	 responded	
more	strongly	to	grasping	with	the	intention	to	drink	than	to	grasping	with	the	
intention	 to	clean	up	the	 table.	 In	 the	current	 thesis,	 the	role	of	visible	context	
of	the	action	in	action	prediction	is	investigated	in	Chapters	3	and	4.	The	visible	
context	in	this	case	concerns	action	constraints	which	shape	actions,	such	that	the	
same	movements	without	 these	 constraints	 can	be	 considered	 inefficient.	That	
is,	a	detour	is	justified	when	an	obstacle	lies	in-between	the	actor	and	her	target,	
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but	 this	 detour	 is	 unnecessary	 in	 the	 absence	of	 such	 an	obstacle.	 In	 this	way,	
action	constraints	can	render	the	exact	same	movements	into	an	efficient	means	
to	achieve	a	target	or	an	inefficient	means.
Action	efficiency	is	also	a	prominent	aspect	of	one	of	the	experience-indepen-
dent	accounts	on	action	prediction	development,	which	 is	 the	 topic	of	 the	next	
section.	From	the	review	below,	it	will	become	clear	that	taking	a	developmental	
approach	when	investigating	action	prediction	also	sheds	light	on	the	processes	
underlying	action	prediction	in	general.
Experience-independent accounts
An	important	distinction	between	theories	on	action	understanding	 is	whether	
the	developmental	processes	for	acquiring	action	understanding	are	thought	to	
be	experience-dependent	or	experience-independent.	A	prominent	theory	of	the	
latter	class	is	the	naïve	theory	of	rational	action	(Gergely	&	Csibra,	2003).	In	this	
theory,	infants	are	thought	to	make	use	of	abstract	rules	to	infer	unseen	aspects	
of	an	action,	and	are	assumed	to	expect	agents	to	act	rationally,	namely	choosing	
the	most	efficient	route	to	achieve	their	goal.	For	instance,	agents	should	take	the	
shortest	possible	path,	taking	into	account	obstacles	in	the	environment.	In	one	
of	the	paradigms	often	used	to	empirically	test	the	theory	of	rational	action	(Csi-
bra,	Bı́ró,	Koós,	&	Gergely,	2003;	Csibra,	Gergely,	Bı́ró,	Koos,	&	Brockbank,	 1999;	
Gergely,	Nádasdy,	Csibra,	&	Bíró,	1995),	a	ball	rolls	over	the	floor	and	then	jumps	
over	a	vertical	obstacle	to	get	to	another	ball	(the	target).	Infants	are	repeatedly	
presented	with	this	jumping	event	until	they	lose	interest	and	have	become	ha-
bituated.	After	habituation,	 infants	are	presented	with	 two	different	 test	 trials,	
which	both	no	longer	contain	the	vertical	obstacle.	In	the	one	test	trial,	the	agent	
takes	 the	 same	 path	with	 a	 jump,	which	 is	 now	 an	 unnecessary	 detour.	 In	 the	
other	test	trial,	the	agent	moves	in	an	efficient,	straight	line	trajectory	towards	the	
other	ball.	The	typical	outcome	is	that	infants	look	longer	at	the	test	trial	contain-
ing	the	detour,	which	is	interpreted	as	the	child	being	surprised	about	the	agent	
taking	an	inefficient	path	(see	Csibra	et	al.,	1999,	2003;	Gergely	et	al.,	1995).	The	
infants’	surprise	also	shows	that,	according	the	authors,	infants	expect	agents	to	
use	an	efficient	means	to	achieve	their	goal,	and	the	unexpected	inefficiency	leads	
to	a	surprise	reaction.
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On	the	hand,	the	naïve	theory	of	rational	action	is	elegant	as	infants	only	need	to	
consider	two	elements	(for	instance,	the	path	and	the	obstacle)	to	infer	the	third	
element	 of	 an	 action	 (the	 goal),	 and	 the	 elements	 can	 be	 left	 out	 interchange-
ably:	the	infant	can	infer	the	goal	from	the	path	and	the	obstacle	as	easily	as	she	
can	 infer	 the	path	 from	 the	goal	 and	 the	obstacle.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	 leaves	
the	developmental	researcher	somewhat	puzzled,	as	the	theory	is	implicit	about	
how	development	is	expected	to	unfold.	How	can	infants	expect	others	to	move	
efficiently	from	A	to	B	if	they	never	locomoted	from	one	location	to	another	them-
selves?	(Amy	Skerry	and	colleagues	for	instance	propose	that	action	experience	is	
a	prerequisite	for	sensitivity	to	action	efficiency,	see	Skerry,	Carey,	&	Spelke,	2013).	
And	what	forms	of	efficiency	are	taken	into	account	by	the	observing	infants?	At	
present,	rationality	theory	provides	no	explicit	definition	of	efficiency.	Both	the	
head	touch	paradigm	and	the	jumping-ball	paradigm	can	be	viewed	as	examples	
of	minimization	of	path	length,	but	also	as	examples	of	minimization	of	consumed	
energy	and	minimization	of	time.	And	what	does	this	theory	tell	us	about	action	
prediction?	The	rationality	principle	is	not	only	used	to	explain	infants’	emerging	
action	understanding,	it	is	also	supposed	to	form	the	basis	for	action	prediction.	
But	 then,	 can	 we	 draw	 conclusions	 about	 action	 prediction	 based	 on	 looking	
times	 in	 a	habituation	paradigm?	Sensitivity	 for	 a	 violation	of	 efficiency	which	
is	 measured	 in	 the	 habituation	 experiments,	 in	 which	 infants	 first	 repeatedly	
watch	an	efficient	event,	might	not	automatically	lead	to	the	ability	to	predict	the	
outcome	of	an	action	based	on	the	efficiency	of	the	action	while	the	action	is	still	
unfolding.	Recently,	Szilvia	Bíró	(2013)	carried	out	an	eye-tracking	study	using	the	
jumping-ball	paradigm	in	which	she	investigated	whether	infants	predict	the	end	
location	of	the	jumping	ball	in	the	presence	or	absence	of	an	obstacle.	Infants	dis-
played	predictive	eye	movements	for	both	the	efficient	and	the	inefficient	action	
condition.	In	the	first	experiment,	predictions	were	made	quicker	in	the	efficient	
compared	to	the	inefficient	condition,	though	this	result	was	not	replicated	in	the	
second	experiment.	In	a	similar	vein,	other	eye-tracking	studies	displaying	long	
and	short	paths	have	 revealed	 that	even	adults	do	not	predict	 an	actor	 to	 take	
the	short	path	the	very	first	time	they	see	the	actor	choosing	this	efficient	path	
(Kayhan,	Monroy,	Hunnius,	Gerson,	&	Bekkering,	 in	prep.;	Paulus,	Hunnius,	van	
Wijngaarden,	Vrins,	van	Rooij,	&	Bekkering,	2011).	Thus,	although	efficiency	can	in	
theory	be	a	very	useful	principle	to	base	action	predictions	on,	it	is	still	unclear	
whether	 it	 is	 used	 in	 everyday	 life,	 as	 the	 empirical	 results	 summarized	 here	
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indicate	that	efficiency	principles	are	not	necessarily	applied	in	the	first	instance,	
not	even	by	adults.
More	accounts	are	available	arguing	 that	action	prediction	and	action	under-
standing	can	develop	independently	from	experience	(Luo,	&	Baillargeon,	2005;	
Baron-Cohen,	1997;	Johnson,	2000;	Leslie,	1995;	Premack,	1990),	but	it	goes	beyond	
the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 describe	 these	 accounts	 in	 depth.	 A	 common	 factor	
shared	in	experience-independent	views	is	that	no	improvement	in	action	predic-
tion	 abilities	 should	 be	 found	with	 –	 for	 instance	 –	 growing	motor	 abilities	 or	
increasing	visual	experience.	Another	hypothesis	stemming	from	the	experience-
independent	viewpoints	is	that	prediction	accuracy	should	be	action-unspecific	
and	only	depend	on	individual	prediction	capabilities.
Experience-dependent accounts
In	contrast,	experience-dependent	viewpoints	share	the	 idea	that	experience	 is	
necessary	for	action	prediction	and	that	experience	improves	action	prediction.	
Generally,	two	types	of	experiences	can	be	distinguished,	namely	perceptual	and	
motor	experience.	As	most	studies	on	action	prediction	focus	on	visual	paradigms,	
only	the	role	of	visual	experience	will	be	discussed,	although	the	same	principles	
likely	also	hold	for	other	sensory	modalities	(see	e.g.,	Aliu,	Houde,	&	Nagarajan,	
2008	on	expectations	of	auditory	action-effects,	and	Blakemore,	Wolpert,	&	Frith,	
2000	on	expectations	of	somatosensory	action-effects).
Visual experience
If	there	is	one	thing	in	the	world	that	we	like	to	look	at,	it	is	other	people.	By	merely	
observing	other	people’s	actions,	infants	can	form	associations	between	different	
aspects	of	actions	that	normally	follow	each	other	(Buchsbaum,	Griffiths,	Gopnik,	
&	Baldwin,	2009;	Monroy,	Gerson,	&	Hunnius,	submitted).	For	instance,	they	may	
learn	that	a	hand	reaching	for	a	cup	often	is	followed	by	the	cup	being	brought	to	
the	mouth	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010).	Studies	on	visual	perception	have	shown	
that	 associative	 learning	 is	 a	powerful	 learning	mechanism	 in	 infancy	 (Fiser	&	
Aslin,	 2002;	Slater,	Mattock,	Brown,	Burnham,	&	Young,	 1991;	Younger	&	Cohen,	
1986).	Not	only	are	 infants	able	 to	 form	associations	between	perceived	events	
(Saffran,	 Johnson,	Aslin,	&	Newport,	 1999),	 they	can	also	use	these	associations	
to	predict	future	events.	Haith	and	colleagues	(Haith,	Hazan,	&	Goodman,	1988)	
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demonstrated	that	3.5-month-old	infants	learn	to	fixate	at	the	location	where	an	
event	will	take	place	when	the	event	sequence	follows	a	regular	pattern,	whereas	
infants	of	6	to	9	weeks	of	age	do	not	yet	show	this	predictive	behavior	consistently	
(Robinson,	McCarty,	&	Haith,	1988).
Visual	 experience	with	 sequences	hence	 can	 later	 form	 the	basis	 for	predict-
ing	 future	 states	of	 these	observed	sequences,	 and	 this	 can	apply	 to	actions	as	
well.	A	recently	conducted	eye-tracking	study	in	our	 lab	tested	whether	infants	
can	predict	observed	action	sequences	based	on	statistical	 learning	(Monroy	et	
al.,	 submitted).	 Infants	 observed	 a	 continuous	 stream	 of	 actions	 consisting	 of	
6	 unique	 actions	 that	were	 repeated	 in	 the	 sequence.	 The	 stream	 consisted	 of	
several	action	pairs	which	followed	each	other	with	a	transitional	probability	of	
1,	meaning	that	that	action	was	always	followed	by	a	specific	next	action.	Other	
actions	were	presented	in	random	order	with	transitional	probabilities	ranging	
between	0.25	and	0.33.	Infants	displayed	more	frequent	anticipatory	looks	to	the	
upcoming	action	of	an	action	pair	than	to	any	of	the	other	potential	actions.	Half	
of	the	infants	were	not	presented	with	a	hand	performing	the	actions,	but	the	ac-
tions	took	place	without	any	human	involvement.	Infants	in	this	“event”	condition	
did	not	look	more	frequently	ahead	to	the	upcoming	second	action	of	pair.	This	
implies	that	infants	can	use	statistical	regularities	in	action	sequences	to	predict	
the	upcoming	action,	but	only	if	the	action	is	performed	by	a	human.
Purely	observational	experience	with	actions	can	lead	not	only	to	the	formation	
of	associations	between	two	visual	events,	it	can	also	lead	to	the	formation	of	vi-
suo-motor	associations.	But	how	can	an	observer	build	associations	between	her	
own	motor	code	necessary	to	carry	out	these	actions	and	the	visual	consequences	
of	another	person’s	action,	without	having	performed	this	action	herself?	This	can	
be	achieved	if	we	adopt	the	viewpoint	that	an	action	constitutes	movements	of	
the	actor	and	action	effects	which	manifest	themselves	in	the	sensory	domain.	In	
the	action	execution	domain,	the	thought	is	that	the	motor	code	for	an	action	and	
the	percept	stemming	from	the	action	effect	become	associated	when	frequently	
experiencing	both	the	action	and	its	effect	(Elsner	&	Hommel,	2001;	2004).	When	
the	association	is	formed,	the	action	effect	can	activate	the	motor	code	while	the	
previous	 actor	 is	 now	 inactive,	 only	 perceiving	 the	 action-effect.	 In	 the	 action	
observation	domain,	a	novel	action	effect	might	become	bound	to	a	motor	code	
in	the	observer	using	a	similar	principle:	the	observer	views	an	actor	making	a	
movement	which	 results	 in	 an	 action	 effect.	 The	 observer’s	motor	 system	gets	
activated	because	the	movements	are	in	her	motor	repertoire.	Over	trials,	an	as-
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sociation	 between	 the	motor	 code	 and	 the	 percept	 of	 the	 action	 effect	may	be	
established	 in	 the	observer,	 this	 time	without	having	performed	this	particular	
action	herself.	Hence,	if	a	person	is	capable	of	performing	an	action,	then	observ-
ing	 that	action	with	a	novel	action-effect	may	 lead	 to	associations	between	 the	
motor	code	and	the	action-effect	(Elsner	&	Aschersleben,	2003;	Paulus,	van	Dam,	
Hunnius,	Lindemann,	&	Bekkering,	2011;	Paulus,	Hunnius,	&	Bekkering,	2013).	In	
this	way,	even	if	the	observed	actions	are	never	performed	by	the	observer,	she	
might	still	have	acquired	sensorimotor	associations	of	these	actions,	which	may	
be	used	for	action	prediction.
Motor experience
As	already	briefly	touched	upon	in	the	previous	section,	motor	experience	might	
play	a	role	in	action	prediction.	To	explain	how	action	prediction	can	be	facilitated	
by	motor	 experience,	 I	will	 first	 review	 findings	on	motor	 system	 involvement	
in	action	perception,	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	role	of	motor	experience	in	
action	perception	development.	Based	on	 these	developmental	 accounts,	 I	will	
explain	how	motor	experience	might	influence	action	prediction.
Motor system involvement in Action Perception
During	the	last	decade,	many	studies	have	examined	the	role	of	the	motor	system	
in	action	perception.	Already	in	1954,	Gastaut	and	Bert	showed	that	action	percep-
tion	can	influence	the	electroencephalographic	(EEG)	signal	 in	a	similar	way	as	
action	 execution	 does.	 Likewise,	 theories	 proposing	 a	 link	 between	 action	 and	
perception	(see	e.g.	Prinz,	1987;	Greenwald,	1970;	Gibson,	1979;	James,	1890;	von	
Hofsten	&	Lee,	1982)	were	formulated	well	before	the	discovery	of	the	so-called	
mirror	neurons	 in	macaque	monkeys	 in	 the	 early	90’s	 of	 the	past	 century	 that	
provided	support	for	the	link	between	action	and	perception	on	single	cell	level	
(Rizzolatti	et	al.,	1996a;	Gallese	et	al.,	1996).	Mirror	neurons	received	their	name	
because	they	were	shown	to	respond	to	performed	as	well	as	to	observed	actions.	
A	debate	followed	on	whether	or	not	humans	also	possess	mirror	neurons	(Ling-
nau,	 Gesierich,	 &	 Caramazza,	 2009;	 Turella,	 Pierno,	 Tubaldi,	 &	 Castiello,	 2009;	
Hickok,	 2009;	Kilner,	Neal,	Weiskopf,	Friston,	&	Frith,	 2009;	Mukamel,	Ekstrom,	
Kaplan,	 Iacoboni,	 &	 Fried,	 2010).	 Now,	 there	 is	 relatively	 broad	 consensus	 that	
humans	 have	 a	mirror	 system	 (MS;	 Rizzolatti,	 2005;	 Aziz-Zadeh,	 Koski,	 Zaidel,	
Mazziotta,	 &	 Iacoboni,	 2006;	 Newman-Norlund,	 van	 Schie,	 van	 Zuijlen,	 &	 Bek-
kering,	 2007;	 Catmur,	 Walsh,	 &	 Heyes,	 2007),	 sometimes	 also	 called	 an	 action	
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observation	 network	 (AON;	 Cross,	 Kraemer,	 Hamilton,	 Kelley,	 &	 Grafton,2009;	
Neal	&	Kilner,	 2010),	which	 responds	 in	 a	 comparable	way	 to	observed	actions	
as	it	does	during	the	execution	of	actions.	Evidence	for	this	comes	from	studies	
using	different	neuroimaging	methods,	such	as	fMRI	(Binkofski	et	al.,	1999;	Buc-
cino	et	al.,	2001;	Iacoboni	et	al.,	1999;	Koski	et	al.,	2002;	Grèzes,	Armony,	Rowe,	&	
Passingham,	2003),	Positron	Emission	Tomography	(PET;	Grafton,	Arbib,	Fadiga,	
&	Rizzolatti,	 1996;	Rizzolatti	et	al.,	 1996b;	Grèzes,	Costes,	&	Decety,	 1998),	Tran-
scranial	Magnetic	Stimulation	 (TMS;	Heiser,	 Iacoboni,	Maeda,	Marcus,	&	Mazzi-
otta,	2003;	Fadiga,	Craighero,	&	Olivier,	2005;	Fadiga,	Fogassi,	Pavesi,&	Rizzolatti,	
1995;	Cattaneo,	Sandini,	&	Schwarzbach,	2010;	Catmur,	Walsh,	&	Heyes,	2007),	and	
electrophysiological	methods	including	magnetoencephalography,	(MEG;	Hari	et	
al.,	1998;	Nishitani	&	Hari,	2000;	2002;	Kilner,	Marchant,	&	Frith,	2009).	This	vast	
amount	of	evidence	brings	up	the	question	what	purpose	the	action	observation	
network	might	serve,	if	any.	If	the	action	observation	network	serves	to	facilitate	
action	understanding,	its	development	is	an	important	topic	to	study	when	one	
wants	to	unravel	the	mechanisms	behind	action	understanding.	That	is,	studying	
the	development	of	 the	action	observation	network	not	only	provides	 informa-
tion	about	 the	developmental	 timeline	of	 the	network,	 it	might	also	shed	more	
light	on	how	the	functions	of	the	network	come	into	place.
Only	a	handful	of	methods	can	be	used	to	measure	neural	motor	activation	in	
infants.	TMS,	MRI,	and	PET	are	considered	invasive	and	hence	not	preferable	for	
testing	children.	Though	MEG	is	not	invasive,	it	is	rarely	used	with	children	as	a	
special	and	expensive	helmet	is	required	to	allow	the	measurement	of	all	brain	
areas	 simultaneously.	 Hence,	 researchers	 assessing	 motor	 activation	 are	 left	
with	EEG	or	functional	Near	Infra-Red	Spectroscopy	(fNIRS)	as	relatively	direct	
measures	 of	 motor	 activation	 and	 with	 imitation	 as	 a	 more	 indirect	 measure.	
The	motor	resonance	account	of	imitation	postulates	that	if	the	motor	system	of	
an	 infant	 is	activated	while	observing	 the	model’s	actions,	 the	chance	 is	higher	
that	the	infant	will	 imitate	the	action	(Paulus	et	al.,	2011d).	Imitation	scores	can	
therefore	be	 a	measure	of	motor	 activation,	 though	only	 in	 an	 indirect	way,	 as	
the	relation	between	motor	activation	during	observing	the	model’s	actions	and	
the	subsequent	 imitation	does	not	need	to	be	one-to-one.	More	directly,	neural	
motor	activation	can	be	measured	using	EEG	and	fNIRS.	The	EEG	signal	contains	
oscillations	of	different	frequencies,	and	several	frequency	bands	have	been	as-
sociated	 with	 motor	 functioning.	 Specifically	 the	 mu-frequency	 band	 (around	
8-12	Hz	in	adults,	Pfurtscheller,	Neuper,	&	Krausz,	2000;	Kuhlman,	1978)	and	the	
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beta-frequency	band	(18-35	Hz	in	adults,	Stancák	Jr,,	&	Pfurtscheller,	1996;	Jasper	
&	Penfield,	1949;	Conway	et	al.,	1995)	display	reduced	power	when	the	owner	of	
the	brain	is	moving.	A	similar	suppression	of	the	mu-	and	beta-frequency	bands	
has	been	found	during	action	observation	(Pineda,	2005;	Muthukumaraswamy	&	
Johnson,	2004;	Muthukumaraswamy,	Johnson	&	McNair,	2004;	Cochin,	Barthelemy,	
Lejeune,	Roux,	&	Martineau,	1998;	Kilner	et	al.,	2009;	Hari	et	al.,	1998).	Develop-
mental	studies	have	shown	that	infants’	mu-frequency	power	(for	more	informa-
tion	 about	 the	 development	 of	 this	 frequency	band,	 see	Marshall,	 Bar-Haim,	&	
Fox,	2002)	decreases	during	action	execution	(Stroganova,	Orekhova,	&	Posikera,	
1999;	Southgate,	Johnson,	Karoui,	&	Csibra,	2010;	Marshall,	Young,	&	Meltzoff,	2011)	
as	well	as	during	action	observation	(Southgate	et	al.,	2010;	Marshall	et	al.,	2011;	
Nyström,	Ljunghammar,	Rosander,	&	von	Hofsten,	2011;	van	Elk,	van	Schie,	Hun-
nius,	Vesper,	&	Bekkering,	2008).
The development of the Action-Perception link
There	is	an	ongoing	debate	in	the	field	about	how	this	link	between	action	and	
perception	comes	into	place.	Some	scholars	claim	that	it	is	present	at	birth	(see	
e.g.	Lepage	&	Théoret,	2007;	Craighero,	Leo,	Umiltà,	&	Simion,	2011).	Others	pos-
tulate	that	the	link	comes	into	place	with	age	through	maturation,	independently	
from	experience	(see	e.g.,	Csibra,	2007;	Southgate,	2013).	As	a	third	alternative,	the	
perception-action	 link	may	 be	 acquired	 through	 sensorimotor	 experience	 (see	
e.g.,	Heyes,	2010;	Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2014).	A	fourth	approach,	which	entails	a	
strong	claim,	would	be	that	motor	experience	alone	is	enough	for	the	formation	
of	the	perception-action	link	(see	e.g.,	Casile	&	Giese,	2006).
The	empirical	test	for	a	nativist	viewpoint	is	to	investigate	newborns.	Frequently	
cited	evidence	for	an	inborn	action-perception	link	is	the	work	of	Andrew	Meltzoff	
on	neonatal	imitation	(Meltzoff	&	Moore,	1977;	1983).	The	argument	here	is	that	if	a	
newborn	is	capable	of	replicating	the	facial	movements	they	observe	in	others,	she	
must	possess	a	mechanism	that	matches	the	observed	actions	onto	the	newborn’s	
own	body	and	movements.	Meltzoff	and	Moore	(1997)	explicitly	leave	room	for	a	
combination	of	experience-dependent	and	experience-independent	viewpoints,	
as	they	mention	that	 infants	might	have	gained	sensorimotor	experience	in	the	
womb,	for	instance	by	experiencing	the	feelings	caused	by	moving	their	mouth.	
However,	other	nativists	seem	to	leave	no	role	for	active	experience	in	acquiring	
the	 perception-link.	 For	 example,	 neonates	 are	 expected	 to	 have	 sensorimotor	
links	 for	actions	 they	are	 incapable	of	performing	 themselves	 (Craighero	et	al.,	
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2011).	Although	 the	 studies	on	neonatal	 imitation	are	 frequently	 cited,	 scholars	
have	had	trouble	replicating	the	famous	findings	on	neonatal	imitation	(see	for	an	
overview	Anisfeld,	1991;	1996;	Ray	&	Heyes,	2011).	It	seems	especially	problematic	
that	infants	reliably	imitate	only	tongue	protrusions,	as	this	behavior	can	also	be	
a	result	of	heightened	arousal	levels	during	the	imitation	phase	(Jones,	2006).
Alternatively,	the	action-perception	link	may	come	into	place	through	matura-
tion	 (Csibra,	 2007;	 Southgate,	 2013).	 In	Csibra’s	 view,	 an	observer	 first	makes	a	
goal	inference	when	observing	an	action	outside	the	motor	system.	Based	on	this	
goal	 inference,	 the	action	 that	 is	necessary	 to	bring	about	 the	goal	 is	emulated	
in	the	motor	system.	Thus,	an	infant	can	link	perception	to	action	as	long	as	the	
observed	action	can	be	emulated	 in	 the	motor	system.	But	when	can	an	action	
and	when	 can	 an	 action	not	 be	 emulated?	 The	 theory	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 ex-
plicit	answer	to	this	question,	but	presumably,	the	infant	must	have	some	motor	
capabilities,	be	 they	sparse.	 If	an	actor	 is	observed	grasping	an	object	with	 the	
foot	and	the	observers	is	capable	of	achieving	the	same	goal,	namely	grasping	the	
object,	but	with	a	different	effector,	the	observer	is	still	capable	of	emulating	the	
action.	But	in	the	absence	of	motor	abilities	to	achieve	the	same	goal,	emulation	
should	not	be	possible.	A	related	view	can	be	found	in	Victoria	Southgate’s	work,	
who	theorizes	that	infants	can	use	their	motor	system	to	understand	and	predict	
actions	of	other	agents.	Infants	do	not	need	to	be	able	to	perform	the	observed	
action,	but	supposedly	rely	on	a	general	motor	plan	to	run	simulations	to	predict	
observed	actions.	In	this	way,	infants	can	also	use	their	motor	system	for	under-
standing	biologically	impossible	actions	(Southgate	&	Begus,	2013).	Development	
in	this	account	comes	from	general	motor	maturation.
A	 contrasting	 third	 view	 is	 that	 the	 action-perception	 link	 comes	 into	 place	
through	accumulation	of	sensorimotor	experiences.	The	most	explicit	mechanis-
tic	description	of	how	sensorimotor	experience	might	instantiate	the	perception-
action	link	is	elegantly	described	by	Cecilia	Heyes	(2010;	a	more	elaborate	descrip-
tion	can	be	found	in	Cook,	Bird,	Catmur,	Press,	&	Heyes,	2014).	The	link	between	
action	and	perception	is	thought	to	come	into	place	through	associative	learning	
based	on	the	accumulation	of	sensorimotor	experience.	That	 is,	when	a	person	
moves,	 both	 the	motor	 code	 necessary	 to	 perform	 the	 action	 and	 the	 percept	
resulting	from	the	motor	code	are	active.	If	the	sensory	code	and	the	motor	code	
are	 contingent	 and	 contiguous,	 an	 association	between	 the	motor	 and	 sensory	
code	is	established.	Based	on	the	acquired	association,	observation	of	the	action	
performed	by	someone	else	can	then	activate	the	associated	motor	code.	For	ac-
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tions	that	cannot	be	observed	by	the	person	performing	them,	such	as	frowning,	
the	association	is	supposedly	formed	upon	viewing	someone	else	imitating	you	
(Catmur	et	al.,	2007).	
The	suggestion	that	sensorimotor	experience	is	a	prerequisite	for	the	link	be-
tween	action	and	perception	leads	to	a	number	of	testable	hypotheses.	Amongst	
others,	the	association	between	a	motor	code	and	the	corresponding	perceptual	
code	of	an	action	must	be	exclusive:	performing	action	A	leads	to	sensory	conse-
quences	A,	and	as	a	result	an	association	will	be	formed	between	motor	code	A	
and	percept	A,	whereas	based	on	this	experience,	no	association	will	be	formed	
between	motor	 code	A	and	a	non-related	percept	B,	nor	will	 there	be	an	asso-
ciation	 formed	between	motor	code	B	and	percept	A.	 If	 this	 theory	holds,	 then	
experts	in	specific	sports	should	show	differential	motor	responses	to	observing	
their	own	sport	compared	to	novices.	This	approach	was	taken	by	Calvo-Merino	
and	colleagues	(Calvo-Merino,	Glaser,	Grèzes,	Passingham,	&	Haggard	2005),	who	
showed	that	the	motor	system	of	ballet	dancers	is	more	strongly	involved	when	
processing	 others’	 ballet	 compared	 to	 capoeira	 dance	moves,	whereas	 the	 op-
posite	holds	for	capoeira	dancers.	A	logical	question	flowing	from	these	results	
is	what	the	role	here	is	of	visual	experience,	as	ballet	dancers	not	only	have	more	
experience	performing	ballet	dance	moves,	they	also	perceive	ballet	dance	moves	
more	frequently.	In	a	follow-up	study,	ballet	dancers	observed	in	the	fMRI	scanner	
dance	moves	of	their	own	gender,	which	are	highly	motorically	familiar,	and	dance	
moves	of	the	opposite	gender,	which	are	highly	visually	familiar.	The	results	con-
firmed	that	motor	rather	than	visual	experience	strengthens	the	action-perception	
link,	as	ballet	dancers	of	both	genders	responded	stronger	for	own	compared	to	
opposite	gender	ballet	dance	moves	(Calvo-Merino,	Grèzes,	Glaser,	Passingham,	&	
Haggard,	2006).	Of	course,	these	were	dance	moves	acquired	prior	to	the	study,	in	
contrast	to	the	study	of	Emily	Cross	and	colleagues	(Cross,	Hamilton,	&	Grafton,	
2006),	who	tested	ballet	dancers	5	times	in	an	fMRI	experiment	during	a	5-week	
period	in	which	they	learnt	a	new	type	of	dance.	The	dancers	displayed	stronger	
motor	 activity	when	observing	 the	newly	 learned	dance	movements	 compared	
to	control	dance	moves,	and	the	effect	increased	with	training	duration.	A	com-
parable	question	has	been	addressed	in	a	study	with	14-	to	16-month-old	infants	
(van	Elk	et	al.,	2008b).	Infants	of	this	age	have	a	considerable	amount	of	crawling	
experience,	but	hardly	any	 to	no	walking	experience.	Mu-frequency	power	was	
significantly	lower	when	observing	crawling	than	when	observing	walking	move-
ments.	 Thus,	 experience	with	 crawling	 seems	 to	 affect	 the	motor	 involvement	
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when	 observing	 crawling.	 Indeed,	 individuals	with	 longer	 crawling	 experience	
also	 showed	 a	 stronger	 effect	 in	 the	 action	 observation	 setting.	 Differences	 in	
crawling	experience	were	due	to	the	natural	variability	in	crawling	onset.		In	line	
with	these	findings,	a	recently	published	study	testing	10-month-old	infants	has	
demonstrated	that	motor	training	but	not	visual	training	 induces	motor	activa-
tion	when	infants	later	perceive	the	sensory	consequences	of	the	trained	action	
(Gerson,	Hunnius,	&	Bekkering,	2014).
The role of Motor Experience for Action Prediction
The	 overwhelmingly	 large	 body	 of	 research	 showing	 that	 the	motor	 system	 is	
activated	during	action	observation	begs	 the	question	what	 the	 functional	 role	
of	 the	motor	 system	 is	 in	action	perception.	A	widely	accepted	 idea	 is	 that	 the	
motor	 system	 is	 involved	 in	 action	 perception	 to	 allow	 an	 observer	 to	 predict	
future	states	of	others’	actions	(Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Prinz,	2006;	Wolpert,	Doya,	&	
Kawato,	2003).	Where	did	the	idea	originate	that	the	motor	system	might	be	used	
for	action	prediction?	Studies	on	action	production	show	that	people	predict	the	
sensory	outcomes	of	their	own	actions	(Wolpert	&	Flanagan,	2001;	Wolpert,	Miall,	
&	Kawato,	1998;	Jordan	&	Rumelhart,	1992;	Wolpert,	Ghahramani,	&	Jordan,	1995).	
As	 sensory	 information	 arrives	 only	 after	 a	 relatively	 long	 delay	 at	 the	 central	
nervous	system,	feedback	of	the	sensory	system	comes	in	relatively	 late	during	
the	 action	 and	 relying	on	 such	 feedback	 is	 hence	not	 very	 effective.	Therefore,	
when	 initiating	movements,	 the	motor	 system	generates	predictions	 about	 the	
expected	 sensory	outcomes	of	 the	 initiated	movement.	These	predictions	 stem	
from	forward	models	(Wolpert	et	al.,	2003;	Wolpert	&	Flanagan,	2001)	which	are	
supposedly	 acquired	 through	 action	 experience.	 Moreover,	 sensory	 outcomes	
become	associated	with	motor	commands	through	sensorimotor	learning.	Once	
the	 associations	 are	 formed,	 they	 can	be	used	 in	 the	 forward	model	 to	predict	
upcoming	 sensory	 states.	 Empirical	 evidence	 for	 this	 mechanism	 stems	 from	
research	 with	 robots	 (Demiris	 &	 Dearden,	 2005)	 and	 adults	 (Sailer,	 Flanagan	
&	 Johansson,	 2005).	 An	 eye-tracking	 study	 of	 Flanagan	 and	 Johansson	 (2003)	
showed	that	adults’	gaze	behavior	for	observing	a	block-stacking	task	was	highly	
similar	to	gaze	behavior	when	performing	a	block-stacking	task.	Gaze	was	already	
focused	on	the	next	target	 location	before	the	hand	arrived	there	with	the	next	
block,	and	gaze	was	thus	predictive	both	in	action	execution	as	well	as	in	action	
observation.	It	is	fascinating	that	gaze	was	not	predictive	when	the	hand	was	not	
visible	in	the	observation	condition.	Apparently,	simulation	and	prediction	of	the	
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action	can	only	take	place	if	the	actor	can	be	observed.	Inspired	by	these	results,	
Falck-Ytter	and	colleagues	(2006)	tested	whether	infants	of	6	and	12	months	of	age	
would	display	similar	predictive	gaze	patterns	when	observing	an	actor	placing	an	
object	in	a	container.	While	12-month-olds	are	capable	of	reaching	and	grasping,	
and	putting	objects	in	buckets,	6-month-olds	are	not.	Based	on	their	motor	abili-
ties,	the	authors	expected	only	the	12-month-olds	to	predict	the	placing	action,	in	
contrast	 to	 the	6-month-olds.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 study	 revealed	 the	 12-	 but	not	
the	6-month-old	 infant	 indeed	 looked	at	 the	container	before	the	hand	arrived.	
Potentially,	prediction	of	an	observed	action	relies	on	motor	experience	with	this	
action.	Follow-up	studies	have	shown	similar	results:	infants	more	readily	make	
an	inference	about	the	end	location	of	an	action	if	the	action	is	within	their	mo-
tor	repertoire	(Kanakogi	&	Itakura	2011;	Cannon	&Woodward,	2012;	Gredebäck	&	
Kochukhova,	2010).
Summary
It	 becomes	 clear	 from	 the	 literature	 described	 above	 that	 there	 are	 multiple	
mechanisms	on	which	predictions	of	observed	actions	can	be	based.	In	principle,	
purely	visual	experience	might	be	enough	to	predict	the	future	states	of	ongoing	
actions.	However,	 a	 growing	body	 of	 literature	 suggests	 that	motor	 experience	
might	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 action	 prediction.	 Furthermore,	 abstract	 rules	 and	
knowledge	 about	 objects	 may	 inform	 action	 prediction	 as	 well.	 The	 current	
thesis	aims	to	shed	more	light	on	what	types	of	 information	from	the	observed	
actions	are	used	to	predict	future	states	of	the	action	(Chapters	2,	3,	4,	5,	and	6).	
Furthermore,	the	mechanisms	potentially	underlying	action	prediction	(Chapters	
2,	4,	5,	and	6)	and	the	development	of	action	prediction	(Chapters	4,	5,	and	6)	are	
examined.
To	that	end,	Chapter	2	describes	a	study	in	which	infants	observed	actors	lifting	
a	cup	to	the	mouth	or	a	phone	to	the	ear,	which	are	ordinary	actions.	The	infants	
also	observed	unusual	actions,	 in	which	the	actor	brought	a	cup	to	the	ear	or	a	
phone	to	the	mouth.	Infants	are	capable	of	predicting	where	actions	with	these	
objects	 normally	 end	 (Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	 2010),	 presumably	 through	 visual	
experience	with	these	actions.	Chapter	2	thus	provides	an	example	of	action	pre-
diction	based	on	previously	acquired	object-knowledge.
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Chapter	3	focuses	on	the	contribution	of	several	types	of	information	for	action	
prediction,	namely	the	role	of	contextual	information,	the	presence	or	absence	of	
a	distinct	target	object,	and	the	kinematics	of	the	actor.	To	further	elucidate	the	
role	of	 contextual	 information	 in	 the	development	of	action	prediction,	Chapter	
4	reports	a	study	on	two	groups	of	 infants	and	a	group	of	adults	who	observed	
an	 efficient	 and	 an	 inefficient	 action.	 In	 this	 study,	 the	 kinematics	 of	 the	 actor	
were	held	constant,	as	was	the	presence	and	location	of	the	target	object.	The	ef-
ficiency	of	the	action	was	defined	through	the	manipulation	of	the	context,	which	
afforded	walking	or	necessitated	a	relatively	inefficient	mode	of	locomotion	(i.e.	
crawling).	In	both	situations,	the	actor	crawled,	and	the	question	was	whether	the	
inefficiency	of	the	crawling	where	it	was	unnecessary	would	be	better	detected	
by	infants	capable	of	walking	compared	to	infants	who	had	crawling	but	no	walk-
ing	 experience.	 Chapter	 5	 depicts	 two	 experiments	 in	which	 the	 role	 of	motor	
experience	for	action	prediction	was	investigated.	If	prediction	of	a	specific	action	
requires	motor	experience	with	exactly	that	same	action,	then	an	action	like	walk-
ing	should	be	more	accurately	predicted	by	those	capable	of	walking	compared	to	
those	yet	incapable.	Similarly,	we	expected	in	Chapter	5	that	infants	who	are	able	
to	aim	at	and	press	small	buttons,	would	be	more	accurate	in	predicting	aiming	
actions.	Three	groups	of	infants	and	a	group	of	adults	observed	a	hand	aiming	for	
and	pressing	a	large	or	a	small	button.	The	movement	is	quicker	for	a	large	than	
for	a	small	button,	and	the	specific	question	in	Chapter	6	was	therefore	whether	
the	velocity	of	the	action	could	be	used	for	predicting	whether	a	button	would	be	
the	target	or	not.	If	motor	processes	underlie	these	speed-based	predictions,	then	
predictions	should	be	more	accurate	for	observers	capable	of	performing	the	ac-
tion	compared	to	those	yet	incapable.	The	chapters	describing	the	experimental	
results	(Chapters	2	to	6)	are	followed	by	a	summary	of	the	main	findings	and	a	
discussion	of	the	implications	of	the	findings	in	Chapter	7.

Chapter 2
Motor	Activation	During	Observation	
of	Unusual	Versus	Ordinary	Actions	in	
Infancy
Keywords: Infant;	EEG;	Action	prediction;	Motor	system
Based on:	Stapel,	J.	C.,	Hunnius,	S.,	van	Elk,	M.,	&	Bekkering,	H.	(2010).	Motor	
activation	during	observation	of	unusual	versus	ordinary	actions	in	infancy.	Social 
Neuroscience, 5,	451-460.
Abstract
Infants	make	predictions	about	actions	
they	observe	already	during	the	first	
year	of	life.	To	investigate	the	role	of	
the	motor	system	in	predicting	the	end	
state	of	observed	actions,	12-month-old	
infants	were	shown	movies	of	ordinary	
and	extraordinary	object-directed	actions.	
The	stimuli	displayed	a	female	actor	who	
picked	up	an	everyday	object	(a	cup	or	
a	phone)	and	brought	it	to	either	her	
mouth	or	her	ear.	In	this	way,	a	similar	
movement	could	be	ordinary	(e.g.,	cup	
to	mouth)	or	extraordinary	(e.g.,	phone	
to	mouth)	depending	on	the	object	used.	
Infants’	EEG	and	eye	movements	were	
recorded.	We	found	a	significantly	stronger	
motor	activation,	indicated	by	a	stronger	
desynchronization	in	the	mu-frequency	
band	over	fronto-central	areas,	during	
observation	of	extraordinary	compared	to	
ordinary	actions.	This	is	explained	within	
the	computational	framework	of	Kilner	
and	colleagues	(2007),	who	suggest	that	
the	motor	system	is	used	to	generate	pre-
dictions	about	actions	we	observe.	If	the	
observed	action	deviates	from	the	initially	
expected	path,	additional	predictions	have	
to	be	generated,	resulting	in	a	stronger	
motor	activation	during	perception	of	
extraordinary	actions.	In	sum,	it	appears	
that	from	early	in	life,	the	motor	system	is	
involved	in	making	predictions	about	how	
an	observed	action	will	end.
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Introduction
From	the	first	days	of	their	life,	infants	watch	their	environment	and	the	people	
acting	 in	 it.	 Recent	 research	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 infants	 form	 expectations	
and	make	predictions	about	others’	actions.	Looking	 time	studies,	 for	 instance,	
show	that	 infants	tend	to	 look	longer	at	actions	that	end	in	an	unexpected	way	
(Phillips,	Wellman,	&	Spelke,	2002;	Reid,	Csibra,	Belsky,	&	Johnson,	2007;	Wood-
ward,	1998).	Neuroimaging	studies	also	suggest	that	infants	respond	differently	
to	unexpected	action	endings	(e.g.,	Reid	et	al.,	2007,	2009).	Moreover,	 infants	as	
young	as	6	months	show	predictive	eye	movements	to	the	target	area	of	actions	
they	observe	(Falck-Ytter	et	al.,	2006;	Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010).	However,	which	
functional	mechanisms	underlie	 infants’	 action	predictions	 is	 still	 an	open	and	
intriguing	question.
Infants	take	account	of	situational	and	contextual	cues	 in	their	predictions	of	
action	goals.	For	instance,	infants	appear	to	have	expectations	about	where	an	ac-
tion	should	end	based	on	the	functional	objects	that	are	involved	in	the	action.	In	
a	recent	study	of	Hunnius	and	Bekkering	(2010),	infants	between	6	and	16	months	
of	 age	were	 presented	with	 stimulus	movies	 in	which	 a	 person	 brought	 three	
everyday	objects	(a	cup,	a	phone,	and	a	hair	brush)	to	either	the	normal	target	
area	associated	with	that	object	(a	cup	to	the	mouth,	a	phone	to	the	ear,	etc.)	or	
to	an	extraordinary	target	area	(e.g.,	a	cup	to	the	ear).	Infants	displayed	more	fre-
quent	predictive	looks	to	the	action	target	when	the	objects	were	brought	to	the	
ordinary	target	area.	Thus,	already	early	in	life	infants	form	expectations	about	
the	course	of	an	action	on	the	basis	of	their	knowledge	about	the	involved	objects.
How	do	infants	come	to	predict	the	goal	of	an	action	on	the	basis	of	the	different	
cues	 they	perceive?	Previous	research	has	shown	that	both	 in	adults	(e.g.,	Bor-
roni,	Montagna,	Cerri,	&	Baldissera,	2005;	Cochin,	Barthelemy,	Roux,	&	Martineau,	
1999;	Hari	et	al.,	1998)	as	well	as	in	infants	(Southgate,	Johnson,	Osborne,	&	Csibra,	
2009)	 the	motor	system	becomes	active	not	only	during	 the	execution	but	also	
during	the	perception	of	actions	(a	phenomenon	called	motor resonance).	More-
over,	a	large	body	of	literature	suggests	that	the	motor	system	may	be	crucial	in	
the	prediction	of	action	goals	during	both	action	observation	and	execution	(see,	
e.g.,	Csibra,	2007;	Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Prinz,	2006;	Wolpert	&	Flanagan,	2001).	For	
actions	 to	be	executed	 smoothly,	we	need	 to	make	predictions	and	 cannot	 rely	
solely	 on	 feedback	 from	 the	 sensory	 system	 as	 this	would	 simply	 be	 too	 slow.	
Therefore,	the	motor	system	is	thought	to	function	through	forward	and	inverse	
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models	(Wolpert	et	al.,	1998).	These	models,	which	predict	the	course	of	an	action,	
need	 to	 integrate	 information	 about	 the	 environment,	 such	 as	 objects	 that	 are	
acted	upon.	The	same	models	that	enable	action	execution	to	run	smoothly	can	be	
used	to	generate	predictions	about	actions	we	observe.	Previous	electroencepha-
lography	(EEG)	studies	indicate	that	the	motor	system	is	involved	in	a	predictive	
manner	during	action	observation,	as	motor-related	EEG	components	appear	to	
be	modulated	 ahead	 of	 time	 (Kilner,	 Vargas,	 Duval,	 Blakemore,	 &	 Sirigu,	 2004;	
Southgate	et	 al.,	 2009).	Kilner	and	colleagues	 (2007)	proposed	a	 computational	
model	of	how	the	mirror	neuron	system	(MNS)	can	generate	predictions	of	which	
goal	 is	 driving	 an	 observed	 action.	 The	 model,	 which	 functions	 as	 a	 Bayesian	
network,	strives	to	minimize	the	error	between	the	predicted	action	path	and	the	
observed	action	path.	The	predictions	about	what	an	action	should	look	like	given	
an	assumed	goal	are	thought	to	be	generated	by	the	motor	system.	During	action	
observation,	the	MNS	continuously	checks	whether	the	goal	ascribed	to	the	action	
still	matches	what	is	being	observed.	In	the	case	where	an	unusual	or	unexpected	
action	 is	 observed,	 there	 is	 an	 initial	mismatch	 between	 the	 observed	 and	 the	
predicted	action,	and	subsequently	new	predictions	need	to	be	generated.	This	is	
thought	to	result	in	stronger	motor	activation.	In	sum,	the	model	implies	stronger	
motor	activation	during	observation	of	 actions	 that	are	hard	 to	understand,	or	
that	unfold	differently	than	assumed	beforehand.
Motor	activation	can	be	measured	with	several	neuroimaging	methods.	One	of	
the	most	frequently	used	neuroimaging	methods	for	studying	the	infant	brain	is	
EEG	because	of	its	noninvasiveness	and	because	it	imposes	only	minimal	restric-
tions	on	the	normal	behavior	of	the	infant.	In	the	EEG,	motor	activation	becomes	
apparent	 as	 a	desynchronization	 in	 the	mu-frequency	band.	Oscillations	 in	 the	
mu-frequency	band	are	 thought	 to	originate	 from	sensorimotor	 cortex	and	are	
found	maximal	over	central	and	precentral	sites	(Pineda,	2005).	Desynchroniza-
tion	 in	 the	mu-frequency	 band	 overlying	 central	 sites	 has	 been	 demonstrated	
during	action	observation	both	in	adults	(e.g.,	Gastaut	&	Bert,	1954;	Muthukuma-
raswamy	et	al.,	2004)	and	in	infants	(Southgate	et	al.,	2009;	van	Elk	et	al.,	2008b)	
and	appears	to	be	stronger	 for	object-directed	actions	than	for	actions	without	
objects	(Muthukumaraswamy	et	al.,	2004;	Southgate	et	al.,	2010).	Moreover,	mu-
desynchronization	has	been	shown	to	be	stronger	if	the	observed	action	is	well	
established	in	the	infant’s	motor	repertoire	(van	Elk	et	al.,	2008b).
It	was	the	aim	of	this	study	to	investigate	whether	the	motor	system	is	differen-
tially	activated	during	infants’	perception	of	ordinary	and	extraordinary	actions.	
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Twelve-month-old	infants	were	repeatedly	presented	with	stimulus	movies	dis-
playing	ordinary	or	extraordinary	actions	(e.g.,	an	actor	bringing	a	cup	or	a	phone	
either	to	her	mouth	or	to	her	ear).	Infants’	EEG	was	measured	and	concurrently,	
their	eye	movements	were	registered	to	investigate	overt	action	predictions.	By	
measuring	 motor	 activation	 in	 response	 to	 action	 observation,	 as	 reflected	 in	
desynchronization	 in	 the	mu-frequency	 band	 of	 the	 EEG,	we	 aimed	 to	 test	 the	
following	hypothesis.	If	motor	system	activation	reflects	the	discrepancy	between	
the	initial	prediction	of	the	action	on	the	basis	of	previous	knowledge	and	the	ac-
tual	observed	action,	we	hypothesize	that	stronger	motor	activation	would	occur	
for	observation	of	extraordinary	compared	to	ordinary	actions.	That	is,	based	on	
previously	acquired	object	knowledge	infants	have	expectations	about	the	course	
and	target	of	the	observed	actions	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010).	In	a	case	where	
the	 observed	 action	 does	 not	match	 the	 infant’s	 expectations,	 new	predictions	
have	to	be	generated,	thereby	resulting	in	a	stronger	motor	activation.
METHOD
Participants
In	total,	36	12-month-old	infants	participated	in	the	study.	Measuring	EEG	and	eye	
movements	in	12-month-olds	in	parallel	turned	out	to	be	difficult.	Twelve	infants	
contributed	sufficient	artifact-free	EEG	trials	to	be	included	in	the	EEG	analyses.	
The	mean	age	of	 this	 group	was	 12	months	 and	 5	days	 (SD =	 10	days),	 and	 the	
group	comprised	8	girls.	For	 11	 infants,	 sufficient	eye	movement	data	were	col-
lected	during	the	experiment	(i.e.,	gaze	information	present	for	more	than	50%	
of	the	testing	time).	This	concerned	7	girls,	and	the	mean	age	of	this	group	was	12	
months	and	5	days	(SD =	11	days).	Seven	infants	contributed	both	eye	movement	
data	and	EEG	data.
Procedure
Infants	were	tested	 in	an	action	observation	setting.	During	stimulus	presenta-
tion,	their	EEG	and	their	eye	movements	were	recorded	with	a	Tobii	eye-tracking	
system	(Tobii	 1750,	Tobii	Technology,	Danderyd,	Sweden).	The	child	was	seated	
in	a	regular	car	seat	at	approximately	60	cm	distance	from	the	computer	screen.	
Before	testing,	the	eye-tracker	was	calibrated	using	the	Clearview	software	(Tobii	
Technology).	A	nine-point	calibration	procedure	was	used	in	which	at	every	posi-
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tion	of	a	screen-wide	3	x	3	grid	expanding–	contracting	circles	appeared	on	a	black	
background.	To	draw	the	infants’	attention	to	the	calibration	stimuli,	the	circles	
were	presented	together	with	a	sound.	 If	seven	or	more	points	were	calibrated	
successfully,	 the	 experiment	 was	 started.	 Otherwise	 the	 calibration	 procedure	
was	repeated	for	the	missing	calibration	points	in	the	grid.
Two	movement	tilt	sensors	(CW60A/30;	Comus	Group	of	Companies,	Tongeren,	
Belgium)	were	 attached	 to	 the	 infant’s	 arm	and	 leg	 to	 record	 limb	movements	
during	the	experiment.	Trials	during	which	the	infant	moved	were	excluded	from	
the	EEG	analysis,	as	body	movements	would	confound	the	data.	The	experiment	
was	conducted	using	a	custom-made	stimulus	presentation	and	data	registration	
program	 implemented	 in	 Presentation	 12.1	 (Neurobehavioral	 Systems,	 Albany,	
CA,	USA).	In	addition,	the	test	sessions	were	video-recorded	and	coded	offline	to	
exclude	 trials	during	which	 the	 infant	did	not	attend	the	screen	(offline	coding	
was	necessary	when	eye	gaze	was	not	captured	by	the	eye-tracker),	and	when	the	
child	was	moving	(offline	coding	was	necessary	when	 infants	had	removed	the	
movement	sensors).
Stimulus material
Infants	watched	movies	of	 approximately	6	 s	 in	which	a	 female	actor	who	was	
sitting	at	a	table	grasped	an	object	with	her	right	hand	and	brought	it	either	to	her	
mouth	or	to	her	ear.	The	objects	were	a	cup	and	a	phone.	These	are	both	common	
everyday	objects	with	distinct	target	areas	(mouth,	ear).	In	the	Ordinary	action	
condition,	the	phone	was	brought	to	the	ear	and	the	cup	to	the	mouth	(see	Figure	
1a	for	an	example),	whereas	in	the	Extraordinary	action	condition	the	phone	was	
brought	to	the	mouth	and	the	cup	to	the	ear	(see	Figure	1b).	The	actor’s	looking	
behavior	was	kept	constant	between	the	conditions,	and	she	never	looked	straight	
into	 the	camera.	All	stimulus	movies	had	a	similar	 time	course:	First,	 the	actor	
was	looking	at	the	object	in	front	of	her	without	any	movement	for	about	1	s;	then	
the	actor	grasped	the	object,	 lifted	it	and	brought	it	either	to	her	mouth	or	ear.	
When	the	object	reached	its	target	area,	the	actor	held	the	object	in	this	end	state	
for	approximately	1	s.	The	movement	path	of	the	grasping	and	lifting	was	similar	
in	all	conditions,	and	only	after	the	object	reached	approximately	the	height	of	the	
actor’s	head	did	the	paths	diverge,	depending	on	the	end	location.	For	each	of	the	
four	conditions,	six	different	movies	were	created	with	small	variations	to	keep	
the	infant	 interested	(6	different	phones	and	6	different	cups).	Each	movie	was	
presented	5	times,	and	the	stimuli	were	presented	in	blocks	of	10	movies	of	the	
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same	condition.	An	advantage	of	presenting	ordinary	and	extraordinary	actions	
in	different	blocks	is	that	it	enhances	semantic	processing	in	contrast	to	random	
presentation,	which	is	thought	to	evoke	processing	via	a	more	automatic	visuo-
motor	route	(Tessari,	Canessa,	Ukmar,	&	Rumiati,	2007;	Tessari	&	Rumiati,	2004).	
Within	blocks,	the	order	of	the	trials	was	randomized.	All	stimulus	material	was	
recorded	with	two	female	actors.	The	infants	always	watched	one	actor	display-
ing	the	ordinary	actions	and	the	other	one	displaying	the	extraordinary	actions.	
This	contingency	in	the	stimulus	presentation	was	intended	to	give	the	infants’	
predictive	system	a	maximal	chance	to	work,	as	predictions	of	action	end	states	
are	always	based	on	a	combination	of	the	action	itself	and	contextual	information	
(van	Rooij,	Haselager,	&	Bekkering,	2008).	Which	actor	displayed	the	correct	ac-
tions	was	counterbalanced	between	participants.
The	visual	 angle	of	 the	movies	was	 21.7°	 in	 the	 vertical	 direction	 and	 21.5°	 in	
the	horizontal	 direction.	The	 angles	 of	 the	movements	were	 approximately	 14°	
(vertical)	and	12°	(horizontal).
A
B
Figure 1: Example	stimuli	used	in	the	experiment.	(A)	Snapshots	taken	from	a	stimulus	used	in	the	
Ordinary	×	Mouth	condition.	(B)	Snapshots	taken	from	a	stimulus	used	in	the	Extraordinary	×	Ear	condition.
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Eye-tracking
To	register	eye	movements,	an	infrared	eye-tracking	system	which	was	integrated	
in	a	17-inch	computer	screen	was	used.	The	eye-tracker	recorded	the	infants’	gaze	
data	continuously	with	a	sampling	rate	of	50	Hz.
Analysis of the eye movement data
The	amount	of	eye	movement	data	per	infant	was	considered	to	be	sufficient	for	
analysis	 if	 gaze	 data	were	 available	 for	 at	 least	 half	 of	 the	 testing	 time.	As	 the	
eye-tracking	system	is	sensitive	to	head	movements,	for	some	babies	eye	data	was	
gathered	during	only	a	part	of	 the	experiment.	On	average,	 15	 to	 18	 trials	could	
be	included	per	condition	and	participant.	A	visual	anticipation	was	defined	as	a	
fixation	in	the	target	area	of	the	action	before	the	object	reached	this	area.	The	co-
ordinates	of	the	mouth	and	ear	target	areas	(areas	of	interest,	AoIs)	were	defined	
for	each	individual	stimulus	movie.	The	size	and	dimensions	of	these	rectangular	
target	areas	were	 identical	 for	each	condition	(see	Figure	2).	For	each	stimulus	
movie,	the	lifting	phase	was	identified	during	which	the	object	was	lifted	from	the	
table	towards	the	target	area.	The	end	of	the	lifting	phase	was	defined	as	the	last	
frame	before	the	object	entered	the	mouth	area.	For	each	trial,	it	was	determined	
whether	 the	 infant	was	attending	 to	 the	actor	and	 the	action	during	 the	 lifting	
Figure 2:  Areas	of	interest	for	the	eye	movement	analysis.	The	blue	rectangle	depicts	the	mouth	area	used	
for	the	analysis	of	the	anticipatory	looks;	the	red	rectangle	depicts	the	ear	area.
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phase.	Then,	whether	the	proportion	of	the	trials	during	which	the	infant	showed	
an	 anticipatory	 fixation	 was	 different	 for	 Ordinary	 vs.	 Extraordinary	 stimulus	
movies	was	determined.	A	custom-made	software	 tool	 (GSA,	Donders	 Institute,	
Nijmegen,	 The	 Netherlands)	 was	 used	 to	 process	 the	 eye	movement	 data	 and	
define	whether	 and	when	 fixations	were	 in	 the	AoIs.	 To	 test	 for	 differences	 in	
frequency of anticipatory looks between	Ordinary	and	Extraordinary	actions,	a	2	
x	2	repeated-measures	analysis	of	variance	(ANOVA)	was	conducted,	with	Target	
area	as	a	second	independent	factor.	Due	to	the	limited	overall	number	of	visual	
anticipations,	latencies of anticipatory looks could	only	be	analyzed	with	the	data	
collapsed	over	the	two	Target	area	conditions.	The	latency	of	the	eye	movements	
was	defined	as	the	difference	between	arrival	of	the	eye	gaze	at	the	AoI	and	the	
object	reaching	the	area	of	interest.	A	paired-samples	t-test	was	used	to	test	for	
differences	 in	 the	 latencies	of	anticipatory	 looks	between	the	Ordinary	and	the	
Extraordinary	action	conditions.
Electrophysiological recording
EEG	 was	 recorded	 using	 a	 BrainCap	 with	 30	 Ag/AgCl	 electrodes	 (EasyCap,	
Herrsching,	 Germany)	with	 a	 layout	 following	 the	 10/20	 system.	 All	 electrodes	
were	referenced	online	to	the	left	mastoid	and	re-referenced	offline	to	the	linked	
mastoids.	A	Brain-Amp	AC	amplifier	using	a	bandpass	filter	of	0.1–80	Hz	was	used	
to	record	the	EEG	signal	at	a	sampling	rate	of	500	Hz.	The	data	were	analyzed	with	
Brain	Vision	Analyzer	(Brain	Products,	Gilching,	Germany).
Analysis of the EEG data
Artifact	rejection	was	done	manually	on	EEG	segments	that	started	with	the	lift-
ing	of	the	object	and	ended	after	1200	ms.	This	interval	was	based	on	the	average	
duration	of	 the	 lifting	phase	and	corresponded	 to	 the	 time	window	of	 the	eye-
movement	analyses1.
Infants	 were	 included	 in	 the	 EEG	 analyses	 if	 their	 EEG	 dataset	 contained	 at	
least	 9	 trials	 per	 condition	 that	met	 the	 following	 criteria:	 (1)	 attention	 to	 the	
stimulus	(based	on	eye-movement	data,	or,	if	missing,	on	the	video	recording	of	
the	test	session),	(2)	no	limb	movements,	(3)	no	EEG	artifacts	(such	as	eye	blinks,	
1	 In	the	eye	movements	analyses,	the	exact	time	frame	could	be	used	from	the	start	of	the	lifting	
movement	to	the	last	frame	before	the	object	entered	the	AoI.	This	resulted	in	small	differences	
in	window	of	analysis	for	each	stimulus.	For	the	EEG	analyses,	fixed	time-windows	were	used	
instead,	because	frequency	analysis	requires	fixed-length	intervals.
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electrode	 drifts,	 or	 broadband	noise).	 Over	 each	 trial,	 fast	 Fourier	 transforma-
tions	(FFTs)	were	conducted	with	the	maximal	spectral	resolution	(.833	Hz)	over	
the	1200	ms	interval.	For	each	infant,	the	peak	in	the	power	of	the	mu-frequency	
band	was	identified	by	averaging	the	power	over	conditions	and	over	the	central	
electrodes	(FC1,	FC2,	FC5,	FC6,	C3,	Cz,	C4,	CP1,	CP2,	CP5,	CP6)	and	plotting	the	log	
of	 the	 power	 against	 the	 frequency	 axis	 (see	 Figure	 3a).	 Infants	 showed	 clear	
peaks	in	the	lower	frequency	bands,	whereas	in	the	higher	frequency	bands	large	
individual	differences	were	observed.	Closer	inspection	of	the	region	where	the	
mu-frequency	band	could	be	expected	(see	Figure	3a)	revealed	that	eight	of	the	
twelve	participants	showed	a	peak	at	the	central	electrode	sites	around	7.5	or	8.3	
Hz.	This	is	in	line	with	previous	research,	which	shows	that	the	power	in	the	mu-
frequency	band	peaks	around	8	Hz	at	the	age	of	12	months	or	somewhat	below	
this	frequency	(Marshall	et	al.,	2002;	Stroganova	et	al.,	1999).	
To	further	substantiate	the	origin	of	the	observed	peaks	in	the	spectra,	the	topo-
graphical	distribution	of	the	average	activity	in	the	mu-frequency	band	was	also	
plotted	(see	Figure	3b).	This	illustrates	that	the	peak	of	the	mu-frequency	band	
showed	 a	 broad	 scalp	 distribution,	 and	was	most	 prominent	 at	 fronto-central	
electrode	sites.
Due	 to	 the	relatively	small	number	of	artifact-free	 trials,	data	were	collapsed	
over	the	Target	area	conditions	for	the	analysis	of	the	experimental	manipulation.	
Grand	averages	of	the	FFTs	were	calculated	for	both	the	Ordinary	and	Extraordi-
nary	conditions.	The	difference	between	the	grand	averages	of	the	two	conditions	
was	plotted	(see	Figure	5).	Electrodes	of	 interest,	overlying	fronto-central	sites,	
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were	analyzed	 in	a	repeated-measures	ANOVA	with	Action	Type	(Ordinary	and	
Extraordinary)	as	within-subjects	factor.
Results
Visual anticipations to the target areas
First,	it	was	investigated	whether	infants	showed	anticipatory	looks	to	the	target	
area	of	the	actions	they	observed	and	whether	the	frequency	of	anticipatory	looks	
differed	between	ordinary	and	extraordinary	action	movies.	The	mean	percent-
age	 of	 visual	 anticipations	 anticipations	 to	 the	mouth	was	 27.2	%	 (SD =	9.1)	 in	
the	Ordinary	Mouth	condition	and	27.2%	(SD =	21.2)	in	the	Extraordinary	Mouth	
condition	(see	Figure	4a).	Anticipations	to	the	ear	occurred	less	frequently	(see	
Figure	 4b).	 For	 the	Ordinary	Ear	 condition,	 anticipatory	 looks	 towards	 the	 ear	
were	 observed	 in	 2.0%	 (SD =	 6.2)	 of	 the	 attended	 trials;	 for	 the	 Extraordinary	
Ear	condition,	visual	anticipations	towards	the	ear	were	observed	on	average	in	
4.1%	of	the	cases	(SD =	3.7).	A	2	×	2	repeated-measures	ANOVA	was	conducted	on	
trials	in	which	the	infant	attended	to	the	action,	with	Action	Type	(Ordinary	vs.	
Extraordinary	action)	and	Target	area	(Mouth	vs.	Ear)	as	independent	factors	and	
as	dependent	variable	the	frequency	of	anticipation.	The	analysis	yielded	a	main	
effect	of	Target	area,	with	more	frequent	anticipations	to	the	mouth	compared	to	
A B
Figure 4: Frequency	of	visual	anticipations.	(A)	The	percentage	of	anticipatory	looks	to	the	mouth	in	the	
stimuli	with	the	target	area	Mouth	for	Ordinary	(left	line)	and	Extraordinary	actions	(right	line).	(B)	The	
percentage	of	anticipatory	looks	to	the	ear	in	the	stimuli	with	the	target	area	Ear	for	Ordinary	(left	line)	and	
Extraordinary	actions	(right	line).
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the	ear,	F(1,	10)	=	59,	p <	.001,	Greenhouse-Geisser	corrected).	No	other	significant	
effects	were	found.	
When	comparing	the	latencies	of	anticipatory	eye	movements,	infants	showed	
no	 difference	 between	 the	 Ordinary	 (M =	 –117	ms;	 SD =	 300)	 compared	 to	 the	
Extraordinary	(M =	–140	ms;	SD =	309)	action	condition,	t(10)	=	25,	p =	0.8.
Mu-suppression in the EEG signal during action observation
It	 was	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 study	 to	 examine	 whether	 the	 EEG	 signal	 in	 the	 mu-
frequency	range	was	more	strongly	suppressed	during	observation	of	ordinary	
actions	compared	to	extraordinary	actions.	Therefore,	the	grand	average	FFT	of	
the	Ordinary	action	condition	was	subtracted	from	the	grand	average	FFT	of	the	
Extraordinary	action	condition.	For	the	frequencies	of	interest	(7.5	to	8.3	Hz),	in-
fants	showed	a	stronger	desynchronization	in	the	Extraordinary	action	condition	
compared	to	the	Ordinary	action	condition	and	this	effect	was	most	pronounced	
over	 fronto-central	 sites	 (see	 Figure	 5).	 The	 power	 in	 the	mu-frequency	 band	
measured	 at	 these	 fronto-central	 electrodes	was	used	 as	 a	 dependent	 variable	
in	a	repeated-measures	ANOVA	with	Action	type	(Ordinary	vs.	Extraordinary	ac-
tion),	Hemisphere	(Left	vs.	Right),	and	Front-to-Back	(F3–F4,	FC1–FC2,	C3–C4)	as	
within-subjects	factors.	A	main	effect	of	Action	type	was	found,	F(1,	11)	=	5.9,	p =	
.04,	Greenhouse-Geisser	corrected,	with	lower	power	in	the	Extraordinary	action	
7.5 - 8.3 Hz
-1.4 µV2 2.5 µV20 µV2
Extraordinary - Ordinary action
Figure 5: Topoplot	displaying	the	difference	in	power	between	the	Extraordinary	and	the	Ordinary	action	
conditions	in	the	frequency	band	from	7.5	to	8.3	Hz.	The	white	dots	indicate	the	electrodes	that	were	
included	in	the	analysis.
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condition	(M =	5.4	µV2;	SD =	2.9)	compared	to	the	Ordinary	action	condition	(M 
=	6.3	µV2;	SD =	3.7).	No	other	main	effects	were	found.	Moreover,	there	were	no	
significant	 interactions,	 which	 suggests	 that	 the	 effect	 was	 evenly	 distributed	
over	both	hemispheres.
Discussion
This	study	investigated	how	infants	perceive	ordinary	and	extraordinary	actions	
and	examined	the	role	of	motor	activation	during	the	processing	of	these	actions.	
Infants	observed	object-directed	actions:	A	cup	and	a	phone	were	brought	either	
to	 the	 ordinary	 target	 location	 (cup	 to	mouth;	 phone	 to	 ear)	 or	 to	 an	 unusual	
target	 location	 (cup	 to	 ear;	 phone	 to	 mouth).	 Infants	 showed	 stronger	 motor	
activation	during	the	observation	of	extraordinary	compared	to	ordinary	actions,	
as	reflected	 in	a	stronger	desynchronization	of	 the	mu-frequency	band	of	 their	
EEG.	These	results	suggest	that	the	infants’	motor	system	is	involved	in	process-
ing	observed	actions,	but	more	importantly,	their	motor	system	seems	to	respond	
differently	for	ordinary	and	extraordinary	actions.
When	watching	 the	 stimulus	movies,	 the	 infants	 in	 our	 study	 showed	 visual	
anticipations	to	the	target	area	of	the	ongoing	action.	This	is	in	line	with	the	find-
ings	of	Hunnius	and	Bekkering	(2010),	who	found	that	infants	from	6	months	of	
age	on	display	predictive	looks	to	the	target	area	of	actions	they	observe.	In	their	
study,	ordinary	actions	 led	 to	more	 frequent	anticipatory	 looks	 than	extraordi-
nary	actions.	 In	the	current	study,	however,	no	significant	difference	was	found	
in	the	frequency	of	anticipatory	looks.	Infants	showed	predictive	looks	about	as	
frequently	for	the	ordinary	as	the	extraordinary	actions,	which	might	be	due	to	
the	 fact	 that	 they	 learned	 about	 the	 unfamiliar	 object–target	 associations	 as	 a	
consequence	of	the	large	number	of	stimulus	repetitions.	Indications	of	learning	
effects	had	been	present	in	the	original	study	of	Hunnius	and	Bekkering	(2010),	
but	 less	 pronounced.	 In	 the	 current	 study,	 learning	might	 have	 had	 a	 stronger	
effect,	 as	EEG	experiments	 require	 far	more	 trials	 than	 eye-movement	 studies.	
In	this	EEG	experiment,	infants	were	presented	with	up	to	30	repetitions	of	each	
action	 compared	 to	 a	maximum	of	 9	 in	 the	 eye-tracking	 study	 of	Hunnius	 and	
Bekkering	(2010).
The	current	study	was	designed	to	study	the	neural	correlates	that	distinguish	
ordinary	actions	from	extraordinary	actions.	As	mentioned	before,	desynchroni-
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zation	in	the	mu-frequency	band	reflects	motor	activation	(Gastaut	&	Bert,	1954;	
Muthukumaraswamy	et	al.,	2004).	Though	in	the	current	study	the	mu-frequency	
desynchronization	 during	 action	 observation	 appeared	 rather	 frontal,	 similar	
scalp-distributions	 of	 motor	 related	 effects	 have	 been	 found	 before	 (see,	 e.g.,	
van	Elk,	 van	 Schie,	 Zwaan	&	Bekkering,	 2010;	 Pfurtscheller,	 Brunner,	 Schlögl,	&	
Lopes	da	Silva,	2006;	displaying	individual	variation	in	topoplots	in	mu-frequency	
desynchronization).	Furthermore,	 in	our	 study,	 the	power	 in	 the	mu-frequency	
band	averaged	over	all	conditions	was	found	maximal	at	frontocentral	sites.
When	 comparing	 brain	 responses	 to	 extraordinary	 actions	 and	 ordinary	 ac-
tions,	we	found	a	stronger	desynchronization	in	the	mu-frequency	band	during	
perception	of	extraordinary	actions.	The	finding	that	infants	respond	differently	
for	actions	with	uncommon	end	states	is	in	line	with	the	literature.	Infants	appear	
to	have	expectations	about	the	end	state	of	other	people’s	actions	at	early	ages.	
For	instance,	when	confronted	with	an	action	end	state	which	deviates	from	the	
usual	pattern,	infants	display	longer	looking	times	(see	e.g.,	Phillips	et	al.,	2002;	
Reid	et	al.,	2007;	Woodward,	1998).	Furthermore,	as	previously	mentioned,	infants	
have	 been	 shown	 to	 visually	 anticipate	 to	 the	 target	 area	 of	 observed	 actions	
(Falck-Ytter	et	al.,	2006;	Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010).	In	addition	to	this	behavioral	
evidence,	a	number	of	developmental	neuroimaging	studies	show	findings	in	line	
with	our	results	that	 infants	have	expectations	about	how	actions	they	observe	
should	end.	Reid	and	colleagues	 (2009),	 for	 instance,	 showed	 that	9-month-old	
infants	differentiate	between	ordinary	 and	extraordinary	 action	 end	 states.	 In-
fants	displayed	an	N400-like	pattern	when	observing	an	extraordinary	action	end	
state,	which	indicates	that	their	expectations	as	to	how	the	action	would	end	were	
violated.	Moreover,	 infants	 appeared	 to	 notice	 if	 an	 action	was	 stopped	 before	
its	goal	had	been	reached,	as	indicated	by	more	gamma-activity	over	left	frontal	
regions	during	observation	of	incomplete	actions	(Reid	et	al.,	2007).
Previous	research	has	thus	demonstrated	that	infants	make	predictions	about	
end	 states	 of	 actions	 they	 observe.	 However,	 which	 processes	 underlie	 these	
predictions	has	not	been	established	 to	date.	The	present	 study	 is	 in	 line	with	
the	notion	that	the	motor	system	might	play	a	role	in	action	prediction	(see	e.g.,	
Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Prinz,	2006;	Wolpert	&	Flanagan,	2001;	Schütz-Bosbach,	&	Prinz,	
2007).	According	to	the	predictive	coding	framework	(Kilner	et	al.,	2007),	actions	
that	develop	differently	 than	expected	beforehand	should	elicit	 stronger	motor	
activation,	 because	 the	 predictions	 need	 to	 be	 updated	 to	match	 the	predicted	
visual	 scene	with	 the	 actual	 visual	 input.	 Our	 results	 are	 compatible	with	 this	
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framework,	as	the	infants	showed	stronger	motor	activation	during	observation	
of	extraordinary	actions	compared	to	ordinary	actions.	Moreover,	the	difference	
in	motor	activation	occurred	during	the	lifting	movement	of	the	object,	so	while	
the	action	was	still	unfolding.	The	timing	of	this	effect	corresponds	with	the	time-
window	in	which	one	would	expect	the	motor	system	to	be	at	work	to	generate	
predictions	about	how	the	action	will	develop	and	how	it	will	end.	Importantly,	
the	effects	in	the	mu-frequency	band	cannot	be	attributed	to	differences	in	overt	
eye	 movements,	 because	 no	 quantitative	 differences	 were	 found	 between	 the	
visual	anticipations	in	the	two	conditions.
Consistent	with	our	findings,	recent	empirical	research	with	adults	has	shown	
that	 the	observation	of	actions	 that	deviate	 from	what	participants	would	nor-
mally	have	expected	is	associated	with	stronger	motor	resonance.	Koelewijn	and	
colleagues,	for	instance,	found	a	stronger	desynchronization	in	the	beta-frequency	
band	originating	from	motor	areas	while	participants	were	watching	actions	that	
were	clearly	mistakes	compared	to	correct	actions	(Koelewijn,	van	Schie,	Bekker-
ing,	Oostenveld,	&	Jensen,	2008).	This	modulation	of	the	beta-band	might	reflect	
a	stronger	motor	activation	in	response	to	deviant	action	stimuli.	Also,	Manthey,	
Schubotz,	 and	 von	 Cramon	 (2003)	 describe	 a	 stronger	 motor	 activation	 when	
participants	were	watching	movements	that	differed	from	what	one	would	expect	
a priori (e.g.,	unlocking	a	bicycle	 lock	with	the	key	held	transverse	to	the	lock).	
Similarly,	a	recent	fMRI	study	using	pictures	of	extraordinary	compared	to	ordi-
nary	action	end	states	demonstrated	a	stronger	activation	of	the	inferior	frontal	
gyrus	(IFG),	which	is	part	of	the	frontal	parietal	motor	network	(de	Lange,	Spronk,	
Willems,	Toni,	&	Bekkering,	2008).	Comparable	results	come	from	neuroimaging	
studies	 that	 investigated	neuronal	responses	to	action	 language.	 In	adults,	pro-
cessing	of	sentences	and	action	pictures	describing	unfamiliar	action	scenarios	
is	associated	with	stronger	motor	activation	compared	to	sentences	and	action	
pictures	of	familiar	action	scenarios	(Beilock,	Lyons,	Mattarella-Micke,	Nusbaum,	
&	Small,	2008	[fMRI,	sensorimotor	areas];	van	Elk	et	al.,	2010	[mu-frequency	ef-
fect,	fronto-central	sites]).	In	sum,	these	studies	provide	converging	evidence	that	
in	 adults,	motor	 resonance	 tends	 to	 be	 stronger	 for	 the	 perception	 of	 unusual	
actions.
Although	motor	processes	are	thought	to	play	an	important	role	in	human	action	
prediction,	there	are	of	course	other	ways	to	predict	action	end	states	(Rizzolatti	&	
Sinigaglia,	2010;	de	Lange	et	al.,	2008).	In	the	infant	domain,	two	more	mechanisms	
have	been	suggested	to	support	action	understanding	and	action	prediction	(for	
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an	overview,	see	Csibra	&	Gergely,	2007).	First,	it	has	been	put	forward	that	young	
infants	evaluate	actions	they	observe	on	the	basis	of	abstract	cognitive	principles	
of	rationality	(Gergely	&	Csibra,	2003).	Following	this	account,	infants	infer	action	
goals	on	the	basis	of	the	observed	action	path	and	the	situational	constraints.	Sec-
ond,	 infants	might	 learn	about	others’	actions	and	 intentions	 through	repeated	
observation	of	actions,	as	they	couple	actions	to	their	effects	(Elsner	&	Aschersle-
ben,	2003).	These	three	mechanisms—rationality,	action–effect	associations,	and	
motor	activation—are	likely	to	complement	and	support	each	other.	Also	in	the	
current	study,	 infants	might	have	 formed	action–effect	associations	that	helped	
them	 to	make	 predictions	 about	 the	 course	 of	 the	 actions	 they	 observed.	 The	
stimulus	presentation	we	used	supported	the	formation	of	such	associations,	as	
for	instance	the	different	action	types	(ordinary	vs.	extraordinary)	were	carried	
out	by	different	actors	and	as	a	blocked	design	was	used	with	10	repetitions	of	
the	same	action	type	in	a	row.	This	experimental	design	provided	the	infants	with	
a	maximal	 chance	 to	make	 correct	predictions	of	 the	 action	 end	 state	 for	both	
ordinary	and	extraordinary	actions.	Although	 the	design	allowed	 the	 infants	 to	
acquire	action–effect	associations,	this	cannot	account	for	the	difference	we	found	
between	ordinary	and	extraordinary	actions.	That	is,	 learning	opportunities	for	
action–effect	 associations	were	 comparable	 for	 ordinary	 and	 extraordinary	 ac-
tion	conditions	(i.e.,	one	actor	performed	ordinary	actions;	another	actor	always	
extraordinary	 actions),	 but	 still,	 a	 stronger	 activation	 of	 motor-related	 brain	
areas	 was	 found	 for	 extraordinary	 compared	 to	 ordinary	 actions.	 This	 motor	
activation	might	be	a	reflection	of	the	predictions	generated	by	the	motor	system.	
Extraordinary	actions	required	additional	predictions	to	be	generated	to	infer	the	
action	 end	 state,	 resulting	 in	 a	 stronger	motor	 activation	 during	 perception	 of	
extraordinary	actions.	Our	data	thus	suggest	that	the	motor	system	is	involved	in	
action	prediction	and	making	sense	of	others’	actions	from	early	on,	and	might	be	
even	more	fundamental	for	cognition	than	previously	thought.
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Abstract
Previous	research	investigated	the	
contributions	of	target	objects,	situational	
context	and	movement	kinematics	to	
action	prediction	separately.	The	current	
study	addresses	how	these	three	factors	
combine	in	the	prediction	of	observed	
actions.	Participants	observed	an	actor	
whose	movements	were	constrained	
by	the	situational	context	or	not,	and	
object-directed	or	not.	After	several	steps,	
participants	had	to	indicate	how	the	action	
would	continue.	Experiment	1	shows	that	
predictions	were	most	accurate	when	
the	action	was	constrained	and	object-
directed.	Experiments	2A	and	2B	inves-
tigated	whether	these	predictions	relied	
more	on	the	presence	of	a	target	object	or	
cues	in	the	actor’s	movement	kinematics.	
The	target	object	was	artificially	moved	
to	another	location	or	occluded.	Results	
suggest	a	crucial	role	for	kinematics.	In	
sum,	observers	predict	actions	based	on	
target	objects	and	situational	constraints,	
and	they	exploit	subtle	movement	cues	of	
the	observed	actor	rather	than	the	direct	
visual	information	about	target	objects	
and	context.
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Introduction
From	very	early	in	life,	humans	do	not	only	just	passively	observe	other	people’s	
actions	but	also	predict	their	action	goals	while	watching	the	actions	unfold	(see	
e.g.,	Falck-Ytter	et	al.,	2006;	Stapel,	Hunnius,	van	Elk,	&	Bekkering,	2010;	Hunnius	
&	Bekkering,	 2010).	Predicting	others’	actions	 is	essential	 in	understanding	 the	
other	(Blakemore	&	Decety,	2001),	and	allows	us	to	smoothly	interact	with	each	
other	(Sebanz,	Bekkering,	&	Knoblich,	2006).	When	observing	actions,	there	are	
several	sources	of	information	which	can	form	the	basis	of	these	predictions.	Goal	
objects,	together	with	situational	constraints,	the	actor’s	movement	kinematics,	
and	the	action	path	itself,	together	make	up	an	action	(Cuijpers,	van	Schie,	Kop-
pen,	Erlhagen,	&	Bekkering,	2006).	Although	it	is	clear	that	all	these	factors	might	
affect	action	prediction,	they	have	to	date	never	been	examined	together	in	one	
empirical	study.	Especially	the	role	of	movement	kinematics	in	combination	with	
other	(competing	or	confirming)	information	is	unclear.	That	is,	on	the	one	hand,	
it	is	obvious	that	there	is	a	“tight	coupling	between	kinematics	and	goals”	(Graf-
ton	&	Hamilton,	2007,	p.609),	on	the	other	hand,	both	behavioral	(Bach,	Knoblich,	
Gunter,	 Friederici,	 &	 Prinz,	 2005;	 van	 Elk	 et	 al.,	 2008a)	 and	 neuroimaging	 data	
(Grafton	&	Hamilton,	2007)	suggest	goals	to	be	more	prominent	than	movement	
kinematics	in	action	perception.	The	current	study	is	the	first	to	investigate	the	
role	 of	 goal	 objects,	 environmental	 constraints,	 and	movement	 kinematics	 for	
predictions	about	the	action	path	of	an	observed	actor.
How	 people	 come	 to	 predict	 others’	 actions	 has	 been	 studied	with	 different	
paradigms,	 all	 contributing	pieces	 to	 the	puzzle	 of	which	 sources	 in	 the	 visual	
domain	may	be	used	 for	 these	action	predictions.	 In	general,	 empirical	 studies	
mainly	have	explored	how	these	sources	contribute	 to	action	prediction	 in	 iso-
lation.	 Theoretical	models,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 have	 to	 some	 extent	 focused	 on	
combined	sources	 for	action	prediction,	as	 they	all	 incorporate	contextual	con-
straints	and	goals	as	major	factors.	According	to	Gergely	and	Csibra	(2003)	and	
Baker,	Saxe,	and	Tenenbaum	(2009),	humans	predict	actions	of	intentional	agents	
by	assuming	 that	 they	 take	 the	most	efficient	path	 to	get	 to	a	certain	goal.	The	
presence	and	position	of	environmental	constraints,	such	as	barriers,	determine	
which	path	is	most	efficient	for	the	agent	to	take.	Hence,	one	can	predict	the	action	
path	based	on	information	about	the	goal	of	an	action	and	the	action	constraints.	
Some	models	 include	movement	 kinematics	 as	 a	 third	 factor	 explaining	 action	
prediction,	besides	goal	and	action	constraint	 information	 (see	e.g.,	Cuijpers	et	
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al.,	2006;	Kilner	et	al.,	2007).	According	to	Kilner	et	al.	(2007),	action	predictions	
are	 generated	by	 the	mirror	neuron	 system	 (MNS),	 and	 are	based	on	 informa-
tion	from	observed	movement	kinematics	(lowest	level),	goal	inferences	(highest	
level),	 and	 contextual	 information	 (serving	 as	 a	 prior).	 Taken	 together,	 three	
aspects	 are	mentioned	 in	 the	 literature	which	 can	 underlie	 action	 predictions,	
namely	information	about	goals,	context	and	movement	kinematics.
The	contribution	of	all	three	factors	in	isolation	to	action	perception	is	indicated	
by	several	empirical	 studies.	First	of	all,	 contextual	 information	can	help	 in	as-
sessing	and	predicting	an	action	goal.	The	same	hand	posture	can	be	interpreted	
as	having	the	action	goal	“to	clean	up”	or	“to	drink”,	based	on	a	different	context	
in	which	the	hand	is	displayed,	and	the	inferior	frontal	gyrus	(which	is	suggested	
to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 human	MNS,	 see	 also	 Rizzolatti	 &	 Craighero,	 2004)	 responds	
differently	in	these	two	cases	(Iacoboni	et	al.,	2005).	The	presence	or	absence	of	
contextual	constraints,	such	as	obstacles,	can	lead	to	different	predictions	about	
an	action	path.	For	instance,	 infants’	expectations	seem	violated	when	an	agent	
makes	a	detour	which	is	no	longer	‘needed’,	because,	an	obstacle	is	removed	from	
the	scene	(Gergely	et	al.,	 1995;	but	see:	Paulus	et	al.,	2011c).	Adults	also	seem	to	
take	action	constraints	into	account	when	making	predictions	about	which	goal	
location	an	agent	is	heading	for	(Baker	et	al.,	2009).
Second,	goal	objects	and	locations	have	been	shown	to	have	a	considerable	im-
pact	on	action	prediction.	Observing	objects	which	can	function	as	an	action	goal	
leads	to	predictions	about	what	action	will	follow	(see	e.g.,	Tucker	&	Ellis,	2004).	
Furthermore,	when	viewing	objects	and	associated	actions,	observers	generate	
predictions	about	goal	locations	(van	Elk,	van	Schie,	&	Bekkering,	2009;	Hunnius	
&	Bekkering,	2010).	Moreover,	 results	 from	neuroimaging	studies	 illustrate	 that	
observed	object-directed	actions	are	processed	differently	 in	 the	brain	than	 in-
transitive	 actions.	 For	 instance,	 observation	 of	 object-directed	 actions	 leads	 to	
stronger	effects	in	cortical	motor	areas	than	non-object-directed	actions	(Muthu-
kumaraswamy	et	al.,	2004;	Buccino	et	al.,	2001;	Caspers,	Zilles,	Laird,	&	Eickhoff,	
2010).	 Furthermore,	 observation	 (and	 simulation)	 of	 object-directed	 actions	 is	
tends	 to	activate	different	regions	 in	 the	parietal	 lobe	compared	to	 intransitive	
actions	(Jeannerod,	1994;	Lui	et	al.,	2008;	Creem-Regehr	&	Lee,	2005).
Third,	action	kinematics	can	be	used	in	understanding	and	predicting	the	ob-
served	actions.	For	 instance,	participants	 can	 judge	based	on	body	movements	
of	 actors	 whether	 the	 weight	 they	 lift	 corresponds	 to	 the	 weight	 they	 expect	
(Grèzes,	 Frith,	&	Passingham,	 2004a),	 and	whether	 lifting	 a	 certain	weight	was	
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pretended	or	real	(Grèzes,	Frith,	&	Passingham,	2004b).	Furthermore,	the	inten-
tion	underlying	a	grasping	movement	 (to	cooperate,	 compete	or	 to	perform	an	
individual	action)	can	be	accurately	predicted	when	the	start	of	this	movement	
is	observed	(Sartori	et	al.,	 2011).	Even	when	 the	action	seems	 to	have	no	 target	
object,	accurate	predictions	about	an	observed	action	can	be	made	on-line	when	
watching	movement	kinematics	 (Graf	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Predicting	 the	 flow	of	 these	
observed	movement	kinematics	is	easier	when	an	observed	point-light	figure	dis-
plays	human	kinematics	compared	to	less	complex	non-human	kinematics,	which	
suggests	 that	 the	motor	 system	maps	 observed	 actions	 to	 come	 to	 predictions	
of	 the	observed	action	(Stadler,	Springer,	Parkinson,	&	Prinz,	2012).	 In	addition,	
in	real	life	tasks,	such	as	in	joint	action	settings,	people	not	only	predict	the	goal	
of	 another	person’s	 action	but	 also	 the	 action	kinematics	 necessary	 to	 achieve	
this	goal.	This	is	illustrated	by	the	finding	that	people	adjust	their	behavior	such	
that	 beginning	 state	 comfort	 is	 attained	 for	 an	 interaction	 partner	 (Gonzalez,	
Studenka,	Glazebrook,	&	Lyons,	2011).
In	 sum,	previous	 research	demonstrates	 that	 contextual	 constraints,	 goal	ob-
jects	as	well	as	action	kinematics	can	be	used	for	action	prediction.	However,	how	
these	 three	aspects	 together	contribute	 to	action	predictions	of	human	actions	
remains	unclear.	Especially,	 the	 role	of	movement	kinematics	opposed	 to	more	
abstract	 object	 and	 context	 information	 needs	 further	 investigation.	 Theoreti-
cally,	action	predictions	could	be	solely	based	on	the	combination	of	situational	
constraints	 and	 target	 objects.	 However,	 when	 simulating	 an	 observed	 action,	
movement	 kinematics	may	 also	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 prediction	 how	 an	 observed	
action	will	unfold.	The	current	research	question,	thus,	was	two-fold.	Do	people	
take	situational	constraints	and	target	objects	into	account	when	predicting	how	
an	observed	ongoing	action	will	unfold?	And	if	so,	do	they	at	least	partially	rely	
on	the	movement	kinematics	in	making	their	predictions?	Experiment	1	was	de-
signed	to	answer	the	first	question.	There,	predictions	had	to	be	made	about	the	
subsequent	movement	of	an	observed	actor,	while	the	action	was	object-directed	
or	not,	and	was	constrained	by	the	context	or	not.	Experiment	2A	and	2B	allowed	
us	to	examine	whether	predictions	were	made	purely	on	the	information	about	the	
goal	object	in	combination	with	the	context	of	the	action,	or	whether	the	predic-
tions	were	based	on	the	actor’s	movement	kinematics.	The	previous	work	in	the	
area	of	action	observation	suggests	that	action	representations	are	hierarchically	
organized	 (Grafton	&	Hamilton,	 2007),	 such	 that	 incongruent	 information	 from	
means	is	less	detrimental	than	incongruent	goal	information	when	processing	ob-
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served	actions	(van	Elk	et	al.,	2008a).	In	similar	fashion,	we	provided	participants	
in	Experiment	2A	with	movement	kinematics	which	were	 incongruent	with	the	
goal-object	 and	action	 context.	Different	 theories	would	generate	opposing	hy-
potheses	for	this	conflict	in	provided	information.	If	action	predictions	are	mainly	
based	on	goal-objects	and	situational	constraints,	prediction	accuracy	may	show	
a	similar	pattern	as	in	Experiment	1.	On	the	other	hand,	 if	humans	make	use	of	
all	three	sources	of	information	(goal-object,	action	context,	and	kinematics)	for	
their	action	predictions,	conflicting	information	may	lead	to	reduced	differences	
between	 the	 conditions.	 However,	 if	 kinematics	 are	 driving	 action	 prediction,	
the	pattern	 in	 the	prediction	accuracy	data	of	Experiment	 1	might	be	reversed.	
In	Experiment	2B,	 information	about	the	goal	object	was	no	 longer	available	to	
the	participant.	If	action	predictions	are	mainly	based	on	goal-objects	and	action	
context,	one	would	expect	 to	 find	a	main	effect	of	action	context,	and	no	effect	
of	object-directedness.	Alternatively,	when	movement	kinematics	can	be	used	as	
a	basis	 for	action	prediction,	a	more	elaborate	pattern	of	accuracy	data	may	be	
obtained.
Experiment 1
METHOD
Participants
Eighteen	participants	(3	males)	with	a	mean	age	of	22	years	(SD	=	4	years)	were	
tested.	 They	 gave	written	 informed	 consent	 to	 participate	 and	 either	 chose	 to	
receive	 five	euros	 in	vouchers	 for	participation	or	credit	points.	All	were	right-
handed	students	recruited	at	the	Radboud	University	in	Nijmegen.
Design
The	 study	 was	 an	 action-observation	 setting,	 in	 which	 a	 two	 by	 two	 within-
subjects	design	was	applied.	Participants	viewed	videos	of	an	actor	walking	a	few	
steps	 and	 then	 crawling.	 In	 half	 of	 the	 cases	 the	 action	was	 object-directed,	 in	
the	other	half	 it	was	not-object-directed	(Target	object	vs.	No	target	object).	As	
a	 second	manipulation,	 the	action	 context	was	manipulated	 such	 that	 crawling	
took	place	either	underneath	the	table	or	beside	the	table	(Underneath	table	vs.	
Beside	 table).	Halfway	 the	 second	 step	 of	 the	 actor,	 the	 video	was	 paused	 and	
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participants	had	to	judge	whether	the	actor	would	take	another	step	walking	or	
change	to	crawling.	In	50%	of	the	cases,	the	correct	response	would	be	that	the	
observed	actor	would	 start	 crawling.	Responses	were	given	by	pressing	one	of	
the	two	response-buttons	with	the	left	or	right	index	finger.	Between	subjects,	the	
response	buttons	were	counterbalanced	between	 left	 and	right	hand.	Accuracy	
rate	of	the	responses	(correct/incorrect)	and	the	d	prime	(d’)	of	this	accuracy	rate	
were	the	dependent	variables.
Materials
Stimuli	were	videos	which	displayed	three	different	female	actors	standing	still	
for	one	second,	then	starting	to	move	with	two	or	three	steps	walking	and	then	
crawling	in	the	same	direction,	and	ending	with	a	still	posture	of	approximately	
one	 second.	Average	 stimulus	duration	was	 5.7	 s	 (SD	=	0.4	 s).	 Stimulus	movies	
were	presented	with	a	frame	rate	25	frames	per	second,	were	displayed	against	
a	black	background	and	were	408	pixels	high	and	720	pixels	wide.	In	all	videos,	a	
table	and	a	volley	ball	were	present.	The	ball	lay	either	on	the	floor	(Target	object	
condition)	or	on	the	table	(No	target	object	condition).	As	participants	received	
the	information	that	the	actor	would	first	walk	and	then	crawl,	it	was	clear	from	
the	start	of	the	experiment	that	the	action	was	not	object-directed	if	the	ball	lay	
on	the	table.	The	table	stood	in	front	of	a	white	wall.	The	actor	either	moved	close	
to	the	wall	(see	Fig.	1a),	or	a	few	steps	more	in	front	(see	Fig.	1b),	which	made	clear	
from	the	start	of	the	movie	whether	the	actor	would	crawl	underneath	the	table	
(close	 to	 the	wall)	or	beside	the	table	(a	bit	more	 in	 front).	When	video-taping	
the	actions,	stimuli	were	recorded	mixing	the	order	of	conditions	constantly,	such	
that	differences	in	the	movements	of	the	actor	are	not	a	consequence	of	having	re-
peated	the	exact	same	action	in	the	same	context	repeatedly.	Actors	were	trained	
in	making	stimulus	material,	and	were	instructed	to	act	as	similar	as	possible	in	
all	their	actions.	To	ensure	the	similarity	between	the	stimuli,	actors	were	shown	
example	 videos	before	 and	 in-between	 taping	 sessions,	 and	were	 asked	 to	pay	
special	attention	to	their	walking	pace,	how	to	end	the	action	in	a	natural	fashion,	
and	the	shift	from	walking	to	crawling.	For	each	condition,	ten	different	stimuli	
were	used.	The	stimuli	displayed	three	different	actors.	However,	one	of	the	ac-
tors	moved	in	a	different	way	than	the	other	two.	That	is,	she	had	the	tendency	to	
not	walk	upright,	and	she	moved	both	her	hands	before	her	body	when	starting	
to	crawl.	Nevertheless,	her	stimulus	movies	were	included	to	keep	some	natural	
variation	in	the	stimuli,	but	only	in	two	out	of	every	ten	stimuli	per	condition.	Fur-
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thermore,	the	movement	direction	was	varied,	and	between	stimuli,	there	were	
little	changes	in	the	position	of	the	furniture,	starting	position	of	the	actor,	and	
position	of	the	ball.	This	was	to	ensure	that	exact	timing	and	position	of	crawling	
of	the	actor	could	not	be	inferred	from	having	seen	the	other	stimuli.	Stimuli	were	
between	conditions	matched	for	stimulus	duration,	movement	duration,	position	
of	the	table,	movement	direction	(left	or	right),	amount	of	steps	before	crawling	
and	the	horizontal	distance	to	the	ball.	For	all	stimuli,	the	motion	energy	for	the	
complete	videos	as	well	as	for	the	part	of	the	videos	before	the	pause	was	calcu-
lated.	Motion	energy	 can	be	 indicative	 for	differences	 in	movements	 contained	
Figure 1a: Example	frame	in	which	actor	will	start	crawling.
Figure 1b: Example	frame	in	which	actor	will	continue	another	step	walking.
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in	videos	(Bobick,	1997;	Schippers,	Roebroeck,	Renken,	Nanetti,	&	Keysers,	2010).	
Between	subjects	ANOVAs	were	conducted	to	test	for	differences	in	the	variability	
(expressed	as	the	SD	of	the	motion	energy	in	the	videos)	of	motion	in	the	mov-
ies,	with	context	and	object-directedness	as	explanatory	variables.	Both	ANOVAs	
showed	a	main	effect	of	context	[Until	the	pause:	F(1,36)	=	4.4,	p =	0.04;	Complete	
videos:	F(1,36)	=	82,	p <	0.001],	with	larger	SDs	in	the	motion	energy	for	the	beside	
table	condition	(Until	pause:	M	=	2,890,012;	Complete	videos:	M	=	3,286,818)	com-
pared	 to	 the	Underneath	 table	 condition	 (Until	pause:	M	=	 2,397,975;	Complete	
videos:	M	=	2,241,175).	The	motion-energy	algorithm	applied	here	 is	 the	sum	of	
the	squared	differences	 in	 the	color	channels	of	each	pixel	between	 frames	(cf.	
Schippers	et	al.,	2010).	In	the	Beside	tables	conditions	the	actor	moves	closer	to	
the	camera,	and	takes	up	a	 larger	area,	and	hence	more	pixels,	of	 the	stimulus,	
which	 could	 explain	 the	 results	 of	 the	motion	 energy	ANOVAs.	Alternatively,	 it	
might	be	that	the	actors	move	in	a	less-variable	manner	in	the	Underneath	table	
condition	compared	to	the	Beside	table	condition.
All	 conditions	 consisted	 of	 10	 different	 stimuli	which	were	 each	 repeated	 four	
times	during	the	experiment.	Stimuli	were	presented	 in	random	order.	To	slow	
down	unwanted	habituation	effects,	we	included	15	catch	trials	(8%	of	the	trials)	
in	which	the	action	path	differed	from	the	usual	path	(e.g.,	crawling	on	the	table,	
walking	beside	the	table).
The	experiment	was	conducted	using	a	custom-made	stimulus	presentation	and	
data	 registration	 program	 implemented	 in	 Presentation	 13.1	 (Neurobehavioral	
Systems,	CA,	USA).	A	response-button	box	was	used	to	 log	the	responses	of	the	
participants.
Procedure
The	experiment	started	with	an	 instruction	phase,	 in	which	participants	 learnt	
that	 the	 stimuli	 would	 display	 an	 actor	who	would	walk	 and	 then	 crawl.	 Fur-
thermore,	the	stimuli	would	be	paused	after	several	steps	of	the	actor,	followed	
by	a	question:	“Will	 the	actor	now	start	crawling,	or	will	she	take	another	step	
walking?”	(see	Fig.1a	and	b	for	example	frames	at	which	the	videos	were	paused).	
Participants	were	 instructed	 to	 respond	 as	 fast	 and	 accurate	 as	 possible.	After	
their	response,	 the	rest	of	 the	video	would	be	displayed.	Participants	practiced	
with	two	example	stimuli	and	were	provided	with	feedback	about	the	accuracy	
of	their	response.	During	the	actual	experiment,	no	explicit	feedback	was	given,	
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although	it	could	be	inferred	from	watching	the	rest	of	the	stimulus	movie.	In	to-
tal,	the	experiment	took	about	30	min	to	complete.	After	finishing	the	experiment,	
participants	were	thanked	and	received	participation	vouchers	or	credit	points.
RESULTS
For	each	participant,	the	accuracy	rate	per	condition	was	calculated.	Furthermore,	
mean	d’	per	participant	per	condition	was	calculated	(see	Table	1).
A	two-by-two	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	conducted	with	Object-directedness	
and	Context	as	independent	factors,	and	accuracy	rate	as	dependent	variable.	A	
main	effect	of	Context	[F(1,17)	=	12.8,	p	=	0.002],	a	main	effect	of	Object-directed-
ness	[F(1,17)	=	78.8,	p	<	0.001]	as	well	as	the	interaction	between	these	two	factors	
[F(1,17)	=	 25.2,	p	 <	0.001]	were	 found	 to	be	 significant.	Post	hoc	paired-samples	
t-tests	revealed	that	accuracy	rates	were	significantly	higher	in	the	Underneath	
table	conditions	(M	=	64%)	than	in	the	Beside	table	conditions	[M	=	56%,	t(17)	=	
3.6,	p	=	0.002].	Furthermore,	the	Target	object	conditions	yielded	a	significantly	
higher	prediction	accuracy	rates	(M	=	65%)	than	the	No	target	object	conditions	
[M	=	55%,	t(17)	=	8.9,	p	<	0.001].
As	 Fig.	 2	 reveals,	 the	main	 effects	 are	 driven	 by	 the	 interaction	 effect,	which	
reflects	the	significantly	higher	accuracy	rates	in	the	condition	Underneath	table	
with	Target	object	condition	compared	to	all	other	conditions	[all	comparisons	
with	the	Underneath	table	with	Target	object	condition:	t(17)	>	5.8,	p	<	0.001;	t(17)	
<	 0.8,	 n.s.	 for	 all	 other	 comparisons].	 The	d’	 analysis	 showed	 exactly	 the	 same	
pattern	of	results,	with	again	a	significant	main	effect	of	Context	[F(1,17)	=	17.1,	p	
<	0.001],	a	significant	main	effect	of	Target	object	[F(1,17)	=	42.8,	p	<	0.001],	and	a	
significant	interaction	effect	of	these	two	factors	[F(1,17)	=	30.5,	p	<	0.001],	when	
Table 1. Mean	accuracy	rates	and	d’	per	condition	for	Experiment	1,	2A,	and	2B.	Standard	deviations	are	
noted	between	brackets.
Exp.1 Exp. 2A Exp. 2B
Accuracy rate D prime Accuracy rate D prime Accuracy rate D prime
Underneath table x Target object 73% (8.6) 1.36 (0.64) 57% (12) 0.30 (0.60) 74% (11) 1.48 (0.74)
Underneath table × No target object 55% (7.0) 0.26 (0.38) 70% (11) 1.29 (0.71) 54% (11) 0.15 (0.57)
Beside table x Target object 57% (7.0) 0.24 (0.44) 59% (8) 0.59 (0.60) 56% (5.8) 0.12 (0.37)
Beside table x No target object 56% (7.2) 0.42 (0.49) 55% (10) 0.06 (0.63) 61% (9.0) 0.75 (0.16)
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Figure 2a: Mean	accuracy	per	condition	Exp.	1.	Bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	of	SE.
Figure 2b: Mean	d’	per	condition	Exp.	1.	Bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	of	SE.
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applying	a	two	by	two	repeated	measures	ANOVA.	Post	hoc	paired-samples	t-tests	
investigating	the	two	main	effects,	show	that	the	d’s	were	higher	in	the	Underneath	
table	(M	=	0.81)	compared	to	the	Beside	table	conditions	[M	=	0.33;	t(17)	=	4.1,	p	=	
0.001],	and	that	the	d’s	of	the	Target	object	conditions	(M	=	0.80)	were	higher	than	
the	No	target	object	conditions	[M	=	0.34;	t(17)	=	6.5,	p	<	0.001].	These	two	main	
effects	are	explained	by	the	interaction	effect,	with	significantly	higher	d’s	in	the	
condition	Underneath	table	with	Target	object	compared	to	all	other	conditions	
[all	comparisons	with	the	condition	Underneath	table	with	Target	object:	at	least	
t(17)	>	6.6,	p	<	0.001;	t(17)	<	1.6;	n.s.	for	all	other	comparisons].
CONCLUSION
The	data	of	Experiment	1	show	that	participants’	predictions	of	the	next	move	of	
an	actor	were	more	accurate	when	two	things	hold:	the	action	was	object-directed	
and	contextually	constrained	compared	to	the	other	three	combinations.	To	rule	
out	the	possibility	that	the	effect	found	was	a	response	bias,	i.e.,	participants	have	
a	general	tendency	to	react	more	often	with	a	positive	response	when	the	action	is	
object-directed,	d’s	were	calculated.	D’	is	a	measure	originating	from	the	sensory	
detection	theory.	It	 is	the	difference	between	the	z-score	of	the	hit	rate	and	the	
z-score	of	the	false	alarm	rate	(Macmillan	&	Creelman,	1991).	The	larger	this	dif-
ference,	the	more	sensitive	is	the	measure	it	reflects.	The	d’	analysis	yielded	the	
same	pattern	of	results	as	the	accuracy	data,	showing	that	the	results	are	not	a	
mere	response	bias.	Furthermore,	 this	suggests	 that	participants	become	more	
sensitive	in	their	predictions	when	there	is	a	target	object	and	the	context	of	the	
action	constrains	the	actor.
The	finding	that	the	accuracy	of	action	predictions	in	all	three	other	conditions	
did	not	differ	from	each	other,	suggests	that	the	effect	of	context	and	target	object	
are	 not	 independent	 from	 each	 other.	 Apparently,	 a	 contextually	 constrained	
movement	only	becomes	more	predictable	if	a	target	object	is	present.	The	target	
object	might	direct	the	movements	of	the	actor	towards	a	specific	location,	which	
renders	 the	 movement	 more	 predictable.	 However,	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 target	
object	in	itself	 is	apparently	not	enough	to	inform	the	observer	about	the	exact	
timing	of	crawling	onset	of	the	actor.	To	predict	whether	crawling	will	start	imme-
diately	after	the	pause	or	not,	more	information	seems	needed.	This	information	
is	provided	by	the	contextual	constraint.	That	is,	the	constraint	induces	a	spatial	
restriction	on	the	spacing	and	timing	of	the	transition	from	walking	to	crawling,	
which	may	increase	the	predictability	of	the	action.	Consequently,	the	combina-
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tion	of	 object-directedness	 and	action	 constraints	might	 lead	 to	more	accurate	
predictions.
From	this	experiment,	it	cannot	be	concluded	whether	the	predictions	made	are	
the	product	of	the	combination	of	the	goal	and	context	information	given	by	the	
visual	scene,	or	are	possibly	derived	from	the	movements	of	the	actor.	Therefore	
as	 a	 follow-up,	 the	 videos	were	 edited	 in	 such	 a	 fashion	 that	 the	 target	 object	
was	placed	on	a	different	location	in	the	scene.	Consequently,	the	movement	ki-
nematics	of	Experiment	1	were	preserved,	but	the	target	information	was	shifted.	
Stimulus	movies	in	which	there	used	to	be	a	target	object	lying	on	the	floor	were	
rendered	into	movies	in	which	the	target	object	was	now	lying	on	the	table.	The	
opposite	was	done	with	the	stimulus	movie	in	which	there	used	to	be	no	action	
target	(as	the	object	had	been	lying	on	the	table	without	any	function).	Here,	the	
object	now	became	the	target	of	the	movement	(the	movie	was	edited	in	a	way	
that	the	object	was	now	lying	on	the	floor).	If	the	most	accurate	action	predictions	
would	still	be	 found	 in	 the	new	Underneath	table	with	Target	object	condition,	
this	would	provide	evidence	for	a	role	of	target	information	in	action	prediction.	
Furthermore,	 this	would	show	that	movement	kinematics	are	neglected	by	ob-
servers	when	making	predictions	about	an	ongoing	action,	and	that	situational	
constraints	and	target	objects	are	the	cornerstones	of	action	prediction	(Gergely	
&	Csibra,	2003;	Baker	et	al.,	2009).	However,	if	the	effect	would	now	be	found	in	
the	new	Underneath	table	with	No	target	object	condition	(with	the	kinematics	of	
the	previous	Underneath	Table	with	Target	object	condition),	this	would	support	
the	notion	that	movement	kinematics	play	a	role	in	action	predictions.
Experiment 2a
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-eight	 students	 (4	males)	 of	 age	 21	 years	 (SD	=	 2	 years)	 participated	 in	
the	study	and	chose	to	receive	either	five	euros	in	vouchers	or	credit	points	for	
participation.	All	gave	written	informed	consent	and	were	right	handed	students	
recruited	at	the	Radboud	University	in	Nijmegen.	One	participant	was	excluded	
from	analysis	because	of	computer	problems.
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Design
The	same	design	as	in	Experiment	1	was	applied.
Materials
The	same	stimulus	material	as	in	Experiment	1	was	used	as	the	basis	for	Experi-
ment	2.	However,	all	stimulus	videos	were	edited	offline	beforehand	using	Adobe	
Premiere	CS	4	(CA,	USA).	The	target	object	was	placed	on	a	different	location	in	
the	scene.	In	the	Underneath	table	with	Target	object	movies,	the	ball	was	placed	
on	 the	 table,	 rendering	 it	 into	an	Underneath	 table	with	No	 target	 stimulus.	 In	
the	Underneath	table	with	No	target	condition,	 the	opposite	was	done:	the	ball	
was	now	placed	underneath	the	table.	 In	a	similar	 fashion,	stimuli	of	condition	
Beside	table	with	Target	object	were	transformed	into	Beside	table	with	No	target	
and	vice	versa	(by	placing	the	ball	either	on	the	table	or	on	the	floor	beside	the	
table).	Besides	the	editing	of	the	stimulus	materials,	no	changes	were	made	to	the	
experiment.
Procedure
The	same	procedure	was	applied	as	in	Experiment	1.
RESULTS
As	 in	 Experiment	 1,	 accuracy	 rates	 and	 d’s	 were	 calculated	 per	 condition	 per	
participant	(see	Table	1).	A	two	(Context)	by	two	(Object-directedness)	repeated	
measures	ANOVA	 revealed	 that	 accuracy	 rates	were	 influenced	by	both	 factors	
[Context:	F(1,26)	 =	 11.6,	p =	0.002;	Object-directedness:	F(1,26)	 =	 9.9,	p =	0.004]	
and	by	the	interaction	of	the	two	[F(1,26)	=	29.4,	p <	0.001].	Accuracy	rates	were	
significantly	higher	in	the	Underneath	table	conditions	(M	=	63%)	compared	to	
the	Beside	table	conditions	[M	=	57%;	t(26)	=	−3.1,	p =	0.004].	The	No	target	object	
conditions	resulted	in	more	accurate	action	predictions	(M	=	63%)	than	the	Target	
object	conditions	[M	=	58%;	t(26)	=	3.4,	p =	0.002].	Figure	3a	demonstrates	that	the	
main	effects	found	were	a	consequence	of	the	significantly	higher	accuracy	rates	
when	the	actor	crawled	underneath	the	table	with	no	target	compared	to	the	other	
three	conditions	[t(26)	>	5.2,	p <	0.001	for	all	comparisons	with	the	Underneath	
table	with	No target	condition;	t(26)	<	1.8,	n.s.	for	all	other	comparisons].
An	equivalent	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	run	on	the	d’	data	and	yielded	the	
same	pattern	of	 results,	namely	again	 two	main	effects	 [Context:	F(1,26)	=	 18.9,	
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Figure 3a: Mean	accuracy	per	condition	Exp.	2A.	Bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	of	SE.
Figure 3b: Mean	d’	per	condition	Exp.	2A.	Bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	of	SE.
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p <	0.001;	Target	object:	F(1,26)	=	5.0,	p =	0.03]	and	 interaction	effect	 [F(1,26)	=	
51.6,	p <	0.001].	Post	hoc	paired-samples	t-tests,	investigating	the	two	main	effects,	
reveal	that	the	d’s	were	higher	in	the	Underneath	table	(M	=	0.80)	compared	to	
the	Beside	table	conditions	[M	=	0.33;	t(26)	=	4.4,	p <	0.001],	and	that	the	No	target	
object	conditions	yielded	higher	d’s	(M	=	0.68)	than	the	Target	object	conditions	
[M	=	0.45;	t(26)	=	−2.2,	p =	0.03].	The	two	main	effects	and	the	interaction	effect	in	
this	ANOVA	could	be	explained	by	significantly	higher	d’s	(M	=	1.29)	for	the	condi-
tion	in	which	the	crawling	took	place	underneath	the	table	with	no	target	object	
compared	to	the	three	other	conditions	[highest	other:	M
Besides_table_x_Target_object
	=	0.59.	
Comparisons	with	Underneath	 table	with	No	 target	 condition	were	 significant:	
all	 t’s(26)	 >	 4.7,	p <	 0.001].	 Other	 post	 hoc	 paired-samples	 t-tests	 showed	 that	
although	d’s	appeared	to	be	higher	in	the	Beside	table	with	Target	object	condi-
tion,	this	was	not	a	systematic	difference	[comparison	with	Beside	table	with	No	
target:	t(26)	=	4.1,	p <	0.001;	comparison	with	Underneath	table	with	Target	object:	
t(26)	=	1.9,	n.s.].
CONCLUSION
Results	of	Experiment	2A	show	a	difference	in	the	accuracy	of	action	predictions	
between	conditions.	Participants	performed	significantly	better	if	the	action	was	
constrained	by	 the	 context	 and	not	object-directed.	The	d’	 analysis	 yielded	 the	
same	pattern	of	 results,	 indicating	 that	 the	 effect	 in	 the	 accuracy	data	 is	 not	 a	
mere	response	bias.	Action	predictions	were	more	accurate	for	the	stimuli	which	
were	in	the	first	experiment	object-directed	and	contextually	constrained.	Thus,	
the	 effect	 found	 in	 Experiment	 1	 shifted	 together	 with	 the	 original	 movement	
kinematics.	This	 finding	suggests	that	not	the	target	object	 itself	 influences	the	
observers’	 action	 predictions,	 but	 the	 movement	 kinematics	 of	 the	 actor	 they	
observed.	 To	 further	 establish	 this	 finding,	 a	 second	manipulation	was	 carried	
out,	in	which	the	target	object	was	not	visible	in	any	of	the	stimuli.	This	was	done	
by	means	of	an	occluder.	In	this	case,	the	effect	could	either	disappear,	indicating	
that	target	object	information	is	crucial	for	action	prediction,	or	it	could	stay,	in-
dicating	that	movement	kinematics	help	us	in	making	accurate	predictions	about	
observed	actions.
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Experiment 2b
METHOD
Participants
In	 Experiment	 2B,	 24	 participants	 (four	 males)	 took	 part	 with	 a	 mean	 age	 of	
twenty	years	(SD	=	2	years).	All	were	right-handed	students	and	gave	written	in-
formed	consent	for	participation.	They	were	recruited	at	the	Radboud	University	
Nijmegen	and	received	afterwards	either	five	euros	in	vouchers	or	credit	points	
for	participation.	For	one	subject,	data	could	not	be	recovered	because	of	com-
puter	problems.
Design
The	same	design	as	in	Experiment	1	and	2A	was	applied.
Materials
The	same	stimulus	material	as	 in	Experiment	 1	was	used.	However,	a	black	oc-
cluder	was	placed	over	 the	 target	object.	The	dimensions	of	 the	occluder	were	
equal	 for	all	 stimuli,	namely	220	pixels	wide	and	720	pixels	high,	occluding	 the	
right	or	the	left	side	of	the	stimulus	(depending	on	the	movement	direction	of	the	
actor),	and	occluded	the	target	object	entirely	(see	Fig.	4).	After	the	response	of	
the	participant,	the	occluder	was	removed,	showing	the	complete,	original	scene.	
Apart	from	these	changes	in	the	stimulus	material,	no	changes	were	made	to	the	
experiment.
Procedure
The	same	procedure	as	in	Experiment	1	and	2A	was	applied.
RESULTS
Comparable	to	Experiment	1	and	2A,	accuracy	rates	and	d’s	were	determined	for	
each	participant	in	each	condition	(see	Table	1).	A	two	by	two	repeated	measures	
ANOVA	showed	that	Context	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	accuracy	rates	[F(1,22)	
=	 7.2,	p =	0.01],	 as	did	 the	manipulation	of	 the	Target	object	 [F(1,22)	=	 20.5,	p <	
0.001],	and	the	interaction	between	these	two	factors	was	also	found	to	be	signifi-
cant	[F(1,22)	=	82.9,	p <	0.001].	Post	hoc	paired-samples	t-tests	were	conducted	to	
verify	the	direction	of	the	main	effects.	Action	predictions	were	more	accurate	in	
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the	Underneath	table	(M	=	64%)	compared	to	the	Beside	table	conditions	[M	=	
58%;	t(22)	=	2.7,	p =	0.01].	Furthermore,	participants	responded	more	accurately	
when	the	action	had	a	Target	object	(M	=	65%)	compared	to	when	there	was	No	
target	object	[M	=	58%;	t(22)	=	4.5,	p <	0.001].	Additional	post	hoc	paired-samples	
t-tests	were	executed	to	examine	the	 interaction	effect.	These	t-tests	show	that	
accuracy	rates	were	highest	in	the	condition	where	the	actor	crawled	underneath	
the	table	towards	a	target	object	[all	t’s(22)	>	4.8,	p <	0.001].	As	can	also	be	seen	in	
Fig.	5,	accuracy	rates	in	the	condition	where	crawling	took	place	beside	the	table	
with	no	 target	were	also	slightly	higher	 than	 the	 two	remaining	conditions	 [all	
t’s(22)	>	3.0,	p <=	0.006].	This	effect	was	driven	by	the	stimuli	of	one	specific	actor,	
who	acted	only	in	two	out	of	ten	movies	per	condition.
The	two	by	two	repeated	measures	ANOVA	on	the	d’s,	again	mirrors	the	results	
of	 the	accuracy	data,	with	a	main	effect	of	Context	 [F(1,22)	=	 10.4,	p =	0.004],	 a	
main	effect	of	Target	object	 [F(1,22)	=	 12.1,	p =	0.002],	 and	a	 significant	 interac-
tion	[F(1,22)	=	109,	p <	0.001].	Post	hoc	paired-samples	t-tests	were	conducted	to	
investigate	 the	 two	main	effects.	The	Underneath	 table	 conditions	appeared	 to	
have	higher	d’s	(M	=	0.82)	than	the	Beside	table	conditions	[M	=	0.43;	t(22)	=	3.2,	p 
=	0.004].	Furthermore,	the	Target	object	conditions	yielded	more	sensitive	action	
predictions	(M	=	0.80)	than	the	No	target	object	conditions	[M	=	0.45,	t(22)	=	3.5,	
p =	0.002].	To	study	the	interaction	effect,	paired-samples	t-tests	were	conducted	
Figure 4: Example	of	the	first	frame	of	a	stimulus	movie	in	Experiment	2B.
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Figure 5a: Mean	accuracy	per	condition	Exp.	2B.	Bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	of	SE.
Figure 5b: Mean	d’	per	condition	Exp.	2B.	Bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	of	SE.
Chapter	3
66
comparing	 the	 four	 separate	 conditions.	 The	d’s	were	 highest	 in	 the	 condition	
where	crawling	took	place	underneath	the	table	towards	a	target	object	(M	=	1.49),	
compared	to	the	three	other	conditions	[t’s(22)	at	least	equaled	4.2	with	all	p’s	<	
0.001].	Comparable	to	the	accuracy	of	results,	the	Beside	table	with	Target	object	
condition	 yielded	 slightly	 higher	 d’s	 (M	 =	 0.75)	 than	 the	 other	 two	 remaining	
conditions	(M
Underneath_table_x_No_target
	=	0.15	and	M
Beside_table_x_Target_object
	=	0.12;	comparisons	
between	the	Beside	table	×	Target	object	condition	and	the	other	two:	t’s	at	least	
equaled	4.4,	p’s	<	0.001).	This	effect	disappeared	when	excluding	the	trials	of	one	
specific	actor.	The	main	and	interaction	effects	then	remained	significant.	The	d’s	
of	the	Beside	table	with	No	target	condition	were	then	no	longer	systematically	
higher	than	the	two	remaining	conditions	[comparison	with	the	condition	Beside	
table	with	Target	object:	 t(22)	=	2.3,	p =	0.03;	 comparison	with	 the	Underneath	
table	with	No	target	object	condition:	t(22)	=	1.13,	n.s.].
CONCLUSION
The	results	of	Experiment	2B	are	in	line	with	those	of	Experiment	2A,	as	action	
predictions	were	more	accurate	when	the	actor	moved	to	the	target	object	and	
was	constrained	in	her	action	by	the	action	context.	Given	that	these	predictions	
were	made	in	the	absence	of	visual	information	about	the	position	of	the	target	
object	 itself,	 these	 findings	 suggest	 a	 crucial	 role	 of	 movement	 kinematics	 in	
action	predictions.	The	d’	analysis	shows	the	same	results	as	the	accuracy	data,	
indicating	that	this	is	not	just	a	response	bias.
Both	 the	 accuracy	data	 and	 the	d’	 analysis	 show	 that	 the	 trials	 of	 one	of	 the	
actors	 yielded	 slightly	 better	predictions	 in	 the	 condition	where	 crawling	 took	
place	beside	 the	 table	with	no	 target	object	compared	 to	 the	Underneath	 table	
with	No	target	and	the	Beside	table	with	Target	object	conditions.	As	mentioned	
in	the	“Method”	section,	this	actor	was	only	included	in	two	out	of	ten	trials	per	
condition	as	she	acted	in	a	slightly	different	way	than	the	other	two	actors.	Appar-
ently,	this	difference	in	movements	between	the	actors	influenced	the	prediction	
accuracy	of	the	observers.
Discussion
The	current	study	investigated	the	role	of	visual	information	about	target	objects,	
situational	constraints	and	movement	kinematics	for	action	predictions.	The	re-
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sults	of	Experiment	1	show	that	observers	are	more	accurate	in	their	predictions	
of	the	next	move	of	an	actor	if	the	action	is	object-directed	and	constrained	by	the	
situational	context.	Experiment	2A	and	2B	show	that	these	predictions	are	based	
on	the	movement	kinematics	of	the	actor.	Thus,	people	act	in	a	more	predictable	
manner	if	they	are	moving	towards	a	target	object	and	are	constrained	by	their	
physical	environment.	This	goal-directedness	which	resides	in	the	movements	of	
the	actor	can	be	effectively	detected	and	used	for	predictions	by	the	observers.
The	present	study	was	the	first	to	test	how	action	prediction	is	affected	by	the	
combination	of	target	object	information,	situational	constraints	and	movement	
kinematics.	 So	 far,	 theoretical	 and	 computational	 studies	 on	 action	 prediction	
suggest	that	action	predictions	are	based	on	information	about	target	objects	and	
situational	constraints	(Gergely	&	Csibra,	2003;	Baker	et	al.,	2009).	In	Experiment	
1,	we	replicated	 these	 findings,	and	 the	results	clearly	show	that	action	predic-
tion	accuracy	is	highest	when	the	action	includes	a	target	object	and	a	situational	
constraint.	However,	from	Experiment	1,	it	was	unclear	what	the	contribution	of	
the	actor’s	kinematics	was	to	these	predictions.	Previous	work	on	action	observa-
tion	 suggests	 that	 action	 representations	 are	 hierarchically	 organized	 (Grafton	
&	Hamilton	2007),	 such	 that	goals	are	more	 important	 than	means.	Making	 the	
kinematics	incongruent	with	the	target	of	the	action,	as	in	Experiment	2A,	might	
therefore	have	 led	to	a	similar	pattern	of	action	prediction	accuracies	as	 in	Ex-
periment	1.	Yet,	the	data	of	Experiment	2A	show	the	reversed	pattern	of	results,	
indicating	a	crucial	role	for	movement	kinematics	in	action	prediction.	The	results	
of	 Experiment	 2B	 confirm	 this,	 as	 the	 absence	 of	 visual	 information	 about	 the	
target	object	still	led	participants	to	be	more	accurate	in	their	predictions	of	the	
constrained	object-directed	actions	compared	 to	 the	other	actions.	 In	 line	with	
our	results,	recent	empirical	work	indicates	that	movement	kinematics	may	affect	
action	predictions	(Sartori	et	al.,	2011;	Graf	et	al.,	2007;	Stadler	et	al.,	2012).
Although	 typically	mentioned	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 action	 perception,	 the	 im-
portance	of	movement	kinematics	for	predicting	the	actions	observed	is	under-
valued.	That	 is,	 it	 is	often	emphasized	 that	actions	with	similar	kinematics	can	
have	different	goals	(Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Jacob	&	Jeannerod,	2005),	and	vice	versa,	
similar	 goals	 can	 be	 achieved	 with	 different	 kinematics.	 Furthermore,	 actions	
with	 different	 kinematics	 but	 the	 same	 goal	 lead	 to	 similar	 activity	 in	 specific	
mirror	neurons	 in	monkeys	 (Fogassi	et	al.,	 2005),	which	also	seems	 to	hold	 for	
MNS	activity	in	humans	(Gazzola,	Rizzolatti,	Wicker,	&	Keysers,	2007).	In	addition,	
in	behavioral	studies,	action	goals	appear	to	dominate	the	means	to	achieve	the	
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goal.	 For	 instance,	 imitation	 studies	 show	 that	 goals	 are	 imitated	while	means	
are	mostly	neglected	(Bekkering	et	al.,	2000;	Wohlschläger	&	Bekkering,	2002).	In	
reaction	 time	studies,	goal-objects	evoke	stronger	 interference	effects	 than,	 for	
instance,	means	(van	Elk	et	al.,	2008a)	or	spatial	information	(Bach	et	al.,	2005).	
Goals	seem	to	be	the	 leading	factor	 in	the	action	hierarchy,	whereas	movement	
kinematics	are	the	lowest	level	in	this	hierarchy	(Grafton	&	Hamilton,	2007;	Ham-
ilton	&	Grafton,	2007).
However,	 there	 are	 indications	 that	movement	kinematics	 are	processed	 and	
used	by	observers.	For	instance,	kinematics	of	observed	actions	have	been	shown	
to	affect	automatic	 imitation,	even	when	the	stimulus	material	 is	very	abstract,	
such	as	consisting	of	a	single	dot	(Bisio,	Stucchi,	 Jacono,	Fadiga,	&	Pozzo,	2010).	
Furthermore,	movement	kinematics	can	form	the	basis	of	action	predictions,	as	
illustrated	by	the	current	study.	In	a	similar	vein,	other	studies	have	reported	that	
subtle	 changes	 in	 the	 kinematics	 of	 an	 observed	 action	 can	be	used	 to	 predict	
action	targets	(Neal	&	Kilner,	2010).	Already	in	infancy,	movement	kinematics	such	
as	the	grip	aperture	of	the	actor	can	form	the	basis	for	expectations	about	which	
the	 target	 object	 will	 be	 grasped	 (Daum,	 Vuori,	 Prinz,	 &	 Aschersleben,	 2009).	
Likewise,	infants	can	predict	which	target	will	be	used	based	on	how	a	multiple	
purpose	tool	 is	handled	(Paulus,	Hunnius,	&	Bekkering,	2011b).	This	means	that	
the	movements	of	the	actor	reveal	that	what	the	target	object	will	be,	before	this	
target	has	been	reached.	Another	example	is	that	observers	can	predict	whether	
a	basketball	shot	will	be	in	or	out,	based	on	the	first	few	moments	of	the	action	
(Aglioti,	 Cesari,	 Romani,	 &	 Urgesi,	 2008).	 Interestingly,	 professional	 basketball	
players	need	fewer	frames	of	the	same	video	stimuli	to	come	to	an	accurate	predic-
tion	of	the	outcome	and	are	more	accurate	than	novice	players.	With	experience,	
people	can	thus	become	more	sensitive	to	the	subtle	differences	in	the	movement	
patterns.
Taking	together	our	results	and	the	previous	findings,	the	importance	of	move-
ment	 kinematics	 and	 its	 role	 in	 action	 prediction	 becomes	 somewhat	 clearer.	
There	are	many	situations	in	which	the	goal	of	an	observed	actor	is	unambiguous.	
In	these	cases,	kinematics	might	safely	be	neglected.	However,	if	the	scene	shows	
multiple	goal	objects	or	 locations,	movement	characteristics	can	serve	as	a	cue	
for	 predicting	what	 the	 goal	will	 be.	 This	might	 for	 instance	be	 the	 case	when	
predictions	are	made	about	which	object	a	multiple	purpose	tool	will	be	applied	
to	(Paulus	et	al.	2011b).	Secondly,	if	we	compare	actions	with	similar	end	locations,	
but	in	one	case	in	which	a	goal	will	be	reached,	and	in	the	other	case	not,	kinemat-
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ics	 can	 also	play	 a	 role	 in	predictions.	This	 holds	 for	 instance	 in	 a	 situation	 in	
which	observers	have	to	judge	whether	a	shot	at	the	goal	is	in	or	out	(Aglioti	et	
al.,	2008),	and	also	for	our	study	in	which	the	one	action	is	object-directed	and	the	
other	is	not.
The	 stimuli	 of	 one	 actor	 produced	 slightly	 higher	 prediction	 accuracy	 scores	
than	the	others	in	one	of	the	conditions	of	Experiment	2B.	This	suggests	that	there	
are	at	least	some	individual	differences	in	the	predictability	of	actions.	This	small	
difference	in	accuracy	is	related	to	one	of	the	actors,	and	it	only	emerged	in	Ex-
periment	2B,	while	the	observed	movements	were	exactly	the	same	as	in	Experi-
ment	1	and	2A.	Apparently,	the	occlusion	of	the	target	object	led	the	participants	
to	direct	more	attention	to	the	actual	movements.	This	strengthens	our	case	that	
the	obtained	results	are	grounded	in	the	movements	of	the	actors.
The	results	of	the	current	study	show	that	participants	may	rely	on	movement	
kinematics	of	an	actor	when	making	predictions	about	the	path	of	the	actor.	To	
what	extend	 these	results	can	be	generalized	 to	other	situations	remains	 to	be	
studied.	 The	 actions	 were	 observed	 from	 a	 third-person	 perspective,	 possibly	
making	it	more	difficult	for	observers	to	predict	how	they	themselves	would	act	
in	 that	 situation.	 Studies	 on	MNS	 activity	 are	 still	 inconclusive	 about	whether	
first	person	perspectives	give	rise	to	stronger	motor	involvement	or	not	(Alaerts,	
Heremans,	Swinnen,	&	Wenderoth,	2009;	Keysers	et	al.	2004;	Schaefer,	Xu,	Flor,	&	
Cohen,	2009).	To	what	extent	people	vary	in	the	goal-directedness	of	their	move-
ments	needs	also	to	be	studied	more	carefully.
A	question	related	to	this	is:	what	movement	cues	do	observers	use	for	action	
predictions?	 What	 defines	 the	 goal-directedness	 in	 the	 movements	 of	 actors?	
There	are	several	parameters	known	from	action	production	studies	which	might	
affect	 the	predictability	of	 the	observed	actions.	First	of	 all,	when	approaching	
an	 obstacle,	 velocity	 is	 normally	 reduced	 and	 step	 width	 is	 increased	 already	
several	 steps	 before	 arriving	 at	 the	 obstacle	 (Vallis	 &	McFadyen,	 2003).	 In	 our	
study,	 the	 table	 functioned	 as	 an	 obstacle	 in	 the	 conditions	 in	which	 the	 actor	
crawled	underneath	 the	 table.	Consequently,	her	deceleration	before	 switching	
to	 crawling	might	have	been	stronger	when	confronted	with	 the	 table.	 Second,	
studies	on	walking	behavior	show	that	larger	steps	combined	with	higher	speed	
lead	to	less	predictable	steps	(Jordan,	Challis,	&	Newell,	2007).	Step	size	and	speed	
may	therefore	function	as	a	parameter	for	predictions	of	observed	actions.	Fur-
thermore,	actions	with	a	wider	range	of	end	locations	take	less	time	to	complete	
than	actions	which	are	tightly	constrained	(Fitts,	1954),	and	action	perception	has	
Chapter	3
70
been	shown	to	be	sensitive	to	this	phenomenon	(Grosjean,	Shiffrar,	&	Knoblich,	
2007).	In	the	object-directed	conditions	of	our	study,	the	end	location	was	more	
strongly	 bound	 in	 space	 than	 the	 not-objected	 directed	 conditions,	which	may	
have	influenced	the	movements	of	the	actors.	Other	parameters	which	may	influ-
ence	the	predictability	of	observed	actions	are	head	orientation,	head	movements	
and	 arm	movements.	 Pelz,	Hayhoe,	&	Loeber	 (2001),	 for	 instance,	 show	 that	 in	
a	 naturalistic	 task,	 the	 pattern	 of	 head,	 eye	 and	 hand	movements	 depends	 on	
the	 task	 context.	 To	what	 extent	 action	prediction	 is	 influenced	by	 all	 of	 these	
movement	parameters	is	still	unknown.	More	experimental	research	is	needed	in	
which	each	of	these	factors	is	carefully	manipulated	to	unravel	that	which	type	of	
movement	cues	are	used	in	the	prediction	of	observed	actions.
In	 conclusion,	 our	 results	 show	 that	 people	 predict	 actions	 based	 on	 target	
objects	 and	 situational	 constraints.	 Predictions	 of	 ongoing	 actions	 are	 more	
accurate	and	sensitive	 if	 the	observed	action	 is	 constrained	by	 the	context	and	
object-directed.	 For	 their	 predictions,	 observers	 use	 subtle	 movement	 cues	 of	
the	 observed	 actor,	 rather	 than	 direct	 visual	 information	 about	 target	 objects	
and	context.	The	action	context	and	target	objects	thus	enhance	predictions	of	an	
observed	ongoing	action,	through	the	movement	kinematics	of	the	actor.
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Abstract
When	performing	actions,	the	motor	
system	is	thought	to	select	movements	that	
are	the	most	efficient	out	of	all	possible	
movements	to	attain	a	planned	goal.	Both	
motor	simulation	theories	and	rationality	
theory	suggest	that	adults	are	capable	of	
predicting	the	goal	when	they	observe	an	
efficient	action.	Motor	simulation	theories,	
but	not	rationality	theory,	assume	that	
own	action	experience	is	a	prerequisite	
for	action	prediction.	The	current	study	
investigated	whether	action	efficiency	
enables	observers	to	better	predict	action	
targets,	.i.e.,	anticipate	the	target	object	
of	an	observed	action,	and	more	crucially,	
whether	action	experience	is	necessary	
for	these	efficiency-based	predictions.	The	
gaze	of	8-	and	23-month-old	infants	and	
adults	was	tracked	while	looking	at	ef-
ficient	and	inefficient	actions.	The	stimulus	
videos	displayed	an	actor	who	walked	
first,	then	crawled,	subsequently	stood	up	
again,	and	reached	for	and	grasped	a	ball	
at	shoulder-height.	A	part	of	the	ceiling	in	
the	action	scene	was	either	lowered	or	at	
normal	height.	In	the	lowered	ceiling	situa-
tion,	crawling	was	necessary	and	therefore	
an	efficient	means	to	get	to	the	ball.	In	the	
high	ceiling	situation,	crawling	was	consid-
ered	an	inefficient	means	as	walking	would	
have	been	faster.	The	results	showed	that	
in	all	age	groups,	participants	looked	
equally	often	at	the	target	ball	compared	
to	a	distractor	target	prior	to	goal	attain-
ment	in	the	efficient	and	inefficient	action	
condition.	In	conclusion,	no	evidence	was	
found	supporting	the	idea	that	observers	
use	principles	of	efficiency	to	predict	the	
target	of	an	observed	action.
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Introduction
A	mutual	understanding	of	each	other’s	actions	is	an	important	building	block	for	
social	interaction	(Carpendale	&	Lewis,	2004;	Gallese,	Keysers,	&	Rizzolatti,	2004).	
Understanding	and	predicting	others’	 actions	 requires	not	only	 that	 the	 action	
itself	is	processed,	but	also	the	situation	in	which	the	action	is	embedded.	In	the	
well-known	thought	experiment	concerning	Dr.	Jekyll	and	Mr.	Hyde,	the	interpre-
tation	and	the	expected	outcome	of	an	observed	action	with	a	scalpel	 (Jacob	&	
Jeannerod,	2005)	might	 flip	 from	“this	 is	 to	cure”	 to	“this	 is	 to	hurt”,	depending	
on	whether	the	action	is	conducted	in	an	operating	theatre	or	elsewhere	(Kilner	
et	al.,	 2007).	This	study	examines	whether	 infants	and	adults	 take	 the	situation	
into	account	when	predicting	others’	actions	and	whether	own	experiences	with	
similar	situations	contribute	to	processing	the	situational	constraints	of	an	action.
The	situation	in	which	an	action	is	embedded	might	shape	predictions	and	ex-
pectations	about	the	action	even	prior	to	action	onset	(Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Ansuini,	
Cavallo,	 Bertone,	 &	 Becchio,	 2014	 Gergely,	 &	 Csibra,	 2003).	 According	 to	motor	
simulation	accounts	(Wilson	&	Knoblich,	2005;	Wolpert	et	al.,	2003),	predictions	
of	observed	actions	can	be	made	by	simulating	the	observed	action	in	one’s	own	
motor	 system.	 In	 action	 execution,	 the	motor	 system	 selects	 those	movements	
that	 are	 the	 most	 efficient	 movements	 to	 accomplish	 a	 planned	 goal	 (Nelson,	
1983).	Observers	may	therefore	expect	others	to	act	efficiently.	A	similar	hypoth-
esis	 can	be	derived	 from	rationality	 theory	 (Gergely	and	Csibra,	 2003).	That	 is,	
adults	and	also	infants	expect	agents	to	act	efficiently	and	to	only	make	detours	
when	confronted	with	obstacles.	Consequently,	the	exact	same	action	path,	mov-
ing	with	a	detour	 towards	a	 target	 location,	 can	be	regarded	as	efficient	 in	 the	
presence	of	a	situational	constraint	or	as	inefficient	in	the	absence	of	a	constraint	
that	would	justify	the	detour.	Most	studies	investigating	observers’	expectations	
of	efficient	and	inefficient	actions	early	in	life	have	used	infants’	looking	time	as	
dependent	variable	(e.g.,	Csibra,	2008;	Kamewari,	Kato,	Kanda,	Ishiguro,	&	Hiraki,	
2005).	However,	looking	behavior	in	response	to	a	test	trial	not	necessarily	signals	
whether	or	not	predictions	were	made	during	observation	of	the	action	(Paulus	et	
al.,	2011c;	Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2014).	Moreover,	many	studies	on	action	efficiency	
have	 used	 relatively	 abstract,	 non-human	 agents	 (e.g.,	 Bíró,	 2013;	 Csibra,	 2008;	
Gergely	 et	 al.,	 1995).	 To	what	 extent	 and	 from	what	 age	 situational	 constraints	
affect	 the	 prediction	 of	 observed	human	 actions	 is	 yet	 unclear.	 Human	 actions	
are	potentially	more	difficult	to	predict	than	actions	of	abstract	agents	as	human	
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arms	and	legs	move	in	various	directions	with	varying	speed	during	locomotion	
(Full	&	Koditschek,	1999;	Kay,	1988),	making	it	computationally	complex	to	derive	
the	action	path	from	the	actor’s	movements	(Bregler	&	Malik,	1998).
There	are	several	developmental	views	on	how	infants	might	come	to	use	situ-
ational	constraints	to	judge	whether	an	action	is	an	efficient	or	an	efficient	means	
to	reach	an	action	goal.	Following	rationality	theory,	infants	might	apply	the	ef-
ficiency	rule	already	by	6	months	of	age,	independently	of	experience	(Gergely,	&	
Csibra,	2003).	Alternatively,	predictions	may	be	based	on	motor	simulation	and	
in	 that	case	 infants	might	use	 their	 (action)	experience	with	comparable	situa-
tions	 to	 judge	whether	 an	action	 is	 efficient	or	 inefficient	 given	 the	 situational	
constraints	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2014).
To	shed	more	light	on	the	development	of	action	prediction	based	on	situational	
constraints,	 an	 eye-tracking	 experiment	was	 conducted	with	 participants	 from	
different	age	groups,	who	were	presented	with	efficient	and	 inefficient	actions.	
The	actor	in	the	stimulus	videos	first	walked	before	she	started	to	crawl	and	then	
got	up	again	 to	reach	and	grasp	 for	a	ball.	The	crawling	was	either	an	efficient	
means	to	get	to	the	ball	or	an	inefficient	means,	depending	on	the	height	of	a	part	
of	the	ceiling	in	the	room	where	the	action	was	situated.	When	the	ceiling	was	low,	
crawling	was	the	only	way	to	get	to	the	target,	whereas	walking	would	have	been	
more	efficient	when	the	ceiling	was	high.	Eight-month-old	infants,	23-month-old	
toddlers,	and	a	group	of	adults	participated	in	the	experiment.	If	the	development	
of	action	prediction	based	on	situational	constraint	is	driven	by	own	action	experi-
ence,	then	the	23-month-olds	and	adults,	but	not	the	8-month-olds	should	process	
the	actions	differently.	That	is,	for	8-month-olds,	who	are	capable	of	crawling	but	
not	yet	of	walking,	crawling	is	an	efficient	means	to	get	from	A	to	B,	regardless	of	
the	situation.	For	23-month-olds,	who	are	capable	of	crawling	but	who	also	have	
extended	walking	experience,	walking	is	the	most	efficient	means	to	get	from	A	
to	B,	if	the	situation	permits	walking.	Moreover,	additional	evidence	for	the	role	
of	action	experience	would	be	a	significant	relationship	between	the	individual	
walking	experience	and	the	extent	to	which	individuals	predict	the	efficient	and	
not	the	 inefficient	action.	To	that	end,	a	parental	questionnaire	was	used	to	as-
sess	the	individual	walking	experience	of	the	toddlers.	Rationality	theory,	on	the	
other	hand,	predicts	that	all	three	age	groups	would	be	capable	of	predicting	the	
efficient	action,	and	no	relationship	should	be	observed	with	walking	experience.	
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Method
Participants
A	group	of	8-month-old	infants	(N	=	25,	Mean	age	=	8.2	months,	SD	=	0.3	months,	
12	 females),	a	group	of	23-month-old	toddlers	(N	=	24,	Mean	age	=	23.2	months,	
SD	=	0.3	months,	14	females),	and	a	group	of	adults	(N	=	17,	Mean	age	=	25	years,	
SD	=	4	years,	12	females)	participated	in	the	study.	The	infants	and	toddlers	were	
recruited	from	the	database	of	the	Baby	Research	Center	Nijmegen,	which	con-
tains	the	names	and	addresses	of	parents	who	indicated	to	be	willing	to	partake	
in	infant	research.	Prescreening	was	applied	prior	to	the	test	sessions	of	infants	
and	 toddlers	 to	 select	 8-month-old	 infants	 capable	of	 (belly-)	 crawling	but	not	
yet	capable	of	cruising	or	walking	independently.	Despite	this	prescreening	pro-
cedure,	four	8-month-olds	could	not	be	included	in	the	final	sample	as	they	were	
capable	of	walking	already	at	test	(N	=	2),	or	not	yet	capable	of	(belly-)	crawling	at	
the	day	of	testing.	The	adults	signed	up	through	a	participant	portal	for	persons	
willing	to	participate	in	experiments	of	the	Radboud	University	Nijmegen	or	via	
an	experimenter	who	advertised	the	study.	Data	of	one	other	adult	were	collected	
but	not	included	in	the	data	analyses,	due	to	an	insufficient	amount	of	valid	trials	
(2	out	of	48).	Written	informed	consent	was	obtained	from	the	parents	and	the	
participating	adults	prior	to	the	study.	As	a	thank	you	for	their	participation,	the	
participating	children	and	their	parents	received	an	infant	book	or	10	Euros,	and	
the	participating	adults	received	a	gift	voucher	of	5	Euros	or	credit	points.
Walking experience of the 23-month-old toddlers
The	 group	of	 23-month-old	 toddlers	 had	on	 average	 38	weeks	 experience	with	
walking	independently	when	they	entered	the	lab.	There	was	substantial	variabil-
ity	 in	the	toddlers’	walking	experience,	which	ranged	between	16	and	61	weeks	
(SD	=	11	weeks).
Stimuli
The	participants	were	presented	with	stimulus	videos	showing	an	avatar	which	
was	 animated	 based	 on	 human	movement	 recordings.	 A	 previous	 study	 using	
comparable	 movements	 showed	 that	 a	 transition	 from	 walking	 to	 crawling	 is	
more	predictable	if	the	crawling	is	constrained	(for	instance	because	the	crawling	
takes	place	under	a	table)	compared	to	if	it	is	unconstrained	(Stapel,	Hunnius,	&	
Bekkering,	2012).	For	the	current	study,	the	purpose	was	to	manipulate	the	action	
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constraints,	 while	 keeping	 the	movements	 of	 the	 actor	 identical	 across	 condi-
tions.	Therefore,	movements	 of	 an	 actor	were	 recorded	with	 an	MVN	Biomech	
motion	 tracking	 system	 (XSens,	 Enschede,	 the	 Netherlands)	 consisting	 of	 17	
inertial	sensors	tracking	the	movements	of	the	actor	at	120	Hz.	The	actor	started	
moving	 from	 an	 upright	 position,	 walked	 a	 step	 forward,	 turned	 to	 crawling,	
crawled	a	few	cycles	and	stood	up	again	to	reach	for	and	grasp	a	ball	located	at	
shoulder	height.	The	actor’s	movements	were	recorded	in	a	constrained	and	an	
unconstrained	situation,	as	the	crawling	took	place	underneath	a	table	frame	or	
in	a	space	without	the	table	frame.	Subsequently,	the	recorded	movements	were	
applied	to	an	avatar	using	MotionBuilder	(Autodesk,	San	Rafael,	USA).	The	avatar	
was	positioned	 in	a	3D	virtual	environment	constructed	 in	3DS	Max	(Autodesk,	
San	Rafael,	USA).	Stimulus	videos	containing	both	 the	virtual	environment	and	
the	avatar	were	rendered	in	Vizard	3.0	(World	Viz,	Santa	Barbara,	USA)	and	final-
ized	in	VirtualDub	1.6.19	(Avery	Lee).	Three	constrained	and	three	unconstrained	
movement	recordings	were	used,	leading	to	6	different	movements.
Three	types	of	video	stimuli	were	presented	during	the	experiment,	all	of	them	
720	pixels	high	and	1280	pixels	wide.	The	first	stimulus	video,	based	on	recorded	
movements	as	well,	displayed	actor	walking	with	a	ball	in	her	hands,	showing	the	
ball	to	the	observer.	This	illustrated	that	the	actor	was	capable	of	walking.	The	ball	
depicted	 in	 the	 first	stimulus	was	 the	 target	of	all	actions	shown	subsequently.	
After	the	first	stimulus,	24	(in	case	of	the	infant	and	toddler	participants)	or	48	
(adults)	trials	were	presented	in	random	order.	In	the	stimuli,	the	actor	could	be	
observed	making	 the	recorded	movements,	with	added	still	 frames	at	 the	start	
(actor	standing	for	0.5	sec)	and	at	the	end	of	the	action	(actor	standing	holding	the	
ball	for	1	sec,	see	Fig.1).	Stimulus	duration	ranged	between	10.6	and	11.7	seconds	
(M	=	 11.3	 sec).	 The	 observed	 crawling	 took	place	 in	 a	 little	 house	 in	which	 the	
ceiling	was	either	at	normal	height	so	that	it	permitted	walking	or	lowered	(see	
Fig.	2A	and	2B).	For	both	stimulus	backgrounds,	all	6	different	movements	were	
used,	 leading	 to	 identical	movements	across	conditions	and	 12	unique	stimulus	
videos.	Not	only	the	target	ball,	but	also	a	second	ball	was	included	in	the	scene	
as	a	distractor	stimulus.	We	examined	whether	participants	predicted	the	actor	
to	grasp	the	target	ball	and	thus	compared	the	frequency	of	anticipatory	looks	to	
both	balls	across	conditions	and	age	groups.	The	non-target	ball	was	located	at	
the	same	side	of	the	stimulus	as	the	target	ball,	but	on	the	floor,	whereas	the	target	
ball	was	positioned	at	shoulder-height.	Consequently,	crawling	in	the	high-ceiling	
condition	should	bias	goal-inferences	 to	 the	 low	ball	on	 the	 floor	 (i.e.	 the	non-
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Figure 1: Example	frames	taken	from	one	of	the	stimulus	videos.
Figure 2: First	frame	of	an	Efficient	(A)	and	of	an	Inefficient	(B)	action	stimulus.
Chapter	4
80
target	ball),	whereas	 crawling	 in	 the	 low-ceiling	condition	was	not	 informative	
about	whether	the	actor	would	go	for	the	high	or	low	ball.	The	color	of	the	target	
ball	(either	green	or	blue)	was	counterbalanced	between	participants.	The	non-
target	ball	was	blue	when	the	target	ball	was	green	and	green	when	the	target	ball	
was	blue.	
Procedure
Upon	arrival	in	the	lab,	participants	were	seated	in	front	of	the	computer	moni-
tor	of	 a	Tobii	 1750	eye-tracker	 (Tobii	Technologies,	Danderyd,	 Sweden).	 Infants	
were	placed	in	a	car	seat	on	their	caregiver’s	lap.	Toddlers	who	were	better	able	
to	 sit	 in	a	 stable	and	upright	position	were	 seated	directly	on	 their	 caregiver’s	
lap,	 and	 adult	 participants	were	 seated	 on	 a	 height-adjustable	 office	 chair.	 All	
participants	first	underwent	a	calibration	procedure	in	which	a	contracting	and	
expanding	circle	was	presented	on	the	screen	on	9	different	locations	after	each	
other,	 forming	 a	 3-by-3	 grid.	 The	 visual	 stimulus	was	 accompanied	 by	 a	 sound	
to	 attract	 attention	 to	 the	 screen.	 The	 calibration	was	 considered	 successful	 if	
data	was	 gathered	 for	 7	 or	more	 grid	 locations.	 Immediately	 after	 the	 calibra-
tion	procedure,	the	experiment	started	and	video	stimuli	were	displayed	on	the	
eye-tracker	 screen	 (resolution:	 1024	 by	 1280)	 while	 the	 participants’	 gaze	 was	
registered.	To	maintain	the	attention	to	the	screen,	the	experimental	stimuli	were	
interleaved	with	attractive	audiovisual	clips	(7	for	the	children,	2	for	the	adults).	
After	 the	 experiment,	 parents	 and	 adult	 participants	were	 debriefed,	 thanked,	
and	everyone	received	a	small	gift	for	participation.
Analyses
For	the	analyses,	equally-sized	square-shaped	areas	of	interest	(AoIs,	145	by	145	
px)	were	defined	around	the	target	and	non-target	ball	(see	Fig.	3).	Furthermore,	
a	 stimulus	 AoI	 was	 defined	 containing	 the	 complete	 display	 (720	 by	 1280	 px).	
Per	participant	and	per	condition,	we	counted	the	number	of	trials	in	which	the	
participant	fixated	at	 least	once	on	the	stimulus	display.	The	infant	and	toddler	
participants	 attended	 to	 at	 least	 10	 trials	 per	 condition,	 the	 adult	 participants	
watched	all	trials.	Per	participant	and	condition,	trials	were	counted	in	which	the	
participant	 looked	 at	 either	 of	 the	 ball	 AoIs	while	 the	 actor	was	 crawling.	 The	
crawling	period	was	the	chosen	period	of	 interest,	as	during	that	period	 it	was	
ambiguous	which	ball	would	be	the	target	of	the	action.	The	number	of	trials	with	
anticipatory	fixations	to	the	target	and	non-target	ball	was	divided	by	the	number	
81
Prediction	of	Efficient	and	Inefficient	Human	Actions	in	Infants	and	Adults
of	watched	trials,	and	expressed	as	percentage	per	condition	and	per	participant.	
A	mixed	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	used	to	investigate	whether	age	and	the	
efficiency	of	the	observed	action	affected	the	percentage	of	target	and	non-target	
anticipations.	If	all	age	groups	would	display	more	frequent	visual	anticipations	
to	the	target	in	the	efficient	condition	(or	less	frequent	anticipations	to	the	non-
target),	then	this	would	serve	as	support	for	rationality	theory.	If	only	the	older	
age	groups	would	display	such	an	effect,	 then	motor	simulation	might	underlie	
the	predictions	found.	In	that	case,	it	would	be	meaningful	to	conduct	a	follow-up	
analysis	 to	 investigate	whether	 individual	walking	experience	of	 the	23-month-
olds	is	correlated	with	the	ability	to	predict	the	efficient	actions	under	study.
Results
Anticipatory fixations
The	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	ball	(target,	non-target)	and	action	efficiency	
(efficient,	 inefficient)	 as	 within-subjects	 factors	 and	 age	 group	 (8-month-olds,	
23-month-olds,	adults)	as	between-subjects	factor	was	conducted	on	the	percent-
age	of	anticipatory	looks	to	either	of	the	balls.	The	analysis	yielded	a	significant	
interaction	effect	of	age	and	the	type	of	ball	(F(2,63)	=	5.65,	p	=	0.006).	Post-hoc	
paired-samples	t-tests	revealed	that	the	adults	and	the	8-month-old	infants	did	
not	differ	in	their	frequency	of	anticipatory	looks	to	the	target	(adults:	M	=	23%,	
Figure 3: Areas	of	interest	were	defined	around	the	target	ball	(blue	AoI)	and	the	non-target	ball	(yellow	
AoI).
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SD	=	20;	8-month-olds:	M	=	8%,	SD	=	10)	compared	to	the	non-target	ball	(adults:	
M	=	17%,	SD	=	8;	t(16)	=	1.25,	p =	0.228;	8-month-olds:	M	=	12%;	SD	=	8,	t(24)	=	-0.61,	
p	=	0.550,	see	Fig.	4),	whereas	the	23-month-old	toddlers	displayed	more	frequent	
anticipatory	looks	to	the	non-target		(M
non-target
	=	28%,	SD	=	16)	than	to	the	target	
ball	(M
target
	=	17%,	SD	=	10;	t(23)	=	-3.14,	p	=	0.005).	Furthermore,	a	significant	in-
teraction	between	the	type	of	ball	and	action	efficiency	was	found	(F(1,63)	=	7.33,	
p	=	0.009).	Post-hoc	paired-samples	t-tests	showed	that	there	were	no	significant	
differences	found	between	the	efficient	and	inefficient	action	in	the	frequency	of	
anticipatory	looks	to	the	target	ball	(M
efficient
	=	15%,	SD
efficient
	=	16;	M
inefficient
	=	17%,	
SD
inefficient
	 =	 16;	 t(65)	 =	 0.76,	p	 =	 0.451,	 see	 Fig.	 5),	 but	 participants	 looked	more	
frequently	 to	 the	non-target	ball	 for	 the	efficient	(M	=	20%,	SD	=	19)	compared	
to	the	inefficient	action	(M	=	15%,	SD	=	15;	t(65)	=	-2.20,	p	=	0.032).	The	difference	
between	the	frequency	of	anticipatory	looks	to	the	non-target	in	the	efficient	and	
the	inefficient	condition	was	not	found	to	be	significant	in	the	separate	age	groups	
(ts	<	1.5,	ps	>	0.15)	,	indicating	that	the	effect	only	emerges	when	aggregating	the	
data	of	the	3	age	groups	(see	also	Fig.6).	
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Figure 4: Mean	percentage	of	trials	in	which	participants	fixated	at	the	target	or	non-target	ball	while	the	
actor	was	crawling,	split	by	age	group	and	the	type	of	ball	(target	versus	non-target).	Error	bars	represent	
95%	confidence	intervals	around	the	means.
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Figure 5: Mean	percentage	of	trials	in	which	participants	fixated	at	the	target	or	non-target	ball	while	the	
actor	was	crawling,	split	by	action	efficiency	and	the	type	of	ball	(target	versus	non-target).	Error	bars	
represent	95%	confidence	intervals	around	the	means.
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Figure 6: Mean	percentage	of	trials	in	which	participants	fixated	at	the	target	or	non-target	ball	while	the	
actor	was	crawling,	split	by	age	group,	action	efficiency	and	the	type	of	ball	(target	versus	non-target).	Error	
bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	around	the	means.
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One	of	the	difficulties	of	experimental	action	prediction	research	is	that	partici-
pants	may	learn	to	predict	the	observed	actions	through	the	repeated	presenta-
tion	of	the	stimuli	(Henrichs,	Elsner,	Elsner,	&	Gredebäck,	2012;	Henrichs,	Elsner,	
Elsner,	 Wilkinson,	 &	 Gredebäck,	 2014).	 Learning	 within	 the	 experiment	 might	
diminish	conditional	differences	that	would	otherwise	be	found.	For	that	reason,	
a	post-hoc	follow-up	analysis	was	carried	out	to	investigate	whether	target	pre-
dictions	depended	on	action	efficiency	at	the	start	of	the	experiment.	Percentages	
of	the	first	two	trials	per	condition	were	analyzed	with	the	same	type	of	ANOVA	as	
used	to	analyze	the	effect	of	action	efficiency	across	all	trials.	The	results	showed	
(amongst	others)	 a	 significant	 three-way	 interaction	between	age,	 type	of	ball,	
and	action	efficiency	(F(2,63)	=	3.16,	p	=	0.049).	Repeated	measures	ANOVAs	on	
the	separate	age	groups	were	used	to	gain	insight	into	the	three-way	interaction.	
These	ANOVAs	revealed	a	marginally	significant	interaction	between	type	of	ball	
and	action	efficiency	in	the	group	of	23-month-olds	(F(1,23)	=	4.06,	p	=	0.056),	and	
a	similar,	significant	interaction	in	the	adult	group	(F(1,16)	=	7.17,	p	=	0.017),	but	not	
in	 the	8-month-olds(F(1,24)	=	0.24,	p	 =0.627).	A	paired-samples	 t-test	 indicated	
that	the	target	ball	was	more	frequently	anticipated	in	the	inefficient	(M	=	33%,	
SD	=	32)	compared	to	the	efficient	condition	(M	=	15%,	SD	=	28,	t(23)	=	2.58,	p	=	
0.017)	by	the	23-month-olds.	The	same	contrast	in	the	adult	sample	did	not	reach	
significance	(M
efficient
 =	35%,	SD
efficient
	=	34;	M
inefficient
	=	47%,	SD
inefficient
	=	41;	t(16)	=	1.29,	
p	 =	 0.216).	 In	 both	 the	 23-month-old	 group	 and	 the	 adult	 group,	 the	 difference	
between	visual	anticipations	to	the	non-target	ball	 in	the	efficient	(23-mo.:	M	=	
46%,	SD	=	36;	adults:	M	=	47%,	SD	=	37)	compared	to	the	inefficient	condition	(23-
mo:	M	=	40%,	SD	=	42;	adults:	M	=	26%,	SD	=	40)	was	found	to	be	not	significant	
(23-mo.:	 t(23)	=	 -0.59,	p	 =	0.560;	 adults:	 t(16)	=	 -1.69,	p	 =	0.110).	More	details	of	
these	analyses	can	be	found	in	the	supplementary	materials.
Discussion
The	current	study	aimed	to	investigate	whether	predictions	of	observed	actions	
depend	 on	 situational	 constraints	 that	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	
observed	action.	 In	addition,	 the	developmental	 timeline	and	 the	role	of	motor	
experience	for	predictions	based	on	action	constraints	were	studied.	No	evidence	
was	 found	 for	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 action	 targets	 of	 efficient	 actions	 are	 more	
predictable	than	the	targets	of	 inefficient	actions	as	no	difference	was	found	in	
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the	 frequency	of	 anticipatory	 looks	 to	 the	 target	between	 the	 efficient	 and	 the	
inefficient	 action	 condition.	 These	 results	 seem	 somewhat	 incompatible	 with	
rule-based	inferential	action	processing	as	laid	out	in	rationality	theory	(Gergely	
&	Csibra,	2003),	which	predicts	that	infants	and	adults,	regardless	of	their	action	
experience,	can	predict	efficient	actions.	Expectations	derived	from	motor	theo-
ries	were	also	not	met,	as	motor	theories	would	predict	that	infants	and	adults	
capable	of	performing	the	observed	action	would	also	be	capable	of	basing	their	
predictions	on	action	efficiency.	 In	sum,	 the	results	are	 incompatible	with	both	
rationality	theory	and	motor	simulation	theories,	as	none	of	the	age	groups	was	
found	to	make	efficiency-based	predictions.
Action	 prediction,	 and	more	 specifically	 the	 prediction	 of	 the	 target	 location	
of	an	observed	action,	was	expected	to	be	based	on	situational	constraints	and	
hence	the	efficiency	of	the	observed	action.	The	hypothesis	that	efficient	actions	
would	be	more	predictable	than	inefficient	actions	can	be	derived	from	multiple	
theoretical	accounts.	Rationality	theory	(Gergely,	&	Csibra,	2003)	postulates	that	
infants	and	adults	expect	others	to	act	efficiently,	and	hence,	observers	are	sup-
posed	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 predicting	 efficient,	 but	 not	 inefficient	 actions.	 Motor	
theories	(Wolpert,	1997;	Nelson,	1983)	and	theories	about	motor	simulation	and	
prediction	(e.g.,	Wolpert	et	al.,	2003)	would	claim	that	the	motor	system	selects	
the	most	optimal	and	efficient	actions	during	action	production	and	therefore	ef-
ficiency	is	expected	to	play	a	role	in	action	observation	as	well.	More	broadly,	con-
strained	actions	have	fewer	degrees	of	freedom	and	can	therefore	be	expected	to	
be	more	predictable.	Both	rationality	theory	and	motor	theories	would	therefore	
predict	that	action	constraints	enable	observers	to	better	predict	the	outcome	of	
the	observed	action.
However,	 the	 current	 results	 lend	 no	 support	 for	 the	 notion	 that	 actions	 are	
more	predictable	when	they	are	constrained	by	the	situation	compared	to	when	
the	 action	 is	 unconstrained.	 There	 was	 no	 difference	 in	 anticipatory	 looks	 to	
the	target	 in	the	efficient	compared	to	the	inefficient	condition,	not	even	in	the	
group	of	adults.	Participants	were	even	more	likely	to	look	at	the	non-target	ball	
during	the	efficient	action.	Potentially,	participants	inferred	that	the	actor	could	
not	see	the	target	while	crawling	underneath	the	low	ceiling,	and	therefore	did	
not	expect	the	actor	to	go	the	target,	but	rather	expected	the	actor	to	go	for	the	
ball	that	was	in	the	line	of	sight	of	the	actor	during	crawling	(i.e.	the	non-target	
ball).	A	potential	explanation	for	the	non-significant	difference	between	target-
predictions	in	the	efficient	and	the	inefficient	action	is	the	multi-facetted	aspect	of	
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the	action.	It	is	known	from	joint	action	research	investigating	multi-step	actions	
that	 co-actors	 tend	 to	 generate	 predictions	 about	 and	 plan	 ahead	 for	 the	 first	
step	of	 the	 co-actors	actions	 (e.g.,	 the	 reaching	 for	an	object,	 see	Ray	&	Welsh,	
2011),	but	do	not	immediately	take	the	second	step	(e.g.,	subsequently	placing	the	
object	at	a	different	location,	see	Meyer,	van	der	Wel	&	Hunnius,	2013)	into	account	
when	acting	jointly.	Another	reason	might	be	that	in	normal	situations,	the	actor’s	
movements	may	 form	 the	 primary	 source	 of	 information	 for	 action	 prediction	
(Stapel	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 and	 information	 about	 the	 action	 constraints	 is	 not	neces-
sary	in	those	cases.	Based	on	the	velocity	profile	(Graf	et	al.,	2007)	together	with	
curvature	 of	 the	 action	 (Flash	&	Hogan,	 1985)	 observers	 can	make	 predictions	
about	the	end-location	of	an	action.	If	the	movements	are	uninformative	about	the	
target	of	the	action	and	predictions	have	to	solely	rely	on	the	situation,	generating	
action	predictions	might	 thus	be	more	difficult.	 Adults	 have	been	 shown	 to	be	
capable	of	 learning	to	predict	the	future	course	of	an	action	path,	 including	the	
path	of	efficient	actions	(Paulus	et	al.,	2011c;	Kayhan,	Monroy,	Gerson,	Hunnius,	&	
Bekkering,	 in	prep.),	but	these	predictions	were	only	made	if	prior	 information	
was	available.	For	instance,	having	frequently	observed	the	same	efficient	action	
might	enable	adults	to	predict	the	future	path	of	that	action	(Paulus	et	al.,	2011c;	
Kayhan	et	al.,	in	prep.).
Actions	are	not	performed	in	a	vacuum,	but	embedded	in	situations.	In	theory,	
action	constraints	can	be	informative	for	the	prediction	of	the	target	of	an	action	
(Gergely	&	Csibra,	2003;	Kilner	et	al.,	2007).	However,	in	the	current	study,	no	evi-
dence	was	found	indicating	that	action	constraints	are	taken	into	account	when	
predicting	the	target	of	an	action.	Potentially,	the	multi-step	nature	of	the	action	
used	in	the	current	study	prevented	observers	from	using	the	action	constraints	
for	the	generation	of	goal-predictions,	but	rather	enabled	them	to	make	predic-
tions	about	the	first	next	step	of	the	action.	Therefore,	more	research	is	needed	
to	 unravel	whether	 and	 how	 action	 constraints	 are	 used	 for	 action	 prediction.	
Action	constraints	can	rule	out	some	of	the	many	future	courses	an	unfolding	ac-
tion	might	take.	Therefore,	action	constraints	may	turn	out	to	be	a	valuable	source	
of	information	for	action	prediction,	though	more	empirical	research	is	needed	to	
investigate	whether	constraints	indeed	inform	the	prediction	of	others’	actions.
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Supplementary materials
Anticipations in the first two trials
A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	conducted	to	analyze	the	anticipation	frequency	
during	 the	 first	 two	 trials	 per	 condition.	 The	within-subject	 factors	 used	were	
ball	 (target,	 non-target),	 and	 action	 efficiency	 (efficient,	 inefficient),	 and	 age	
group	(8-month-olds,	23-month-olds,	adults)	was	included	as	a	between-subjects	
factor.	A	main	effect	of	age	was	found	(F(2,63)	=	10.57,	p	<	0.001),	indicating	that	
8-month-olds	anticipated	either	of	 the	balls	 less	 frequently	 (M	=	 12%,	SD	=	 16)	
than	23-month-olds	(M	=	33%,	SD	=	22,	t(42.7)	=	-3.89,	p	<	0.001)	and	adults	did	(M	
=	39%,	SD	=	25,	t(25.5)	=	-3.97,	p	=	0.001).	The	adults	and	23-month-old	infants	did	
not	differ	significantly	in	their	anticipation	frequency	(t(39)	=	-0.78,	p 	=	0.442).	
The	ANOVA	furthermore	yielded	a	significant	interaction	between	ball	and	age	
group	on	the	anticipation	frequency	(F(2,63)	=	3.33,	p	=	0.042).	Post-hoc	paired-
samples	t-tests	revealed	that	8-month-olds	(M
target
	=	11%,	SD	=	16,	M
non-target
	=	13%,	
SD	=	23,	t(24)	=	-0.44,	p	=	0.664)	and	adults	(M
target
	=	41%,	SD	=	33,	M
non-target
	=	37%,	
SD	=	29,	t	(16)	=	0.47,	p	=	0.645)	did	not	display	a	difference	in	the	frequency	of	
anticipating	to	the	target	and	non-target	ball,	whereas	23-month-olds	did	(t(23)	=	
-3.00,	p	=	0.006).	The	23-month-olds	looked	more	frequently	at	the	non-target	ball	
(M	=	43%,	SD	=	29)	than	the	target	ball	(M	=	24%,	SD	=	24)	while	the	action	was	
still	unfolding.
In	 addition,	 action	 efficiency	 and	 type	 of	 ball	 had	 a	 combined	 effect	 on	 the	
frequency	of	anticipatory	looks	(F(1,63)	=	7.77,	p	=	0.007).	While	anticipations	to	
the	non-target	ball	did	not	differ	 in	 frequency	 for	 the	efficient	 (M	=	34%,	SD	=	
36)	and	inefficient	action	condition	(M	=	26%,	SD	=	37%,	t(65)	=	-1.56,	 p	=	0.124),	
anticipations	to	the	target	ball	did	differ	marginally	(t(65)	=	1.80,	p	=	0.077).	More	
frequent	target	anticipations	were	observed	in	the	inefficient	(M	=	27%,	SD	=	34)	
compared	to	the	efficient	action	condition	(M	=	20%,	SD	=	29).
Lastly,	 action	efficiency,	 type	of	ball	 and	age	group	were	 found	 to	have	a	 sig-
nificant	three-way	interaction	effect	on	the	anticipation	frequency	(F(2,63)	=	3.16,	
p	 =	 0.049).	 Repeated	measures	ANOVAs	were	 run	 on	 the	 data	 of	 the	 three	 age	
groups	separately	to	find	which	of	the	groups	showed	a	significant	interaction	of	
action	efficiency	and	ball	on	the	frequency	of	anticipatory	looks.	This	interaction	
was	found	to	be	(marginally)	significant	for	the	23-month-olds	(F(1,23)	=	4.06,	p	
=	 0.056)	 and	 the	 adults	 (F(1,16)	 =	 7.17,	p	 =	 0.017),	 but	 not	 for	 the	 8-month-olds	
(F(1,24)	=	0.24,	p	=	0.627).	The	23-month-old	infants	anticipated	more	frequently	
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to	the	target	in	the	efficient	compared	to	the	inefficient	condition	(t(23)	=	2.58,	p	
=	0.017),	whereas	such	conditional	differences	were	not	found	for	visual	anticipa-
tions	to	the	non-target	(t(23)	=	-0.59,	p	=	0.560).	In	the	adult	data,	no	differences	
were	found	between	the	efficient	and	inefficient	action	condition	in	the	frequency	
of	anticipations	 to	 the	 target	ball	 (t(16)	=	 1.29,	p	=	0.22),	 and	 the	same	held	 for	
anticipations	to	the	non-target	ball	(t(16)	=	-1.69,	p	=	0.11).	The	absence	of	a	signifi-
cant	difference	in	either	of	the	t-tests	shows	that	the	interaction	was	significant	
only	because	the	difference	of	the	difference	was	significant.	There	tended	to	be	
more	target	anticipations	in	the	inefficient	(M	=	47%,	SD	=	41)	compared	to	the	
efficient	 condition	 (M	=	 35%,	 SD	=	 34),	whereas	 there	 tended	 to	 be	more	non-
target	anticipations	in	the	efficient	(M	=	47%,	SD	=	37)	compared	to	the	inefficient	
condition	(M	=	26%,	SD	=	40).

Chapter 5
Motor	System	Contribution	to	Action	
Prediction:	Temporal	Accuracy	
Depends	on	Motor	Experience
Keywords: Action	prediction;	Simulation;	Prediction	accuracy;	Motor	system
Based on:	Stapel,	J.C.,	Hunnius,	S.,	Meyer,	M.,	&	Bekkering,	H.	(in	revision).	Motor	
system	contribution	to	action	prediction:	Temporal	accuracy	depends	on	motor	
experience.
Abstract
Predicting	others’	actions	is	essential	
for	well-coordinated	social	interactions.	
In	two	experiments	with	an	infant	
population,	this	study	addresses	to	what	
extent	motor	experience	of	an	observer	
determines	prediction	accuracy	for	others’	
actions.	Results	show	that	infants	who	
were	proficient	crawlers	but	inexperienced	
walkers	predicted	crawling	more	ac-
curately	than	walking,	whereas	age	groups	
mastering	both	skills	(i.e.	toddlers	and	
adults)	were	equally	accurate	in	predict-
ing	walking	and	crawling.	Regardless	
of	experience,	human	movements	were	
predicted	more	accurately	by	all	age-
groups	than	non-human	movement	control	
stimuli.	This	suggests	that	for	predictions	
to	be	accurate,	the	observed	act	needs	to	
be	established	in	the	motor	repertoire	of	
the	observer.	Through	the	acquisition	of	
new	motor	skills,	we	also	become	better	at	
predicting	others’	actions.	
The	findings	thus	stress	the	relevance	
of	motor	experience	for	social-cognitive	
development.
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Introduction
Predicting	others’	actions	is	crucial	for	acting	in	a	social	world.	For	social	interac-
tion	to	run	smoothly,	accurate	predictions	of	the	precise	timing	of	the	partner’s	
movements	are	necessary	(Sebanz	&	Knoblich,	2009).	According	to	the	simulation	
account	 (Wilson	&	Knoblich,	 2005),	 the	motor	 system	 generates	 predictions	 of	
how	 observed	 actions	 will	 continue	 in	 time	 and	 space.	 These	 predictions	 are	
thought	to	be	based	on	the	motor	program	a	person	uses	for	executing	the	same	
action	(Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Prinz,	2006;	Wolpert	et	al.,	2003).	Studies	contrasting	
human	 and	 non-human	 movements	 provide	 a	 first	 indication	 that	 the	 motor	
system	is	 indeed	involved	in	the	prediction	of	actions	and	their	timing:	Though	
human	motion	should	be	much	harder	to	predict	due	to	its	complexity,	empirical	
results	show	the	opposite	(Saunier,	Papaxanthis,	Vargas,	&	Pozzo,	2008;	Stadler	
et	al.,	2012).	The	current	study	investigated	whether	the	motor	system	is	crucially	
involved	in	action	prediction	by	comparing	how	well	groups	with	different	motor	
experiences	can	predict	different	actions.
Previous	neuroimaging	 studies	 showed	 that	 the	motor	 system	 is	not	only	 in-
volved	in	action	execution,	but	also	in	action	observation	(e.g.,	Candidi,	Sacheli,	
Mega,	&	Aglioti,	2014;	de	Bruijn,	Schubotz,	&	Ullsperger,	2007;	Glenberg	et	al.,	2010;	
Hari	et	al.,	 1998;	Malfait	et	al.,	2009;	Rizzolatti	et	al.,	 1996a).	Motor	activation	in	
adults	 is	 found	 to	be	 stronger	 if	 the	observer	has	more	motor	experience	with	
this	action	(Calvo-Merino	et	al.,	2005,	2006;	Cross	et	al.,	2006).	The	same	holds	for	
infants	as	shown	in	a	study	by	Van	Elk	and	colleagues	(2008b).	The	tested	14-	to	
16-month-old	 infants,	who	were	 experienced	 crawlers	 but	 inexperienced	walk-
ers,	 displayed	 stronger	motor	 activation	while	watching	 crawling	 compared	 to	
walking	movements.	Motor	experience	thus	changes	action	perception.	But	does	
it	also	have	an	impact	on	the	accuracy	of	for	example	temporal	action	predictions?	
Presumably,	the	internal	model	that	predicts	the	sensory	consequences	of	a	mo-
tor	command,	also	called	a	forward	model	(Wolpert	et	al.,	2003),	becomes	more	
fine-grained	through	action	experience.	Such	an	experience-based	forward	model	
would	then	result	in	predictions	of	observed	actions	that	become	more	accurate	
with	increasing	action	experience.
Converging	evidence	suggests	 that	 the	motor	 system	plays	an	 important	 role	
in	the	prediction	of	perceived	actions.	That	is,	the	motor	system	is	active	during	
action	prediction	tasks	(Fontana	et	al.,	2012)	prior	to	goal	attainment	(Umiltà	et	
al.,	 2001),	and	sometimes	even	prior	 to	action	onset	 (Kilner	et	al.,	 2004).	Motor	
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activation	is	stronger	when	the	observed	action	is	not	yet	completed	than	when	
the	goal	is	attained	(Urgesi,	Moro,	Candidi,	&	Aglioti,	2006;	Urgesi	et	al.,	2010).	The	
accumulating	evidence	 from	 the	neuroimaging	 literature,	however,	 leaves	open	
the	question	whether	there	is	a	measurable	behavioral	benefit	of	the	involvement	
of	the	motor	system	when	observing	another	person’s	action.	One	benefit	 illus-
trated	in	many	recent	studies	is	that	infants	more	readily	infer	the	end	location	
of	an	observed	action	if	that	action	is	part	of	their	motor	repertoire.	For	instance,	
infants	are	quicker	to	infer	the	end	location	of	a	human	compared	to	a	non-human	
action	 (Cannon	&	Woodward,	 2012;	Falck-Ytter	et	 al.,	 2006;	Kanakogi	&	 Itakura,	
2011)	and	quicker	to	make	a	goal	inference	if	they	are	more	proficient	in	the	action	
they	observe	 (Ambrosini	 et	 al.,	 2013;	Gredebäck	&	Kochukhova,	 2010;	Kanakogi	
&	 Itakura,	 2011).	Opponents	of	 this	 interpretation	argue	 that	goal	 inference	 im-
proves	due	to	general	motor	maturation	rather	than	as	a	result	of	increased	active	
experience	with	the	specific	actions	involved	(Southgate,	2013).	It	thus	still	needs	
to	be	examined	whether	the	prediction	of	an	action	benefits	from	experience	with	
specifically	this	action	and	whether	motor	involvement	supports	precise	tempo-
ral	predictions	which	are	needed	in	everyday	social	interactions.	
To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 the	 current	 study	 compares	 the	 prediction	 ac-
curacy	of	actions	that	are	either	part	of	the	observer’s	motor	repertoire	or	not.	
To	 that	 end,	 the	 participant	 groups	were	 selected	 such	 that	 they	 had	 different	
motor	capabilities	because	of	their	age.	This	developmental	approach	provides	a	
unique	opportunity	to	study	the	benefits	of	action	experience	for	the	prediction	
of	observed	actions	in	a	natural	training	setting,	namely	by	examining	the	impact	
of	real-life	experiences.	Initially,	testing	and	comparing	prediction	accuracy	over	
different	age	groups	might	appear	difficult,	as	reaction	times	tend	to	be	slower	
and	more	 variable	 in	 young	 children,	 making	 it	 hard	 to	 weigh	 their	 reactions	
against	those	of	older	age	groups.	However,	the	oculomotor	system	reaches	adult	
levels	of	functioning	early	in	life	(Hunnius,	2007),	which	makes	gaze	location	and	
gaze	timing	suitable	measures	to	test	action	prediction	performance	across	age	
groups	(Falck-Ytter	et	al.,	2006;	Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010).	When	predicting	the	
trajectory	of	objects	reappearing	from	behind	an	occluder,	even	infants	have	been	
shown	to	take	into	account	complex	velocity	profiles	of	moving	objects	(e.g.,	cir-
cular	movement	by	9	months	of	age,	Gredebäck,	von	Hofsten,	&	Boudreau,	2002).	
In	a	similar	fashion,	gaze	timing	to	a	post-occluder	area	was	used	as	a	measure	of	
action	prediction	accuracy	in	the	current	study.	All	participants	observed	videos	
of	an	actor	or	object	moving	 from	one	side	of	 the	scene	to	 the	other.	The	actor	
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briefly	disappeared	behind	an	occluder	and	 then	reappeared	on	 the	other	 side	
(see	Fig.	1).	The	participants’	ability	to	accurately	predict	when	the	actor	or	object	
would	reappear	was	investigated.	Besides	prediction	accuracy,	the	stability	of	the	
predictions	was	measured,	which	also	provides	information	about	the	underlying	
prediction	process:	whereas	high	variability	in	prediction	accuracy	might	reflect	
guessing,	little	variability	likely	stems	from	a	well-established	process	(Zanone	&	
Kelso,	1997).
To	investigate	whether	differences	found	in	action	prediction	accuracy	between	
age	groups	are	not	due	to	general	(motor)	maturation,	but	related	to	motor	expe-
rience	with	the	specific	actions	observed,	different	actions	were	used.	Experiment	
1	 served	 as	 a	 proof	 of	 concept,	 comparing	 14-month-old	 infants	 (experienced	
crawlers,	 inexperienced	 walkers)	 with	 30-month-old	 toddlers	 and	 adults	 (ex-
perienced	 in	both	walking	and	crawling).	The	 infant	group	was	expected	 to	be	
more	accurate	and	stable	 in	predicting	crawling	compared	to	walking,	whereas	
the	other	age	groups	were	 to	be	equally	stable	and	accurate	 in	predicting	both	
actions.	In	Experiment	2,	18-	to	20-month-old	toddlers	were	investigated	to	test	
whether	 relatively	 little	 walking	 experience	 would	 be	 sufficient	 to	 accurately	
predict	walking.
In	both	experiments,	a	third	condition	was	included	which	displayed	an	object	
moving	through	the	scene.	This	allowed	for	a	comparison	between	predictions	of	
movements	that	can	be	generated	by	the	motor	system	and	movements	that	are	
probably	 predicted	using	 other	 brain	 areas,	 such	 as	Medial	 Superior	Temporal	
area	(MST)	and	Middle	Temporal	area	(MT,	Newsome,	Wurtz,	Dursteler,	&	Mikami,	
1985;	Tanaka	&	Saito,	 1989).	These	areas	 respond	 to	non-biological	movements	
in	a	visual	scene	 in	macaque	monkeys,	and	especially	MST	 is	responsive	 to	 the	
direction	of	movement	in	humans	as	well	(Smith,	Wall,	Williams,	&	Singh,	2006).	
In	 line	with	previous	research	(Saunier	et	al.,	2008;	Stadler	et	al.,	2012),	predic-
tions	of	human	movements	were	expected	to	be	more	accurate	and	stable	than	
predictions	of	the	non-human	movements.
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Experiment 1
METHOD
Subjects
Sixteen	right-handed	adults	(11	females,	mean	age	=	22.8	years,	SD	=	3.6),	seventeen	
infants	(10	females,	mean	age	=	14.0	months,	SD	=	0.26),	and	twenty-three	toddlers	
(6	females,	mean	age	=	29.9	months,	SD	=	0.33)	were	tested.	Two	additional	infants	
and	two	additional	toddlers	were	tested	but	data	were	not	included	in	the	analy-
ses	due	to	insufficient	calibration	of	the	eye-tracker.	All	children	were	recruited	
via	the	database	of	the	Baby	Research	Center	Nijmegen,	which	consists	of	parents	
who	signed	up	for	participation	in	child	research.	The	adults	were	recruited	via	
the	university’s	participant	database.	Participants	in	the	adult	sample	and	parents	
of	the	child	participants	gave	written	informed	consent	for	participation	(either	
their	own	or	their	child’s)	in	the	study.
Procedure
All	participants	were	presented	with	the	same	set	of	stimuli	on	a	Tobii	1750	eye-
tracker	 (Tobii	 Technology,	 Stockholm,	 Sweden).	 First,	 a	 calibration	 procedure	
was	administered,	during	which	participants	viewed	contracting	and	expanding	
circles	placed	on	a	3	by	3	 (children)	or	4	by	4	grid	 (adults).	Data	was	 included	
in	the	analyses	if	sufficient	information	for	minimally	7	(children)	or	14	(adults)	
calibration	 points	was	 available.	 After	 calibration,	 48	 (children)	 or	 96	 (adults)	
stimulus	 repetitions	 were	 presented	 in	 random	 order,	 interleaved	 with	 brief	
audiovisual	clips	to	maintain	attention	to	the	screen.	
Materials
The	stimulus	material	consisted	of	short	movies	displaying	either	an	object	or	an	
infant	actor	moving	from	left	to	right	or	right	to	left	in	the	scene	(8	different	mov-
ies	per	condition,	duration:	73-112	frames,	25	frames	per	second).	The	six	different	
infant	actors	were	filmed	while	either	walking	or	crawling	towards	their	parent	
who	was	not	visible	in	the	stimulus.	Part	of	the	stimulus	was	occluded	by	a	black	
rectangle	(290	x	396	px),	so	that	the	actor’s	or	object’s	movements	were	hidden	
from	view	for	280	to	720	ms	during	each	stimulus	presentation	(see	Fig.	1).	The	
occluder	was	 located	30	pixels	 from	the	side	of	 the	stimulus	display	where	 the	
movements	would	end,	leaving	open	a	small	area	of	the	scene	where	the	actor	or	
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Figure 1: Example	frames	from	the	three	stimulus	conditions,	A)	infant	crawling,	B)	infant	walking,	and	C)	
moving	object.
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object	would	reappear	after	occlusion.	Occlusion	duration	was	varied	to	ensure	
that	predictions	could	not	be	based	on	fixed	timing	after	stimulus	onset.	Variation	
in	occlusion	duration	was	achieved	by	selecting	videos	of	actors	who	differed	in	
velocity.	The	different	durations	were	matched	across	conditions.	The	time	from	
stimulus	onset	to	full	occlusion	of	the	actor	or	object	was	fixed	(55	frames).	The	
stimulus	videos	containing	the	object	were	created	with	Adobe	Premiere	(Adobe,	
San	Jose,	USA).	Different	objects	were	used	to	match	the	variety	in	actors.	The	ob-
jects	were	first	cut	out	(using	Adobe	Illustrator)	from	a	frame	of	a	video	recorded	
in	the	same	room	as	the	infant	actors	to	ensure	similar	lighting	conditions.	Then,	
the	objects	were	moved	 through	 the	background	scenes	with	constant	velocity	
using	Adobe	Premiere.	Occlusion	durations	were	matched	with	the	infant	actor	
stimuli.
A	parental	questionnaire	was	put	 together	with	questions	 about	 the	 children’s	
walking	experience.	Questions	concerned	the	start	date	of	supported	and	inde-
pendent	walking	and	the	certainty	with	which	parents	could	recall	these	dates.	
Many	parents	reported	having	noted	down	the	developmental	milestones	of	their	
infant	 in	a	diary.	The	questionnaire	was	 filled	 in	only	by	the	 infants’	parents	to	
assess	whether	they	indeed	had	little	walking	experience.
RESULTS
The	area	of	the	scene	where	the	actor	or	object	would	reappear	was	used	as	an	
Area	of	Interest	(AoI)	in	the	eye	movement	analysis.	Data	from	the	first	200	ms	of	
every	stimulus	presentation	was	excluded,	because	gaze	may	still	have	lingered	at	
a	location	determined	by	the	previous	stimulus	movie.	The	stimulus	movies	con-
tinued	for	minimally	9	frames	(360	ms)	after	reappearance	of	the	actor.	To	allow	
comparisons	between	conditions,	fixations	initiated	after	360	ms	were	discarded.	
Fixations	 to	 the	AoI	 throughout	 the	 stimulus	presentation	were	 identified,	 and	
fixations	closest	in	time	to	the	moment	of	reappearance	were	selected.	Fixations	
to	the	post-occluder	area	are	expected	to	be	aligned	in	time	with	the	reappear-
ance	of	the	actor	or	object	(Bennett	&	Barnes,	2006).	Hence,	the	difference	in	the	
onset	 of	 fixation	 to	 the	AoI	 and	 the	 actual	 reappearance	 of	 the	 actor	 or	 object	
was	taken	as	an	index	of	prediction	accuracy.	Furthermore,	per	participant,	the	
standard	deviation	of	the	timing	of	the	fixations	was	calculated	per	condition	and	
used	as	a	measure	for	prediction	stability.
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Repeated	measures	ANOVAs	were	conducted	with	Type	of	movement	 (crawl-
ing,	walking,	object)	as	within-subjects	 factor	and	Age	group	(infants,	 toddlers,	
adults)	 as	 between-subjects	 factor.	 Overall	 prediction	 accuracy	 (F(1.7,	 89.3)	 =	
33.8,	p	<	0.001,	ƞp	=	0.39)2	and	stability	(F(2,104)	=	19.1,	p	<	0.001,	ƞp	=	0.27)	were	
higher	for	the	human	actions	compared	to	the	object	movement,	as	indicated	by	a	
main	effect	of	Movement	type.	Effects	as	described	were	further	examined	using	
paired-samples	t-tests	(Movement	type	and	Age	by	Movement	type	interaction)	
and	independent	samples	t-tests	(Age).	Detailed	outcomes	of	these	tests	can	be	
found	in	Tables	1,	2	and	3.	Predictions	of	crawling	movements	tended	to	be	more	
stable	than	of	walking	movements	(t(54)	=	-1.91,	p	=	0.06),	and	this	effect	seems	
to	be	driven	by	infant	group	(see	Fig.3).	A	comparison	of	the	age	groups	(F(2,52)	
=	25.28,	p	<	0.001,	ƞp	=	0.49)	shows	that	infants	were	least	stable	in	their	predic-
tions,	followed	by	the	toddlers.	Infants	were	also	less	accurate	in	their	predictions	
compared	to	adults	and	toddlers	(F(2,52)	=	9.24,	p	<	0.001,	ƞp	=	0.26).
Our	analyses	 focused	on	whether	 the	age	groups	differed	 in	prediction	perfor-
mance	 for	 the	 three	 movements	 and	 revealed	 significant	 interaction	 effects	
between	Age	and	Movement	type	for	both	prediction	accuracy	(F(3.4,	89.3)	=	6.31,	
p	<	0.001,	ƞp	=	0.20)	and	prediction	stability	(F(4,104)	=	6.36,	p	<	0.001,	ƞp	=	0.20).	
Infants	were	less	accurate	(t(15)	=	3.27,	p	<	0.01)	and	less	stable	(t(15)	=	-4.66,	p	
<	0.001)	 in	 their	predictions	of	walking	compared	 to	 crawling	actions,	whereas	
adults	 and	 toddlers	 displayed	 equally	 stable	 and	 accurate	 predictions	 for	 both	
walking	and	crawling	(see	Table	1	and	2).	Predictions	for	human	movements	were	
more	accurate	and	stable	 than	 for	 the	object	movements	 in	all	age	groups	(see	
Table	1	and	2).
2 		In	cases	in	which	sphericity	could	be	not	assumed	as	indicated	by	a	significant	outcome	of	Mau-
chly’s	test	of	Sphericity,	Huynh-Feldt	corrected	ANOVA	results	are	reported.
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Figure 2: Action	prediction	accuracy:	difference	in	time	between	gaze	arrival	at	the	post-occluder	area	and	
the	time	of	actual	reappearance,	split	by	age	group	and	type	of	observed	movement.	Bars	represent	95%	
confidence	intervals	around	the	means.
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Figure 3: Action	prediction	stability:	standard	deviation	of	the	difference	in	time	between	gaze	arrival	at	the	
post-occluder	area	and	the	time	of	actual	reappearance	per	participant	and	per	type	of	observed	movement.	
Bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals	around	the	means.
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DISCUSSION
Two	main	 conclusions	 can	 be	 derived	 from	 Experiment	 1.	 First,	 in	 accordance	
with	what	we	had	hypothesized,	action	prediction	was	more	accurate	and	more	
stable	for	observed	actions	participants	had	more	motor	experience	with.	Second,	
in	line	with	previous	research,	predictions	of	human	movements	were	more	ac-
curate	than	predictions	of	non-human	movements	(Saunier	et	al.,	2008;	Stadler	et	
al.,	2012).	In	the	following	experiment,	two	factors	were	controlled	for	that	might	
be	criticized	in	Experiment	1.	In	Experiment	2,	a	more	natural	non-human	control	
was	used,	namely	video-recorded	rolling	balls.	Furthermore,	a	critical	age	group	
of	18-	to	20-month-old	toddlers	was	included	to	test	whether	relatively	little	walk-
ing	experience	is	sufficient	to	accurately	predict	walking.
Table 1: Results	of	the	paired-samples	t-tests	used	to	examine	the	effects	of	age	group	on	prediction	
accuracy.	*)	p	<	0.05,	**)	p	≤	0.01,	***)	p	≤	0.001.
Age Group Crawling-Walking Crawling-Object Walking-Object
Infants t(15) = 3.27** t(15) = 6.44*** t(15) = 2.52*
Toddlers t(22) = -0.95 t(22) =3.74*** t(22) = 5.42***
Adults t(15) = -1.30 t(15) = 5.44*** t(15) = 6.17***
All participants t(54) = 1.54 t(54) = 6.32*** t(54) = 5.84***
Table 2: Results	of	the	paired-samples	t-tests	used	to	examine	the	effects	of	age	group	on	prediction	
stability.	*)	p	<	0.05,	**)	p	≤	0.01,	***)	p	≤	0.001.
Age Group Crawling-Walking Crawling-Moving object Walking-Moving object
Infants t(15) = -4.66*** t(15) = -6.96*** t(15) = -1.06
Toddlers t(22) = 0.47 t(22) = -2.49* t(22) = -3.48**
Adults t(15) = 0.64 t(15) = -3.95*** t(15) = -3.43**
All participants t(54) = -1.91 t(54) = -5.42*** t(54) = -4.01***
Table 3: Results	of	the	independent-samples	t-tests	used	to	examine	the	differences	between	the	age	groups	
on	Prediction	Accuracy	and	Stability.	*)	p	<	0.05,	**)	p	≤	0.01,	***)	p	≤	0.001.
Age Group Infants-Toddlers Infants-Adults Toddlers-Adults
Prediction Accuracy t(37) = -2.67** t(30) = -5.05*** t(37) = -1.69
Prediction Stability t(37) = 2.40* t(23.5) = 6.91*** 1 t(37) = 5.61***
1	In	case	equal	variances	could	not	be	assumed	as	indicated	by	a	significant	outcome	of	Levene’s	test	for	
equality	of	variances,	adjusted	dfs	are	reported.
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Experiment 2
METHOD
Subjects
Eighteen	infants	between	18	and	20	months	of	age	took	part	in	Experiment	2.	The	
sample	 consisted	of	 6	 infants	 from	each	month	 cohort	 (11	 females,	mean	age	=	
19.7	months,	SD	=	1.04).	Two	additional	infants	were	recruited	but	data	were	not	
included	in	the	analyses,	due	to	technical	failure	(N	=	1)	or	inability	to	walk	(N	=	
1).	The	participants	were	recruited	via	the	database	of	the	Baby	Research	Center	
Nijmegen.	Written	parental	informed	consent	was	obtained	prior	to	the	study.
Procedure
The	young	toddlers	first	participated	in	an	eye-tracking	experiment	with	a	pro-
cedure	identical	to	Experiment	1.	After	the	experiment,	their	walking	proficiency	
was	assessed.	Children	were	asked	to	walk	on	a	straight	 line	of	several	meters,	
which	had	been	set	out	on	the	floor	using	white	tape	(width	of	1	cm)	on	the	floor.	
The	experimenter	first	demonstrated	how	to	walk	on	the	line	by	placing	the	feet	
sequentially	on	it	and	then	invited	the	toddler	to	follow	her	example.	A	camera	
was	positioned	at	the	start	of	the	line	with	the	line	in	the	middle	of	the	field	of	
view.	Care	was	taken	that	the	camera	was	positioned	in	the	exact	same	way	for	
each	testing	session.	After	administration	of	this	walking	task,	parents	filled	in	a	
questionnaire	about	 the	walking	experience	of	 their	 child,	 similar	 to	 the	 infant	
group	in	Experiment	1.
Materials
The	 walking	 and	 crawling	 stimulus	 videos	 of	 Experiment	 1	 were	 also	 used	 in	
Experiment	 2.	 The	 object	 videos	 were	 replaced	 by	 videos	 displaying	 a	 rolling	
ball.	The	size	of	the	ball	in	the	video	and	occlusion	duration	were	matched	with	
the	walking	 and	 crawling	 stimuli.	 Rolling	 balls	 were	 recorded	 against	 a	 green	
background	and	edited	into	the	same	background	as	the	human	movement	videos	
(using	Adobe	Premiere	Elements	11).	Three	different	balls	were	used	to	match	the	
different	actors	displayed	in	the	human	movement	stimuli.
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Results
The	analyses	of	the	gaze	data	were	identical	to	Experiment	1.	Repeated	measures	
ANOVAs	were	conducted	with	Movement	Type	(crawling,	walking,	ball)	as	within-
subjects	 factor.	Movement	 type	had	an	effect	on	prediction	accuracy	(F(2,	32)	=	
10.2,	p	<	0.001,	 ,	ƞp	=	0.39),	with	accuracy	being	higher	 for	 the	two	types	of	hu-
man	movements	compared	to	the	ball	movement,	but	not	significantly	different	
between		crawling	and	walking	(see	Table	4	and	Fig.	2).	For	prediction	stability,	
no	significant	effect	of	Movement	Type	was	observed	(F(2,24)	=	1.49,	p	=	0.25,	see	
Fig.	3).
According	to	the	parental	report,	 the	14-month-old	infants	from	Experiment	1	
had	significantly	less	walking	experience	(M	=	1.8	weeks,	SD	=	3.2)	than	the	18-	to	
20-month-old	toddlers	from	Experiment	2	(M	=	23.9	weeks,	SD	=	8.4,	t(20.5)	=	-10.2,	
p	<	0.001).	Age	and	walking	experience	appear	to	be	closely	linked	in	the	young	
toddler	group	(r	=	0.57,	p	<	0.05),	whereas	no	such	 indication	was	 found	 in	 the	
infant	group	(p	=	0.32).	No	significant	correlations	were	found	between	reported	
walking	 experience	 and	 prediction	 accuracy	 and	 stability	 of	 observed	walking	
movements	for	either	age	group	(ps	>	0.2).
For	the	walking	task,	several	indices	were	defined	to	describe	the	quality	of	the	
walking	behavior.	These	indices	were	walking	speed	(number	of	steps	divided	by	
the	time	spent),	the	ability	to	walk	on	a	straight	line	(ratio	of	steps	on	the	line	rela-
tive	to	the	total	number	of	steps	taken)	and	step	width	(measured	in	pixels	on	the	
video-recording).	These	measures	were	based	on	items	assessing	walking	skills	
from	the	Bayley	Scales	of	Infant	Development	(van	der	Meulen,	Ruiter,	Lutje	Spel-
berg,	&	Smrkovsky,	2000)	and	previous	studies	examining	walking	development	
(Adolph,	1997;	Bril	&	Brenière,	1992).	The	indices	of	walking	competence	were	not	
correlated	with	the	amount	of	walking	experience	reported	by	the	parents	(ps	>	
0.30),	nor	were	they	correlated	with	the	infants’	age	(ps	>	0.27).	Furthermore,	the	
indices	were	not	significantly	related	to	prediction	accuracy	and	stability	of	the	
observed	walking	(all	ps	≥	0.15).
Table 4: Outcomes	of	the	paired-samples	t-tests	used	to	examine	the	effects	of	movement	type	on	
prediction	accuracy.	*)	p	<	0.05,	**)	p	≤	0.01,	***)	p	≤	0.001.
Age Group Crawling-Walking Crawling-Rolling ball Walking-Rolling ball
Young toddlers t(16) = -0.91 t(16) = 3.31** t(17) = 4.09***
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DISCUSSION
Experiment	2	yielded	two	main	findings.	First,	predictions	of	human	actions	were	
again	more	accurate	than	predictions	of	object	stimuli,	in	this	case	naturally	rolling	
balls.	Hence,	the	possible	alternative	explanation,	namely	that	object	movements	
were	less	accurately	predicted	due	to	the	low	plausibility	and	unfamiliarity	of	the	
observed	action,	can	be	ruled	out	on	the	basis	of	the	results	of	Experiment	2.
Second,	the	young	toddlers	of	Experiment	2	were	equally	accurate	in	predicting	
walking	and	crawling,	which	replicates	the	pattern	of	results	found	in	the	older	
toddler	 group	 of	 Experiment	 1.	 Apparently,	 toddlers	 become	 able	 to	 precisely	
predict	walking	 actions	 between	 14	 and	 20	months	 of	 age,	which	 is	 the	 period	
during	which	they	also	learn	to	walk	themselves.	This	provides	further	evidence	
that	walking	development	and	the	development	of	prediction	accuracy	of	others’	
walking	movements	goes	hand	in	hand.
Interestingly,	 Experiment	 2	 provided	 no	 evidence	 for	 a	 correlation	 between	
walking	experience,	as	measured	in	the	lab	or	as	reported	by	parents,	and	predic-
tion	accuracy,	 i.e.,	 the	 indices	of	walking	experiences	were	not	 significantly	 re-
lated	to	prediction	accuracy	and	stability	of	the	observed	walking.	Furthermore,	
walking	proficiency	as	measured	in	the	lab	was	not	related	to	walking	experience	
as	reported	by	the	parents.	Evidently,	longer	walking	experience	does	not	neces-
sarily	 automatically	 imply	better	walking	 skills.	A	 longitudinal	 study	may	 shed	
more	 light	on	 the	relation	between	walking	development	and	 the	development	
of	 predicting	 observed	walking,	 as	 a	 longitudinal	 study	may	 partially	 rule	 out	
the	 large	 individual	 differences	 that	 now	 potentially	 obscure	 the	 relationship	
between	walking	and	its	prediction.
General discussion
The	current	study	aimed	to	shine	new	light	on	the	question	whether	the	accuracy	
of	action	predictions	depends	on	motor	experience,	and	thus	on	the	motor	system.	
Four	groups	of	participants	that	differed	in	motor	expertise	were	assessed	directly	
in	terms	of	accuracy	and	variability	of	predictions	of	observed	actions.	The	results	
showed	that	participants	who	were	not	yet	experienced	in	walking,	but	who	were	
proficient	crawlers,	were	less	stable	and	less	accurate	in	their	prediction	of	walk-
ing	compared	to	crawling,	whereas	participants	who	were	experienced	walkers	
displayed	no	such	differences.	Regardless	of	age,	participants	were	more	accurate	
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in	their	predictions	when	observing	human	movement	compared	to	object	move-
ment.	Moreover,	this	difference	between	human	and	non-human	movements	held	
both	for	objects	that	moved	with	constant	velocity	and	for	objects	moving	with	a	
natural	velocity	profile.
The	finding	that	human	movements	were	predicted	more	precisely	than	differ-
ent	 types	of	object	movements	 is	 in	 line	with	previous	research	(Saunier	et	al.,	
2008;	Stadler	et	al.,	2012).	Moreover,	this	difference	was	found	both	for	unnatural	
but	computationally	simple	object	movements	(Experiment	1)	as	well	as	for	more	
complex,	 but	 natural	 movements	 (Experiment	 2).	 Whereas	 the	 motor	 system	
can	provide	accurate	predictions	of	human	movements	for	which	it	contains	for-
ward	models,	it	cannot	provide	accurate	predictions	of	non-human	movements.	
Presumably,	 predictions	of	 the	moving	objects	 are	 generated	 in	different	brain	
structures,	for	instance	in	MST	or	MT	(Newsome	et	al.,	1985;	Tanaka	&	Saito,	1989).	
Also,	human	movements	are	more	socially	relevant	than	object	movements,	and	
hence	prediction	accuracy	might	have	decreased	for	the	less	relevant	situations.	
Future	research	could	focus	on	the	role	of	task	relevance	for	prediction	accuracy.
Central	to	the	study	was	the	hypothesis	that	participants	with	different	motor	
skills	vary	in	their	prediction	accuracy	of	the	respective	motor	acts.	According	to	
the	simulation	account	(Wilson	&	Knoblich,	2005)	the	same	mechanism	for	pre-
dicting	the	sensory	consequences	of	one’s	own	actions	is	used	to	predict	actions	
of	others.	Our	results	lend	support	for	this	account,	as	infants	performed	worse	
at	 predicting	 an	 action	 they	had	 little	 experience	with	 (i.e.	walking)	 compared	
to	an	action	they	were	proficient	in	(i.e.	crawling).	Toddlers	and	adults,	who	had	
experience	with	either	action,	were	equally	good	in	predicting	walking	and	crawl-
ing.	Experiment	2	showed	that	also	a	younger	toddler	group	was	able	to	generate	
predictions	 for	walking	 that	were	 equally	 accurate	 as	predictions	 for	 crawling.	
These	young	toddlers	were	closer	in	age	to	the	infant	group	of	Experiment	1,	but	
comparable	 in	 their	motor	 abilities	 to	 the	 toddler	 group	 of	 Experiment	 1.	 The	
prediction	accuracy	results	of	this	group	matched	those	of	the	older	toddlers	of	
Experiment	 1:	both	groups	predicted	walking	as	accurately	as	 crawling.	Appar-
ently,	 in	 the	time	frame	in	which	 infants	 learn	to	walk	 independently,	 they	also	
improve	 in	prediction	accuracy	 for	walking	actions	when	they	observe	 them	in	
others.	
These	findings	are	consistent	with	the	study	by	Van	Elk	and	colleagues	(2008b),	
who	showed	that	proficient	crawlers	with	limited	to	no	experience	with	walking	
activate	their	motor	system	more	strongly	when	watching	others	crawling	com-
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pared	to	walking.	When	acquiring	a	new	skill,	an	infant	might	use	a	wide	variety	
of	motor	commands	to	try	to	perform	the	intended	action,	and	with	experience,	
the	only	 the	most	 effective	motor	 commands	become	established	 in	 the	motor	
system	(Hadders-Algra,	2000;	Sporns	&	Edelman,	1993).	These	motor	commands	
can	then	be	used	to	simulate	and	predict	these	actions	when	they	are	observed	
being	performed	by	others.	Predicting	an	observed	action	facilitates	understand-
ing	of	the	action	(Ambrosini	et	al.,	2013).	 In	sum,	experience	with	an	action	can	
thus	lead	to	a	better	understanding	of	this	action	in	others	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	
2014;	Sommerville,	Woodward,	&	Needham,	2005;	Woodward,	1998).
The	finding	that	motor	expertise	is	beneficial	for	action	prediction	is	in	line	with	
results	of	Aglioti	and	colleagues	(Aglioti	et	al.,	2008),	who	showed	that	basketball	
experts	are	better	in	perceiving	whether	basketball	shots	would	be	successful	or	
not.	Though	studies	 investigating	experts	are	essential	 for	this	 line	of	research,	
the	current	study	looks	at	effects	of	motor	experience	in	the	general	population.	
This	study	is	among	the	first	to	show	that	differences	in	predictive	abilities	are	
not	 unchangeable	 properties	 of	 specific	 populations,	 but	 predictive	 abilities	
change	over	the	course	of	development	as	a	result	of	developmental	changes	in	
motor	experience.	This	is	also	emphasized	by	the	fact	that	the	youngest	age	group,	
having	crawling	as	main	modus	of	locomotion,	almost	outperformed	the	children	
who	were	16	months	older	in	terms	of	prediction	stability	for	crawling	actions.
In	 sum,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 present	 study	 show	 that	 action	 prediction	 is	more	
accurate	 and	more	 stable	 for	movements	 that	 are	within	 the	motor	 repertoire	
of	 an	 observer	 compared	 to	movements	 that	 are	 not.	 These	 results	 are	 in	 line	
with	the	simulation	account	(Wilson	&	Knoblich,	2005),	which	postulates	that	the	
kinematics	of	observed	actions	can	be	predicted	by	means	of	a	simulation	in	the	
motor	system.	For	predictions	to	be	accurate,	the	observed	action	needs	to	be	es-
tablished	in	the	motor	system	of	the	observer.	Consequently,	young	children	who	
acquire	new	motor	skills	may	also	become	more	proficient	social	action	partners	
(Meyer,	Bekkering,	Haartsen,	Stapel,	&	Hunnius,	in	press),	as	their	motor	experi-
ence	may	help	them	to	predict	their	interaction	partner’s	actions	and	accurately	
time	their	own	actions	in	response.
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Abstract
In	a	world	full	of	objects,	predicting	which	
object	a	person	is	going	to	grasp	is	not	
easy	for	an	onlooker.	Among	other	cues,	
the	characteristics	of	a	reaching	movement	
might	be	informative	for	predicting	its	
target,	as	approach	movements	are	slower	
when	more	accuracy	is	required.	The	
current	study	examines	whether	observers	
can	predict	the	target	of	an	action	based	
on	the	movement	velocity	while	the	
action	is	still	unfolding,	and	if	so,	whether	
these	predictions	are	likely	the	result	of	
motor	simulation.	We	investigated	the	
role	of	motor	processes	for	velocity-based	
predictions	by	studying	participants	
who	based	on	their	age	differed	in	
motor	experience	with	the	task	at	hand,	
namely	reaching.	To	that	end,	9-,	12-,	and	
15-month-old	infants	and	a	group	of	adults	
participated	in	an	eye-tracking	experiment	
which	assessed	action	prediction	accuracy.	
Participants	observed	a	hand	repeatedly	
moving	towards	and	pressing	a	button	on	
a	panel,	one	of	which	was	small,	the	other	
one	large.	The	velocity	of	the	reaching	
hand	was	the	only	cue	for	predicting	which	
button	would	be	the	target	of	the	observed	
action.	Adults	and	15-month-old	infants	
made	more	frequent	visual	anticipations	to	
the	target	button	compared	to	the	non-
target	button	and	were	thus	able	to	use	the	
information	in	the	speed	of	the	approach	
movement	for	the	prediction	of	the	action	
target.	The	9-	and	12-month-olds,	however,	
did	not	display	this	difference.	After	the	
eye-tracking	experiment,	infants’	ability	to	
aim	for	and	press	buttons	of	different	sizes	
was	evaluated.	Results	showed	that	the	
15-month-olds	were	more	proficient	than	
the	9-	and	12-month-olds	in	performing	the	
reaching	actions.	The	developmental	time	
line	of	velocity-based	action	predictions	
thus	corresponds	to	the	development	of	
performing	that	motor	act	yourself.	Taken	
together,	these	data	suggest	that	motor	
simulation	may	underlie	velocity-based	
predictions.
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Introduction
Predicting	others’	actions	is	crucial	for	social	interactions	to	run	smoothly	(Bek-
kering	et	al.,	2009;	Sebanz	&	Knoblich,	2009).	Anticipating	which	goal	object	an	ac-
tion	partner	will	grasp,	however,	is	complicated	in	a	world	full	of	objects.	How	do	
observers	predict	which	object	another	person	is	reaching	for?	Motor	theories	of	
action	perception	suggest	that	the	motor	system	is	used	to	predict	others’	actions	
the	same	way	it	is	used	to	predict	the	outcomes	of	one’s	own	motor	acts	(Kilner	
et	 al.,	 2007;	 Prinz,	 2006;	Wolpert	 et	 al.,	 2003;	Oztop,	Wolpert,	&	Kawato,	 2005).	
In	accordance	with	this	notion,	a	 large	body	of	 literature	shows	that	 the	motor	
system	is	not	only	active	during	action	execution	but	also	during	the	observation	
of	others’	actions	(Hari	et	al.,	1998;	Rizzolatti	et	al.,	1996b;	Cattaneo	et	al.,	2007),	
suggesting	that	similar	processes	are	at	work	during	observation	and	execution.	
Consequently,	 laws	 governing	 action	 production	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 also	 affect	
action	perception.	One	of	 these	 laws	 is	 Fitts’s	 law	 (1954),	which	describes	 that	
actions	directed	at	small	targets	require	more	time	to	perform.	Recent	empirical	
findings	 illustrate	 that	 observers	 have	 expectations	 about	 the	 speed	 of	 an	 ob-
served	movement	depending	on	the	size	of	the	target	(Grosjean	et	al.,	2007)	and	
that	these	expectations	follow	Fitts’s	law.	However,	it	is	yet	unclear	whether	this	
law	is	used	to	predict	ongoing	observed	actions.	If	so,	this	would	allow	people	to	
predict	 the	 target	of	a	partner’s	actions	when	many	potential	 targets	are	pres-
ent.	The	first	question	of	the	current	research	was	whether	observers	indeed	can	
use	the	velocity	of	an	action	to	predict	whether	an	action	 is	directed	at	a	small	
or	large	object.	The	key	advantage	of	action	prediction	over	mere	processing	of	
completed	actions	is	that	prediction	allows	for	smooth	and	timely	social	interac-
tion	(Bekkering	et	al.	2009;	Sebanz	&	Knoblich,	2009).	A	second	aim	of	the	study	
was	to	investigate	which	mechanism	underlies	velocity-based	predictions.	Given	
the	large	body	of	literature	suggesting	that	the	motor	system	is	involved	in	action	
prediction	(Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Prinz,	2006;	Wolpert	et	al.,	2003;	Oztop	et	al.,	2005)	
and	prior	empirical	evidence	that	Fitts’s	law	affects	action	observation	(Grosjean	
et	al.,	2007;	Eskenazi,	Grosjean,	Humphreys,	&	Knoblich,	2009),	it	is	plausible	that	
motor	simulations	bring	about	velocity-based	predictions.	As	a	second	question	
we	therefore	examined	cross-sectionally	whether	motor	development	goes	hand	
in	hand	with	the	development	of	velocity-based	predictions.
When	acquiring	a	novel	motor	skill,	the	actor	builds	associations	between	the	
motor	 commands	utilized	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 these	motor	 commands	 as	 experi-
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enced	via	the	sensory	modalities	(Kawato,	1999,	Miall	&	Wolpert,	1996).	At	first,	
gaze	 is	 directed	 at	 the	 effectors	 (hands,	 fingers,	 feet)	 to	monitor	 the	 results	 of	
the	new	motor	commands	(Sailer	et	al.,	2005;	Burton,	Castle,	&	Held,	1964).	With	
action	proficiency,	gaze	will	no	longer	be	directed	at	the	effectors,	but	at	the	target	
of	the	action	(Sailer	et	al.,	2005)	and	hence	reveals	the	target	of	the	ongoing	ac-
tion.	Based	on	associations	formed	during	the	acquisition	phase,	a	forward	model	
of	 the	action	can	be	constructed,	which	allows	the	actor	 to	predict	 the	sensory	
consequences	of	an	intended	action	ahead	of	time	(Wolpert,	1997).	The	forward	
model	becomes	more	fine-grained	with	increasing	motor	experience.	In	this	way,	
motor	experience	leads	to	a	precise	forward	model	of	the	action	and	to	precise	
predictions	of	future	sensory	states.	
Motor	 theories	of	 action	perception	assume	 that	 similar	processes	are	active	
during	action	perception	as	during	action	production	(e.g.,	Oztop	et	al.,	2005).	On	
a	behavioral	level,	goal-directed	eye	movements	have	been	shown	to	be	predic-
tive	and	follow	the	same	time	course	for	action	execution	and	action	observation	
(Flanagan	&	Johansson,	2003),	and	blocking	the	motor	system	by	means	of	Tran-
scranial	Magnetic	 Stimulation	 (TMS)	 disrupts	 these	 predictive	 eye	movements	
(Elsner,	 D’Ausilio,	 Gredebäck,	 Falck-Ytter,	 &	 Fadiga,	 2013).	 Eye-tracking	 studies	
investigating	the	development	of	action	prediction	indicate	that	motor	experience	
is	crucial	for	predicting	these	actions	in	others	(Falck-Ytter	et	al.,	2006;	Kanakogi,	
&	Itakura,	2011;	Ambrosini	et	al,	2013;	Stapel,	Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	submitted).	
It	is	therefore	likely	to	assume	that	velocity-based	predictions	become	more	ac-
curate	as	a	consequence	of	motor	development.
In	action	performance,	speed	depends	on	the	accuracy	required	for	successful	
completion	of	the	action.	That	is,	the	more	accurate	one	has	to	be,	the	slower	the	
movements	become.	Fitts	(1954)	formalized	and	quantified	this	relation	based	on	
data	he	collected,	and	the	relation	he	found	was	shown	to	hold	for	many	move-
ments	(see	for	an	overview	Plamondon	&	Alimi,	1997).	Fitts’s	law	states	that	the	
time	needed	to	move	between	two	targets	is	based	on	the	distance	between	the	
targets	and	 the	width	of	 the	 target	 (Fitts,	 1954).	Hence,	movement	 time	can	be	
shorter	between	large	compared	to	small	target	objects,	and	bridging	small	dis-
tances	can	be	done	quicker	than	bridging	large	distances.	For	example,	reaching	
and	grasping	a	small	object	requires	more	accuracy,	and	has	been	shown	to	take	
more	time	(Bootsma,	Marteniuk,	MacKenzie,	&	Zaal,	1994;	Zaal	&	Thelen,	2005).
Empirical	 research	 shows	 that	 in	 adults,	 not	 only	 action	 production	 follows	
Fitts’s	 law;	also	action	perception	 is	 influenced	by	 it.	For	 instance,	adults	were	
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capable	of	dissociating	whether	an	observed,	artificial	 reaching	movement	was	
physically	possible	or	 impossible	 in	reality	given	 the	movement	 time,	adhering	
in	their	judgments	to	Fitts’s	law	(Grosjean	et	al.,	2007).	Also,	a	neurophysiological	
patient	violating	Fitts’s	law	in	his	action	production	by	not	adjusting	movement	
speed	for	smaller	targets	displayed	similar	violations	in	action	perception	(Eske-
nazi	et	al.,	2009).	This	indicates	that	determining	whether	observed	actions	have	
an	appropriate	velocity	might	be	grounded	in	the	action	production	capabilities	
of	the	observer.	Presumably,	the	neural	motor	system	is	recruited	during	action	
perception	to	simulate	the	observed	action.	These	simulations	during	action	ob-
servation	may	enable	the	observer	to	predict	future	states	of	the	action	(Wilson	&	
Knoblich,	2005).	An	fMRI	study	by	Eskenazi	and	colleagues	(Eskenazi,	Rotshtein,	
Grosjean,	 &	 Knoblich,	 2011)	 revealed	 that	 activity	 in	 motor	 areas	 of	 the	 brain	
during	the	observation	of	movements	was	related	to	the	difficulty	of	performing	
these	movements	as	formalized	in	Fitts’s	law.	In	sum,	the	speed-accuracy	trade-
off	not	only	constrains	action	production,	it	also	affects	action	observation,	and	
these	 constraints	 influence	 activity	 in	motor	 cortical	 areas	 of	 the	 brain	 during	
observation	and	execution.
The	current	 study	was	 set	out	 to	 investigate	whether	observers	not	only	use	
the	speed-accuracy	trade-off	to	dissociate	possible	from	impossible	actions,	but	
whether	they	also	use	this	principle	to	predict	the	targets	of	actions	they	observe.	
Furthermore,	if	the	motor	system	generates	target	predictions	based	on	the	ve-
locity	of	 the	observed	movements,	 then	 these	predictions	can	only	be	made	by	
observers	capable	of	performing	the	observed	action	herself,	because	before	skill	
acquisition,	the	observer	most	probably	lacks	the	necessary	forward	model	to	pre-
dict	the	action	outcome.	We	therefore	adopted	a	developmental	approach:	Nine-,	
12-	and	15-month-old	infants	participated	together	with	adults	in	an	eye-tracking	
experiment	during	which	they	observed	an	actor	moving	her	hand	towards	and	
pressing	a	large	or	a	small	button.	In	all	stimulus	videos,	there	were	two	buttons,	
a	 large	and	a	 small	one,	 at	 the	end	of	 a	 table.	A	hand	started	moving	 from	 the	
one	side	of	 the	 table	 to	 the	other	 to	press	either	 the	 large	or	 the	small	button.	
If	 participants	made	more	 correct	 visual	 anticipations	 than	 incorrect	 anticipa-
tions,	then	that	would	indicate	that	the	observers	used	the	velocity	of	the	hand	
to	predict	which	button	would	be	pressed.	We	hypothesized	the	ability	to	predict	
others’	aiming	and	pressing	actions	to	develop	in	parallel	with	their	own	ability	
to	accurately	aim	their	hand	and	finger	at	a	small	target	in	order	to	press	it.	Young	
infants	might	be	able	to	successfully	aim	with	their	hand	for	a	large	button,	but	
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they	might	base	their	movements	on	a	relatively	inaccurate	forward	model,	which	
prevents	them	from	smoothly	reaching	for	and	pressing	a	small	button.	Having	
a	coarse-grained	forward	model	might	necessitate	them	to	make	corrections	 in	
their	movements	if	they	would	try	to	aim	for	and	press	a	small	button.	At	the	same	
time,	this	coarse-grained	forward	model	might	not	allow	them	to	make	accurate	
predictions	of	other’s	actions.	To	 further	clarify	 the	role	of	motor	expertise	 for	
velocity-based	action	prediction,	the	infant	groups	were	tested	for	their	ability	to	
aim	at	a	small	button.	This	allowed	us	to	disentangle	whether	potential	develop-
ments	 in	predicting	targets	based	on	speed	arise	specifically	 from	the	develop-
ment	of	the	motor	skill	at	hand	or	rather	reflect	other	age-related	changes.	
Method
Participants
Twenty-seven	infants	(8	girls)	with	a	mean	age	of	8.8	months	(SD	=	0.3),	28	infants	
(16	girls)	with	a	mean	age	of	12.2	months	(SD	=	0.3),	and	28	infants	(11	girls)	with	
a	mean	age	of	15.0	months	(SD	=	0.2)	participated	in	the	study.	Furthermore,	18	
adults	(12	women,	mean	age	=	24.9	years,	SD	=	5.2)	took	part	in	a	longer	version	of	
the	experiment.	Eight	additional	infants	(three	9-month-olds,	five	12-month-olds)	
and	 one	 additional	 adult	 were	 tested	 but	 excluded	 from	 the	 analyses	 because	
they	did	not	meet	the	eye-tracking	calibration	criteria	(7	infants)	or	because	they	
produced	an	insufficient	amount	of	gaze	data	(gaze	data	for	only	3	or	less	trials:	
1	 infant,	1	adult).	All	 infant	groups	were	recruited	via	the	Baby	Research	Center	
in	Nijmegen.	 The	 adults	were	 recruited	 via	 a	 participant	 database	 of	 Radboud	
University	Nijmegen.	Written	 informed	 consent	 of	 the	 participants	 or	 the	 par-
ticipants’	parents	was	obtained	prior	to	participation.	Participation	in	the	study	
was	 rewarded	with	 a	 small	 gift	 (an	 infant	 book	 or	 10	 Euros	 for	 the	 participat-
ing	 infants,	5-Euro-gift	vouchers	or	credit	points	 for	 the	adults).	The	study	was	
approved	by	the	ethical	committee	of	behavioral	science	at	the	Faculty	of	Social	
Sciences	in	Nijmegen,	and	was	conducted	in	conformity	to	the	ethical	standards	
of	(developmental)	psychology.
Stimuli
Four	different	short	video	clips	(duration:	3.1	 to	3.6	sec)	were	used	as	stimulus	
material.	The	videos	showed	a	table	with	a	large	(4	by	4	cm)	and	a	small	(1	by	1	
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cm)	button	on	one	side	(see	Figure	1).	An	actor	was	sitting	behind	the	table.	One	
of	the	buttons	was	relatively	close	to	the	edge	of	the	table,	and	the	other	one	was	a	
bit	further	away	from	the	edge	towards	the	middle.	In	half	of	the	videos,	the	small	
button	was	the	one	closer	to	the	edge	of	the	table,	whereas	it	was	the	large	button	
in	the	other	half	of	the	videos.	The	stimulus	videos	started	with	a	still	 frame	in	
which	the	actor’s	hand	was	shown	on	the	far	side	of	the	table.	To	create	a	balanced	
stimulus	set,	also	horizontally	flipped	versions	of	the	videos	were	made	by	means	
of	editing	the	original	video	material	in	VirtualDub	(www.virtualdub.org).	After	
one	second,	the	hand	started	moving	towards	the	buttons,	and	the	action	ended	
with	the	hand	pressing	one	of	the	buttons	with	the	index	finger.	The	video	ended	
with	one	second	of	still	frame	of	the	hand	in	its	end	position	with	the	index	finger	
pressing	the	button.	This	could	be	either	a	small	and	far,	small	and	close,	 large	
and	far,	or	a	 large	and	close	button.	The	index	finger	was	already	stretched	out	
during	the	start	of	the	movie,	such	that	during	movement	the	fingers	did	not	move	
with	respect	to	the	hand.	As	expected	based	on	Fitts’s	law,	movements	towards	
the	 small	 buttons	 took	more	 time	 than	movements	 towards	 the	 large	 buttons	
(300	msec	difference),	 and	pressing	 the	distal	 button	 required	more	 time	 than	
pressing	the	proximal	button	(20	msec	difference).	The	main	manipulation	in	the	
stimuli	that	affected	the	movement	time	was	the	size	of	the	buttons	and	not	the	
distance	between	the	buttons.	The	reason	for	this	choice	was	of	practical	nature:	a	
large	distance	between	the	buttons	would	have	meant	that	we	would	have	had	to	
reduce	the	distance	between	the	initial	hand	position	and	the	first	target,	which	
would	have	led	to	movement	times	too	short	to	allow	the	participants	to	display	
a	predictive	eye-movement	(data	of	15-month-olds	indicate	that	movement	times	
of	800	msec	are	insufficient	to	allow	the	infant	to	make	an	anticipatory	saccade	
based	on	kinematic	 information	only,	 Stapel,	 Elsner,	Galazka,	&	Gredebäck,	un-
published	results).
Figure 1: Example	frames	from	a	stimulus	video	with	the	small	button	close	to	the	edge	of	the	table	and	the	
hand	moving	to	the	large	button.
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Button press device
To	assess	the	infants’	proficiency	of	aiming	at	and	pressing	large	and	small	but-
tons,	a	button	press	device	was	constructed	(see	Figure	2).	The	device	consisted	
of	a	wooden	frame,	in	which	boards	with	a	single,	red	button	could	be	fitted.	Two	
boards	were	used,	one	with	a	small	(1	by	1	cm)	button,	and	one	with	a	large	button	
(4	by	4	cm)	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	board.	The	main	 factor	 influencing	movement	
time	 in	 the	observation	 task	was	button	 size	 and	not	distance.	Therefore,	 only	
button	size	was	manipulated	in	the	execution	task.	To	ensure	that	infants	would	
aim	precisely	at	the	button	instead	of	pushing	it	with	their	whole	hand,	the	but-
tons	were	inlaid	into	the	surface,	with	a	black	edge	around	them.	Pressing	elicited	
a	sound	to	enhance	infants’	motivation	to	try	to	succeed	in	pressing	the	button.
Procedure
The	 procedure	 for	 data	 collection	 was	 kept	 as	 similar	 as	 possible	 across	 age	
groups.	Participating	infants	were	seated	in	a	car	chair	resting	on	the	lap	of	their	
caregiver	 in	 front	 of	 a	 computer	 monitor.	 Participating	 adults	 were	 seated	 on	
an	office	chair	adjusted	to	their	height.	Infants’	gaze	was	recorded	using	a	Tobii	
1750	(Tobii	Technology,	Sweden).	Adults’	gaze	was	recorded	with	a	different,	but	
comparable	eye-tracker	 (Tobii	T120;	Tobii	Technology,	 Sweden),	 as	adults	were	
tested	for	a	different,	unrelated	study	at	the	same	occasion.	All	participants	first	
underwent	a	calibration	procedure	in	which	a	contracting	and	expanding	circle	
accompanied	by	a	sound	was	shown	on	9	locations	on	the	screen,	forming	a	3-by-3	
   
Figure 2: The	button	press	device.	The	small	button	is	presented	at	the	left	(A),	and	the	large	button	at	the	
right	(B).
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grid.	The	calibration	was	accepted,	if	data	was	available	for	7	or	more	calibration	
points.	Immediately	after	calibration,	the	experiment	started,	which	consisted	of	
96	(adults)	or	48	(infants)	trials.	Trials	were	presented	in	random	order	and	were	
interleaved	with	brief	attractive	audiovisual	clips	to	maintain	the	attention	of	the	
participants	to	the	screen	(16	for	the	infants,	3	for	the	adults).
After	the	eye-tracking	experiment,	infants	who	had	been	sitting	in	the	car	seat	
were	put	on	their	parents	lap.	They	were	presented	with	the	button	pressing	de-
vice,	which	stood	on	the	table	in	front	of	them.	Their	actions	were	recorded	with	
a	video	camera	(Sony	handycam	DCR-SR190,	frame	rate:	25	Hz).	They	were	first	
asked	to	try	to	press	the	large	button,	then	the	small	button,	followed	by	again	the	
large	and	 then	 the	small	button.	The	experimenter	demonstrated	how	to	press	
the	button	and	encouraged	the	infant	to	follow	her	example	in	case	infants	were	
hesitant	to	press	the	button	themselves.
Gaze data analyses
Square-shaped	 areas	 of	 interest	 (AoIs)	 of	 equal	 size	 (100	 by	 100	 pixels)	 were	
defined	around	the	buttons	in	the	stimulus	displays,	and	in	addition,	an	AoI	was	
defined	 containing	 the	 full	 display	 of	 the	 stimulus	movie	 (1280	 by	 580	 pixels).	
First,	 the	 stimuli	 that	were	 attended	 to	were	 counted	 per	 participant	 and	 per	
condition.	A	stimulus	was	considered	“watched”	if	at	least	one	fixation	fell	on	the	
full	stimulus	AoI	while	the	stimulus	video	was	playing.	Second,	per	condition,	tri-
als	were	counted	in	which	the	participants	fixated	at	one	of	the	two	button	AoIs	
after	 onset	 of	 the	hand	movement	 and	before	 the	hand	 reached	 the	AoI	 of	 the	
first	button.	These	target	fixations	are	subsequently	referred	to	as	“anticipatory	
looks”.	A	percentage	of	trials	in	which	participants	showed	an	anticipatory	look	
to	one	of	the	buttons	was	calculated	based	on	the	total	number	of	watched	trials	
in	 that	 condition.	 In	 trials	 in	which	participants	 looked	at	both	buttons	during	
the	anticipation	interval,	the	trial	would	count	both	as	a	target	and	a	non-target	
anticipation.	Repeated	measures	ANOVAs	were	used	to	investigate	whether	par-
ticipants	correctly	predicted	whether	a	button	served	as	the	target	of	the	action	
or	not.
Video coding of button presses
Infants’	attempts	to	press	the	large	and	small	buttons	were	coded	from	the	video-
recordings.	Per	 type	of	button,	 the	attempts	 to	press	 the	button	were	 counted.	
Behavior	was	considered	as	an	attempt	 to	press	 the	button	 if	 the	 infant’s	hand	
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touched	the	board	in	which	the	button	was	embedded	while	the	infant	looked	at	
the	button.	Button	press	attempts	were	considered	successful	if	the	infant	touched	
the	button	while	looking	at	it.	Attempts	in	which	the	infant	was	being	moved	or	
helped	by	their	caregiver	were	excluded	from	the	analyses.	Beside	success	on	the	
task,	we	were	interested	in	the	quality	of	the	infant’s	aiming.	A	well-aimed	button	
press	needs	no	correction	in	the	movements,	such	that	the	aiming	hand	or	finger	
lands	directly	on	 the	button	 instead	of	 first	on	 the	surroundings	of	 the	button.	
Movement	correction	was	quantified	as	the	time	between	the	first	moment	the	
device	was	touched	and	the	first	moment	the	button	was	touched.	Accurate	initial	
aims	would	result	in	short	(down	to	zero	seconds)	movement	correction	times.
Results
Action perception
The	action	in	the	stimulus	display	became	disambiguated	once	the	hand	reached	
the	first	button,	as	then	either	the	hand	stayed	on	the	first	button,	or	continued	
to	 the	 second	 button.	 Thus,	 importantly,	 only	 anticipatory	 fixations	 initiated	
during	 this	 first	ambiguous	phase	of	 the	action	were	analyzed	(the	duration	of	
the	ambiguous	phase	ranged	from	1.58	to	1.88	seconds	after	stimulus	onset).	An	
implication	 of	 this	 analysis	 choice	was	 that	 fixations	 to	 the	 first	 button	would	
likely	occur	more	frequently	compared	to	fixations	to	the	second	button,	because	
for	 the	 latter,	gaze	needed	to	be	more	ahead	of	 the	action	 in	space	and	time	to	
reach	the	button	during	that	period.	Inspection	of	the	data	substantiated	this	as-
sumption.	Figure	3	displays	the	mean	percentage	of	fixations	to	the	first	button	
(closest	to	the	initial	position	of	the	hand)	and	the	second	button	(further	from	
the	initial	position	of	the	hand)	during	the	analysis	window	collapsed	over	condi-
tions.	Given	 that	participants	 tended	 to	anticipate	only	 to	 the	close	button	and	
appeared	 to	 exhibit	 hardly	 any	 anticipations	 to	 the	 far	 button,	 the	 subsequent	
conditional	 analyses	will	 focus	 on	 anticipations	 to	 the	 first	 button,	which	was	
either	the	target	of	the	action,	or	not.
A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	conducted	to	analyze	the	frequency	of	antici-
patory	looks	to	the	first	button	with	button	function	as	a	within-subjects	factor	
(target,	non-target)	and	age	group	(9-month-olds,	12-month-olds,	15-month-olds,	
adults)	as	a	between-subjects	factor.	There	was	a	main	effect	of	age	on	the	percent-
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age	of	anticipatory	looks	(F(3,97)	=	50.33,	p	<	0.001,	η2
p
	=	.61).	Post-hoc	independent	
samples	t-tests	showed	that	adults	displayed	a	higher	percentage	of	anticipatory	
looks	(M	=	55%,	SD	=	18)	than	the	15-month-olds	(M	=	19%,	SD	=	11,	t(25.4)	=	7.55,	
p	<	.001)3	and	the	12-month-olds	(M	=	18%,	SD	=	12,	t(26.5)	=	7.56,	p	<	.001).	No	dif-
ference	was	found	in	anticipatory	looks	between	the	15-	and	12-month-olds	(t(54)	
=	0.17,	p	=	.867).	The	9-month-olds	showed	less	frequent	anticipatory	looks	(M	=	
11%,	SD	=	8)	than	the	12-	(t(53)	=	2.38,	p	=	.021)	and	15-month-olds	(t(53)	=	2.68,	p	
=	.010).
A	main	effect	of	button	function	was	observed	(F(1,97)	=	14.56,	p	<	.001,	η2
p
	=	.13),	
indicating	that	across	age	groups,	participants	anticipated	more	frequently	to	the	
first	button	when	it	was	the	target	(M	=	25%;	SD	=	22)	compared	to	when	it	was	
not	the	target	button	(M	=	21%;	SD	=	19).	A	significant	interaction	effect	was	found	
(F(3,97)	=	5.09,	p	=	0.003,	η2
p
	=	.14),	indicating	that	the	age	groups	differed	in	the	
frequency	of	anticipatory	looks	to	the	target	compared	to	the	non-target	button.	
To	further	verify	that	the	interaction	effect	was	not	solely	due	to	the	difference	
between	adult	and	infant	performance,	an	ANOVA	was	run	without	the	adult	data.	
A	marginally	significant	main	effect	of	button	function	was	found	(F(1,80)=	3.38,	
p	=	.070,	η2
p
	=	.04),	together	with	a	significant	interaction	effect	of	age	group	and	
3	 In	case	equal	variances	could	not	be	assumed	as	indicated	by	a	significant	outcome	of	Levene’s	
test	for	equality	of	variances,	adjusted	dfs	are	reported.
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Figure 3: Mean	percentage	of	visual	anticipations	to	the	button	close	or	far	from	the	initial	position	of	the	
hand,	regardless	of	condition,	split	by	age	group.	Error	bars	represent	one	standard	error	of	the	means.
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button	function	(F(2,80)	=	3.51,	p	=	0.035,	η2
p
	=	.08).	Planned	paired	comparisons	
for	the	separate	age	groups	revealed	that	adults	anticipated	more	frequently	to	
the	button	when	it	was	the	target	compared	to	when	it	was	not	(t(17)	=	3.32,	p	=	
.004).	The	same	was	the	case	for	the	15-month-olds	(t(27)	=	2.37,	p	=	.025),	whereas	
the	12-	and	9-month-olds	did	not	look	more	frequently	at	the	first	button	when	it	
was	the	target	compared	to	when	it	was	not	(12-month-olds:	t(27)	=	1.59,	p	=	.125	,	
9-month-olds:	t(26)	=	-1.45,	p	=	.141;	see	Figure	4).
Action production
A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	used	to	analyze	the	effect	of	button	size	(small,	
large)	and	age	group	(9-month-olds,	 12-month-olds,	 15-month-olds)	on	 the	per-
centage	of	successful	button	press	attempts	out	of	all	attempts.	A	main	effect	of	
button	 size	 on	 the	 percentage	 of	 successful	 button	 presses	was	 found	 (F(1,68)	
=	28.05,	p	<	0.001,	η2
p
	=	 .29),	 indicating	that	the	 infants	were	more	successful	 in	
pressing	the	large	(M
large
	=	88%,	SD
large
	=	22)	compared	to	the	small	button	(M
small
	
=	69%,	SD
small
	=	37).	Furthermore,	the	interaction	between	age	group	and	button	
size	was	found	to	be	significant	(F(2,68)	=	15.18,	p	<	0.001,	η2
p
	=	.31).	Independent	
samples	 t-tests	 showed	 that	 the	 12-month-olds	were	more	 successful	 than	 the	
9-month-olds	when	trying	to	press	the	small	button	(t(32.9)	=	5.79,	p	<	0.001),	but	
no	 significant	differences	were	 found	between	 these	groups	when	 trying	press	
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Figure 4: Percentage	of	anticipatory	looks	to	the	first	button	when	it	was	the	target	(blue	bars)	or	not	
(green	bars)	split	by	age	group.	Error	bars	represent	one	standard	error	of	the	means.
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the	 large	button	(t(42)	=	0.51,	p	=	0.611).	The	success	rates	of	 the	12-month-olds	
for	the	small	and	large	button	(M
small
	=	86%,	SD
small
	=	19,	M
large
	=	88%,	SD
large
	=	24)	
were	not	different	from	the	15-month-olds	(M
small
	=	81%,	SD
small
	=	35,	t(47)	=	0.65,	p	
=	.522;	M
large
	=	90%,	SD
large
	=	26,	t(48)	=	-0.29,	p	=	.771).	In	addition,	the	percentage	of	
successful	button	presses	was	found	to	be	higher	in	general	for	the	12-	compared	
to	the	9-month-olds	(F(2,68)	=	15.18,	p	<	0.001,	η2
p
	=	.31;	9-month-olds:	M
small
	=	38%,	
SD
small
	=	34,	M
large
	=	85%,	SD
large
	=	12).
An	identical	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	conducted	on	the	movement	cor-
rection	 time	data.	A	main	effect	 of	button	 size	was	observed	 (F(1,63)	=	 53.81,	p	
<	0.001,	η2
p
	=	 .46),	 as	 significantly	more	 time	was	needed	 to	 correct	 the	aiming	
movement	to	a	small	(M
small
	=	0.52	sec,	SD
small
	=	0.54)	than	to	a	large	button	(M
large
	=	
0.08	sec.,	SD
large
	=	0.14).	The	interaction	between	age	group	and	button	size	had	a	
significant	effect	on	the	movement	correction	times	(F(2,63)	=	6.69,	p	=	.002,	η2
p
	=	
.18).	The	three	age	groups	were	equally	fast	in	pressing	the	large	button	(M
9mnts
	=	
0.09	sec,	SD
9mnts
	=	0.12,	M
12mnts
	=	0.10,	SD
12mnts
	=	0.12,	M
15mnths
	=	0.06,	SD
15mnths
	=	0.18,	all	
ts	<	1.0,	all	ps	>	.308).	However,	the	15-month-olds	needed	less	time	for	correcting	
their	movements	 than	 the	other	 two	groups	when	aiming	 for	 the	 small	 button	
(M
9mnths
	=	0.82	 sec,	 SD
9mnths
	=	0.79,	M
12mnths
	=	0.50	 sec,	 SD
12mnts
	=	0.32,	M
15mnts
	=	0.27	
sec,	SD
15mnths
	=	0.15;	ts	>	3.0,	ps	≤	0.006),	whereas	the	9-	and	12-month-olds	differed	
only	marginally	in	this	respect	(t(26.8)	=	1.71,	p	=	.099).	Furthermore,	movement	
correction	time	was	dependent	on	age	(F(2,63)	=	6.93,	p	=	 .002,	η2
p
	=	 .18),	which	
was	caused	by	differences	in	aiming	for	the	small	button.
Relation between action observation and action production
The	results	presented	above	show	that	success	rates	in	aiming	at	the	small	but-
ton	 improved	between	9	and	12	months	of	age	and	movement	correction	 times	
decreased	between	12	and	15	months	of	age.	The	ability	to	make	velocity-based	
predictions	develops	in	parallel,	as	15-month-olds	displayed	velocity-based	pre-
dictions,	whereas	 9-	 and	 12-month-olds	did	not.	 To	 study	 the	 relation	between	
action	observation	and	action	performance	more	closely,	we	examined	the	group	
of	12-month-olds,	as	this	was	the	transitional	group	consisting	of	infants	who	were	
at	the	verge	of	learning	to	use	velocity	to	predict	actions.	A	correlation	analysis	
was	performed	 to	 investigate	whether	action	production	and	action	prediction	
skills	were	related	at	the	level	of	the	individual	infants.	In	the	correlation	analyses,	
proficiency	in	aiming	at	the	small	button	was	used	as	the	measure	of	interest,	as	
this	reflects	the	ability	to	aim	with	high	precision	best.	The	time	needed	to	correct	
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the	 aiming	movements	 to	 the	 small	 button	was	 not	 found	 to	 be	 related	 to	 the	
prediction	accuracy,	expressed	as	the	difference	between	the	percentage	of	target	
and	non-target	anticipations	(p	=	.654,	controlling	for	age	in	days).	Likewise,	the	
relation	between	the	success	rate	of	aiming	at	the	small	button	was	not	found	to	
be	related	with	action	prediction	accuracy	(p	=	.902,	controlling	for	age	in	days).
Discussion
The	aim	of	the	current	study	was	to	examine	whether	the	velocity	of	a	movement	
is	used	by	an	observer	to	predict	which	object	will	be	the	target	of	the	observed	ac-
tion,	and	if	so,	whether	motor	development	and	hence	the	motor	system	is	crucial	
for	these	predictions	to	emerge.	Gaze	data	showed	that	adults	and	15-month-old	
infants	more	frequently	displayed	visual	anticipations	to	a	button	when	it	was	the	
target	compared	to	when	it	was	not.	This	indicates	that	they	based	their	predic-
tions	on	the	speed	of	an	observed	movement,	as	velocity	was	the	only	cue	avail-
able	for	distinguishing	targets	from	non-targets.	 In	contrast,	 infants	of	9	and	12	
months	of	age	did	not	show	any	indications	that	they	used	the	speed	information	
of	the	observed	movement	for	their	action	predictions.	This	was	congruent	with	
the	development	of	producing	this	action:	15-month-olds	were	more	proficient	in	
aiming	at	and	pressing	a	button	accurately	 than	the	12-	and	9-month-olds.	This	
suggests	that	the	motor	system	underlies	velocity-based	predictions.
Three	 factors	 influenced	how	 frequently	 the	observers	 looked	at	 the	buttons	
while	the	action	was	unfolding.	First,	many	more	anticipatory	looks	were	made	
to	the	button	nearest	to	the	initial	position	of	the	hand	than	to	the	button	located	
further	 away,	when	 the	 hand	 had	 not	 yet	 passed	 the	 nearest	 button.	However,	
our	analysis	period	ended	when	the	hand	was	at	the	point	of	passing	the	nearest	
button,	because	once	 the	hand	had	passed	 the	 first	button,	 it	was	obvious	 that	
the	second	button	was	the	target.	As	a	consequence,	to	be	counted	as	a	predictive	
look,	observers	had	to	be	more	ahead	of	the	action	when	predicting	the	far	button	
than	when	predicting	the	near	button.	Due	to	the	low	base	rate	of	predictions	to	
the	far	button,	only	the	predictions	to	the	first	button	could	be	analyzed.
The	 second	 factor	 that	 influenced	 anticipatory	 looks	was	 the	 velocity	 of	 the	
movement,	which	was	 the	main	manipulation	 in	 the	 current	 study.	The	 results	
showed	that	participants	looked	more	frequently	at	the	first	button	when	it	was	
the	 target	 compared	 to	when	 it	was	 not,	which	 indicates	 that	 the	 participants	
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made	use	of	the	velocity	information	of	the	hand	to	predict	which	button	would	
be	pressed.
The	 third	 factor	 that	 affected	 the	 frequency	 of	 anticipatory	 looks	 was	 age.	
Whereas	adults	and	15-month-old	infants	looked	more	frequently	to	the	first	but-
ton	when	 it	was	 the	 target	 compared	 to	when	 it	was	not,	 9-	 and	 12-month-old	
infants	did	not	show	this	difference.
Velocity-based	predictions	may	result	from	action	simulation	in	the	motor	sys-
tem	of	the	observer.	The	motor	system	has	been	shown	to	respond	stronger	to	the	
observation	of	actions	that	have	to	be	performed	with	more	accuracy	(Eskenazi	
et	al.,	2011).	The	speed	people	expect	to	see	during	an	observed	action	matches	
the	the	actual	speed	of	 the	performed	action	(Grosjean	et	al.,	2007;	Eskenazi	et	
al.,	2009),	which	illustrates	that	the	action-perception	link		also	plays	a	role	in	the	
speed-accuracy	trade-off	(Flanagan	&	Johannson,	2003;	Hari	et	al.,	1998;	Rizzolatti	
et	al.,	1996a;	Cattaneo	et	al.,	2007).	Given	these	prior	findings,	the	hypothesis	of	the	
current	study	was	that	the	motor	system	not	only	underlies	post-hoc	judgments	of	
the	observed	velocity	of	movements,	but	also	facilitates	on-line	predictions	made	
while	 the	 action	 still	 unfolds.	 Our	 results	 are	 in	 line	with	 this	 hypothesis:	 The	
action	 prediction	 performance	 of	 the	 15-month-old	 infants	 suggested	 that	 they	
use	velocity	information	in	action	prediction,	whereas	the	9-	and	12-month-olds	
seemed	not	to	integrate	the	observed	velocity	in	their	predictions	of	the	observed	
actions.	The	tested	15-month-old	infants	were	also	better	at	pressing	buttons	than	
the	9-	and	12-month-olds.	Using	velocity	information	to	predict	which	button	will	
be	pressed	 thus	 follows	–	at	 least	by	and	 large	–	 the	same	developmental	 time	
course	as	the	ability	to	press	buttons.	However,	within	the	group	of	12-month-old	
infants,	 the	 individual	 button	pressing	proficiency	was	not	 found	 to	be	 related	
to	the	ability	to	use	speed	for	action	prediction.	It	might	well	be	that	our	motor	
measurement	was	not	sensitive	enough	to	correlate	motor	performance	with	ac-
tion	prediction	performance	at	an	individual	level.	Nevertheless,	it	is	interesting	
that	 the	 differences	 in	motor	 performance	 at	 the	 group	 level	 overlap	with	 the	
anticipatory	eye	capacities	in	the	observation	task.	However,	at	least	two	alterna-
tives	can	be	given	for	the	suggested	improvement	in	terms	of	motor	simulation.	
First,	visual	experience	acquired	between	12	and	15	months	of	age	may	contribute	
to	 velocity-based	predictions	 as	well	 (Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	 2014).	 Second,	 the	
effects	observed	could	also	be	related	to	a	general	maturation	pattern	of	the	brain	
that	enables	both	action	execution	as	well	as	action	observation.	The	importance	
of	visual	experience	and	brain	maturation	in	the	development	of	velocity-based	
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predictions	can	be	tested	in	future	research	by	investigating	whether	15-month-
olds	can	use	velocity	information	for	the	prediction	of	actions	that	are	not	yet	part	
of	their	motor	repertoire.
In	conclusion,	we	found	empirical	evidence	that	observers	can	predict	the	target	
of	an	action	based	on	the	velocity	of	the	observed	movement.	In	the	current	study,	
the	action	target	was	a	button.	Fifteen-month-old,	but	not	9-	and	12-month-old	in-
fants	showed	an	adult-like	prediction	pattern,	suggesting	that	at	15	months	of	age,	
infants	are	beginning	to	use	velocity	to	inform	their	predictions	of	other’s	button	
pressing	actions.	The	15-month-olds	were	more	proficient	in	performing	this	type	
of	action	compared	to	the	9-	and	12-month-olds.	Together,	this	indicates	that	the	
development	of	velocity-based	predictions	follows	a	time	line	corresponding	to	
the	development	of	motor	skill	of	 the	predicted	action.	Future	research	should	
parse	out	the	roles	of	visual	and	motor	experience	for	action	prediction.	Being	a	
proficient	actor	may	turn	out	to	be	necessary	in	order	to	accurately	predict	what	
other	people	are	planning	to	do.
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The	prediction	of	 others’	 actions	 is	 fundamental	 for	 understanding	others’	 be-
havior	 and	 for	 selecting	 an	 appropriate	 response	 (Castelfranchi,	 1998;	 Vesper,	
Butterfill,	Knoblich,	&	Sebanz,	2010).	This	thesis	describes	a	series	of	studies	that	
investigated	which	types	of	 information	are	used	to	predict	others’	actions	and	
from	which	age	infants	make	use	of	these	types	of	information	to	predict	others’	
actions.	Furthermore,	the	studies	were	aimed	to	unravel	the	processes	underly-
ing	action	prediction	development	and,	at	the	same	time,	unravel	the	processes	
underlying	human	action	prediction	in	general.	In	this	last	chapter,	the	findings	
from	 the	previously	described	 five	 empirical	 studies	 and	 their	 implications	 for	
our	understanding	of	action	prediction	in	infants	and	adults	are	discussed.
Summary of the main findings
Types of information
As	outlined	 in	 the	General	 Introduction,	actions	contain	multiple	sources	of	 in-
formation	that	can	be	used	either	separately	or	in	combination	to	predict	future	
states	of	an	observed	action.	Potential	sources	investigated	in	the	current	thesis	
are	object-knowledge,	the	presence	of	a	distinct	action	target,	the	context	of	the	
action,	and	the	kinematics	of	the	actor.	Starting	with	object-knowledge,	a	previ-
ous	eye-tracking	study	had	shown	that	the	frequency	with	which	the	end-location	
of	an	action	is	predicted	by	infants	and	adults	depends	on	the	object	that	is	being	
used	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010).	For	instance,	a	phone	rather	than	a	cup	is	pre-
dicted	to	go	the	ear	and	a	cup	rather	than	a	phone	is	predicted	to	go	to	the	mouth.	
Chapter	 2	 showed	 that	 the	neural	 responses	 to	 observation	of	 these	more	 and	
less	 predictable	 object-directed	 actions	were	 different,	which	 provides	 further	
evidence	for	the	claim	that	object-knowledge	plays	a	role	in	predicting	actions.
Moreover,	 the	results	reported	 in	Chapters	2,	4,	5	and	6	 illustrate	 that	 infants	
and	adults	are	able	to	predict	the	object	or	end-location	an	action	is	targeted	at.	
Object-directed	actions	turned	out	to	be	more	predictable	than	not	object-direct-
ed	actions	(Chapter	3).	However,	 follow-up	experiments	presented	in	Chapter	3	
highlighted	that	object-directed	actions	may	be	more	predictable	because	actors	
tend	 to	move	 in	 a	more	predictable	manner	when	 they	move	 towards	 a	 target	
object	compared	to	when	their	movements	are	not	object-directed.	This	only	held	
if	the	action	was	constrained	by	the	context,	suggesting	that	the	combination	of	
having	a	spatially	defined	action	target	and	having	to	take	into	account	barriers	
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reduces	 the	degrees	of	 freedom	of	 the	movements	 to	 an	extent	 that	 the	 action	
becomes	clearly	more	predictable.	
The	role	of	kinematics	for	action	prediction	was	investigated	in	more	depth	in	
the	 experiments	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 There,	 the	 prediction	 accuracy	 of	 the	
timing	of	movements	was	assessed.	Observers	were	to	base	their	predictions	on	
different	types	of	movements,	such	as	walking	and	crawling,	or	the	movements	of	
objects.	Prediction	accuracy	was	higher	for	observed	human	compared	to	object	
movements.	 Furthermore,	 the	 youngest	 infants	 (14-month-olds)	were	more	 ac-
curate	in	predicting	the	timing	of	crawling	than	of	walking,	indicating	that	move-
ment	type	affects	action	prediction.
The	impact	of	kinematics	on	action	prediction	was	studied	from	another	angle	
in	Chapter	6.	 Infants	and	adults	observed	object-directed	actions	with	different	
velocities.	The	results	showed	that	velocity	of	 the	movements	 is	used	 in	action	
prediction.
Developmental timeline
The	different	types	of	information	that	are	used	in	action	prediction	might	not	be	
integrated	 into	 infants’	action	prediction	all	at	once,	and	studying	 the	develop-
mental	timeline	of	action	prediction	may	offer	insight	in	how	different	capacities	
build	 on	 each	 other.	 In	 addition,	 such	 a	 developmental	 timeline	might	 provide	
indications	 about	 the	 developmental	 processes	 underlying	 action	 prediction	
development,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 give	 insight	 into	 the	 processes	 underlying	
action	prediction	in	general.
To	 start	 again	 with	 object-knowledge,	 previous	 work	 had	 shown	 that	 by	 6	
months	of	age,	infants	can	already	make	target	predictions	based	on	the	objects	
involved	in	an	action	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010).	By	that	age,	infants	are	not	yet	
capable	of	performing	at	least	part	of	the	observed	actions	(e.g.,	bringing	objects	
to	 their	 ears),	which	 rules	 out	 the	 possibility	 that	motor	 experience	 underlies	
these	predictions.	An	inborn	notion	of	how	artifacts	are	normally	used	also	seems	
highly	unlikely.	Quite	plausibly,	these	predictions	might	thus	be	acquired	through	
observational	 experience.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 early	 predictions	 of	 object	 use	
are	based	on	knowledge	that	is	most	likely	acquired	through	visual	experience,	
we	observed	 in	Chapter	 2	 that	 at	 12	months	 of	 age,	 the	motor	 system	 is	 active	
during	 object-based	predictions.	 At	 this	 age,	 infants	 are	 capable	 of	 performing	
the	observed	actions,	as	caregivers	of	 the	participating	 12-month-olds	reported	
that	their	infant	performed	this	type	of	action	in	daily	life.	Together,	these	studies	
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suggest	that	although	predictions	may	first	be	based	on	visual	experience,	once	
motor	experience	 is	acquired,	 the	motor	 system	may	be	used	 in	predicting	 the	
actions	as	well.
Predictions	about	the	timing	of	crawling	actions	were	demonstrated	to	be	accu-
rate	from	at	least	14	months	of	age,	younger	infants	were	not	tested	here	(Chapter	
5).	Between	14	and	20	months	of	age,	infants	appear	to	become	more	accurate	in	
predicting	the	timing	of	observed	walking	actions	(Chapter	5).	The	20-month-old	
participants	had	longer	walking	experience	than	the	14-month-olds	according	to	
caregivers’	report.	Predicting	aim-for-and-button-press	actions	followed	a	differ-
ent	developmental	time	line:	Fifteen-	but	not	12-month-old	infants	were	shown	to	
be	able	to	predict	the	target	of	button-pressing	actions	based	on	the	velocity	of	
the	hand	aiming	for	the	button	(Chapter	6).
Processes underlying action prediction and action prediction development
Which	processes	underlie	action	prediction	and	its	development?	This	question	
is	discussed	in	almost	every	chapter	of	this	thesis.	My	core	hypothesis	was	that	
own	action	experience	ameliorates	the	precision	of	action	prediction.	The	results	
suggest	that	action	experience	indeed	plays	an	important	role	in	action	prediction	
development.	Prediction	accuracy	was	found	to	be	higher	for	actions	observers	
had	 in	 their	motor	 repertoire	 compared	 to	 actions	 not	 yet	 acquired	 (Chapters	
5	and	6).	Prediction	of	button-presses	was	shown	to	develop	between	12	and	15	
months	of	age,	corresponding	to	the	developmental	timeline	of	becoming	able	to	
execute	 these	button-pressing	 actions	 (Chapter	 6).	 Fourteen-month-old	 infants	
capable	of	crawling	were	demonstrated	to	reach	adult-levels	of	accuracy	for	pre-
dicting	the	timing	of	crawling	(Chapter	5).	Twenty-month-old	toddlers,	who	were	
capable	of	both,	crawling	and	walking,	displayed	equally	accurate	predictions	for	
walking	and	crawling,	whereas	the	14-month-olds	were	less	accurate	in	predict-
ing	walking	 compared	 to	 crawling.	These	 findings	 support	 the	 idea	 that	motor	
processes	are	crucial	for	action	prediction	(see	also	Chapter	2),	in	infants	as	well	
as	in	adults.	Furthermore,	these	findings	lend	support	for	the	notion	that	motor	
experience	is	fundamental	for	action	prediction	development.
In	the	remainder	of	this	chapter,	I	discuss	how	our	findings	can	be	placed	in	the	
theoretical	 framework	presented	in	the	General	Introduction,	and	what	the	im-
plications	of	our	findings	are	for	existing	theories	on	action	prediction.	To	start,	I	
show	that	the	relative	importance	of	goals	compared	to	means	for	action	predic-
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tion	must	 be	 reconsidered.	Movements	 form	a	 key	 aspect	 in	 action	prediction.	
Furthermore,	I	show	that	action	prediction	could	theoretically	be	based	on	visual	
experience	only,	but	that	the	empirical	data	shows	otherwise,	namely	that	motor	
experience	crucially	affects	action	prediction.	I	argue	that	motor	experience	has	
a	 unique	 and	powerful	 contribution	 to	 action	prediction	beyond	visual	 experi-
ence	only.	That	is,	motor	experience	can	lead	to	more	precise	predictions	and	the	
computational	models	required	for	accurate	action	prediction	can	more	easily	be	
acquired	through	motor	experience.	First,	I	focus	on	action	prediction	itself	and	
then	on	the	processes	underlying	action	prediction	and	its	development.
What types of information are used to predict others’ actions?
Actions	consist	of	several	elements	that	can	be	used	to	predict	others’	actions:	the	
agent,	the	target,	the	movements,	and	the	action	context.
The agent
The	potential	effect	of	the	type	of	actor	is	only	briefly	touched	upon	in	the	cur-
rent	thesis.	 In	Chapter	5,	observers	had	to	predict	the	timing	of	objects	moving	
with	constant	velocity	(Experiment	1)	and	had	to	predict	the	timing	of	a	naturally	
rolling	ball	 (Experiment	2).	From	the	viewpoint	of	agency	ascription,	 the	 latter	
contains	 less	 agency	 cues,	 as	 the	 rolling	 ball	was	 not	 self-propelled	 (Premack,	
1990).	The	ball	only	lost	movement	energy	along	the	way,	in	contrast	to	the	ob-
jects	that	moved	with	constant	velocity.	Based	on	the	data,	it	seems	that	agency	
ascription	does	not	impact	the	prediction	of	the	timing	of	object	movements,	as	
prediction	accuracy	 for	both	actions	 is	 relatively	 low,	but	as	 the	 study	was	not	
designed	 to	answer	 this	question,	 the	data	do	not	directly	 speak	 to	 the	agency	
issue.	The	role	of	agency	cues	in	action	observation	is	more	elaborately	debated	
by	Turella	and	colleagues	(Turella,	Erb,	Grodd,	&	Castiello,	2009)	and	Daprati	and	
colleagues	(Daprati	et	al.,	1997).
The target
The	 infants	 and	adults	 in	our	 studies	were	able	 to	 identify	potential	 targets	 in	
the	actions	 they	observed,	as	 in	many	cases	participants	were	 found	 to	 look	at	
the	target	location	of	the	action	(e.g.,	an	area	of	the	face	or	an	object	in	the	scene)	
before	the	action	was	completed	(see	Chapters	2,	4,	5,	and	6).	Action	prediction	ac-
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curacy	was	found	to	be	higher	for	object-directed	compared	to	not	object-directed	
actions	(see	Experiment	1	of	Chapter	3).	The	follow-up	experiments	described	in	
the	 same	chapter	 stress	 the	need	 to	 consider	not	only	 the	action	 targets	when	
investigating	action	prediction,	but	also	 the	 information	which	comes	 from	the	
actor’s	movements.
The movements
Theoretically,	movements	can	be	considered	to	be	of	less	interest	than	goals,	as	
the	 same	 goal	 can	 be	 reached	 through	 many	 different	 movements	 (Park,	 Kim	
&	Nagai,	 2014;	Wolpert,	 1997).	 In	 principle,	 observers	 do	 not	 need	 to	 take	 into	
account	the	details	of	 the	actor’s	movements,	as	 long	as	the	movements	do	not	
deviate	from	what	would	be	expected	based	on	the	inferred	target.	The	empirical	
results	described	in	Chapter	3	suggest	otherwise.	Predictions	of	object-directed	
actions	were	more	accurate	than	those	of	non-object-directed	actions.	Even	with-
out	visual	access	to	the	target	object	observers	were	more	accurate	in	predicting	
object-directed	compared	to	not	object-directed	actions,	suggesting	that	the	ac-
tor’s	movements	carried	crucial	information	about	the	presence	or	absence	of	the	
target	object.
Goals versus means
During	the	last	few	decades,	the	notion	prevailed	in	the	literature	that	goals	(in	the	
current	thesis	called	‘action	targets’)	are	more	informative	for	action	perception	
and	prediction	than	means	(here	called	‘movements’;	Umiltà	et	al.	2008;	Grafton	
&	Hamilton,	2007;	van	Elk	et	al.,	2008a).	Movements	are	thought	to	be	relatively	
uninformative	 for	 action	 prediction	 because	 the	 relation	 between	 targets	 and	
movements	can	be	expressed	as	a	many-to-many	mapping	(Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	van	
Rooij	et	al.,	2008).	Many	movements	can	be	used	to	arrive	at	the	same	target,	and	
the	 same	movement	may	have	many	 targets.	However,	 the	current	data,	 along-
side	 recent	 other	 empirical	 work	 (Becchio	 et	 al.,	 2008,	 2012;	 Ansuini,	 Santello,	
Massaccesi,	 &	 Castiello,	 2006;	 Ansuini,	 Giosa,	 Turella,	 Altoè,	 &	 Castiello,	 2008;	
Sartori,	 Becchio,	 Bara,	 &	 Castiello,	 2009;	 Schuboe,	 Maldonado,	 Stork,	 &	 Beetz,	
2008),	potentially	indicate	something	else:	although	a	target	may	be	reached	by	
many	different	movements,	one	movement	may	be	associated	to	a	single	target.	
This	changes	 the	computational	problem	from	a	many-to-many	mapping	 into	a	
many-to-one	mapping.	 If	 the	action	context	and	principles	of	efficiency	 further	
narrow	down	 the	 solution	 space	 from	many-movements-to-a-single-target	 into	
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a	 selected-set-of-movements-to-a-single-target,	 then	 the	 problem	of	 explaining	
action	prediction	becomes	substantially	smaller.
The action context
The	context	in	which	movements	are	performed	is	crucial	for	the	interpretation	
of	the	action	(e.g.,	Blakemore,	Goodbody,	&	Wolpert,	1998;	Iacoboni,	2005).	Action	
constraints	are	a	specific	and	clear	case	of	how	the	context	of	an	action	influences	
the	movements	of	the	action.	Barriers	make	a	detour	meaningful,	but	when	the	
barrier	is	taken	away,	efficient	actors	should	chose	a	new	action	path	(Gergely	&	
Csibra,	2003)	if	they	want	to	preserve	time	and	energy	(Nelson,	1983).	In	Chapters	
3	and	4,	observers	were	asked	to	predict	constrained	and	unconstrained	actions.	
The	 results	 of	 these	 chapters	 are	 inconclusive	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 action	 con-
straints	on	action	prediction.	Chapter	3	showed	that	actors	move	in	a	more	pre-
dictable	way	when	facing	an	action	constraint	than	in	the	absence	of	constraints,	
and	 in	 that	 way,	 action	 constraints	 support	 action	 prediction.	Whether	 or	 not	
action	constraints	themselves	are	used	for	action	prediction	is	yet	unclear.	Con-
straints	have	the	potential	to	affect	action	prediction,	but	maybe	constraints	only	
affect	 local	predictions,	 concerning	 the	movements	of	 the	actor,	 and	not	 global	
predictions	about	the	final	target	of	the	action.
Processes underlying action prediction and the early development 
of action prediction
A	question	 central	 to	 the	 current	 thesis	 is	 how	action	prediction	develops	 and	
which	processes	underlie	action	prediction	and	its	development.	To	what	extent	
is	 action	 prediction	 development	 an	 experience-independent	 or	 a	 experience-
dependent	 process?	 And	 if	 experience	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 action	 prediction	
development,	what	aspects	of	these	experiences	make	these	experiences	so	valu-
able?	
Is action prediction development experience-independent?
To	make	 a	 clear	 case	 for	 an	 experience-independent	 viewpoint,	 it	 is	 necessary	
to	 test	neonates	and	show	that	action	prediction	abilities	are	 inborn.	However,	
even	if	neonates	are	studied,	still	a	case	for	experience	dependency	can	be	made	
(see	e.g.,	Meltzoff	&	Moore,	1997),	as	sensorimotor	experiences	with	actions	can	
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be	acquired	already	in	the	womb.	The	current	set	of	studies	is	therefore	not	well	
suited	to	make	claims	about	the	experience-independent	nature	of	action	predic-
tion	development.
There	are	two	aspects	in	the	current	thesis	that	should	be	considered	when	dis-
cussing	experience-independent	processes	 in	action	prediction.	First,	 for	 those	
favoring	 experience-independent	 theories,	 the	 current	 thesis	 provides	 some	
positive	news.	In	line	with	experience-independent	viewpoints,	no	evidence	for	
a	direct	relation	between	motor	experience	and	action	prediction	was	found	in	
Chapter	 5	 and	 6.	However,	 the	 absence	 of	 evidence	 does	 not	 allow	 the	 conclu-
sion	that	the	relation	does	not	exist.	Other	related	studies	have	found	a	relation	
between	motor	experience	and	action	prediction	(Kanakogi	&	Itakura,	2011;	Gre-
debäck	&	Kochukhova,	2010;	Ambrosini	et	al.,	2013).
Second,	experience-independent	processes	might	bring	about	action	efficiency,	
which	is	discussed	in	the	current	thesis.	The	naïve	theory	of	rational	action,	an	
example	of	an	experience-independent	account,	suggests	that	action	targets	can	
be	predicted	based	on	situational	constraints	and	the	path	of	an	action,	namely	by	
assuming	that	actors	strive	for	efficiency	(Gergely	&	Csibra,	2003).	In	Chapter	4,	
action	constraints	were	either	present	or	absent,	while	the	movements	of	the	ac-
tor	were	held	constant.	Consequently,	half	of	the	actions	were	an	efficient	means,	
and	half	of	the	actions	were	an	inefficient	means	to	obtain	the	target	object.	Action	
efficiency	had	no	significant	effect	on	target	predictions,	contrary	to	what	would	
be	expected	based	on	rationality	theory.
Is action prediction development experience-dependent?
As	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	both	visual	and	motor	experience	might	contribute	to	
action	prediction	development.	From	a	theoretical	perspective,	it	may	be	valuable	
to	consider	whether	visual	and	motor	experience	have	separate	contributions	to	
action	prediction	development.	 In	practice,	visual	and	motor	experiences	often	
coincide:	normally	developing	infants	observe	the	consequences	of	their	own	ac-
tions	while	they	gain	motor	experience	with	new	actions.	For	conceptual	clarity,	I	
will	first	separate	these	two	types	of	experiences.
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The case for a ‘visual experience only’ account: theoretical considerations
It	is	good	scientific	practice	to	generate	and	test	minimalistic	theories	to	explain	
phenomena.	Parameters	should	only	be	included	if	necessary,	a	principle	that	is	
commonly	 known	 as	Ockham’s	 razor	 (Thorburn,	 1915;	 Baker,	 2003).	 For	 theory	
construction	it	is	therefore	valuable	to	evaluate	to	what	extent	action	prediction	
development	can	theoretically	be	explained	based	on	visual	experience	only.	This	
theoretical	excise	will	provide	more	insight	into	the	benefits	of	visual	experience	
and	the	limitations	of	visual	experience	for	action	prediction	development.
In	the	first	year	of	life,	infants	have	limited	motor	capabilities	(Thelen,	1995).	The	
oculomotor	system	forms	an	exception,	as	it	develops	very	early	and	is	one	of	the	
first	systems	in	development	that	reaches	an	adult	level	of	functioning	(Hunnius,	
2007).	As	a	consequence,	visual	experience	can	form	the	basis	of	action	prediction	
development	 from	 earlier	 on	 than	motor	 experience	 can.	 Infants	may	 learn	 to	
predict	others’	actions	through	statistical	learning,	with	observations	of	actions	
as	the	material	to	learn	from.	There	is	empirical	support	for	this	notion:	infants	
are	capable	of	predicting	actions	they	cannot	perform	yet	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	
2010),	and	infants	were	shown	to	be	capable	of	predicting	events,	with	actions	as	
a	subclass,	based	on	the	statistical	structure	of	observed	event	sequences	(Haith	
et	al.,	1988;	Monroy	et	al.,	submitted).
It	is	very	useful	that	actions	can	be	predicted	as	a	result	of	purely	visual	experi-
ence	with	actions,	as	this	allows	the	prediction	of	many	types	of	actions	not	(yet)	
acquired	by	the	observer.	It	enables	observers	to	predict	human	actions	outside	
their	motor	repertoire.	For	example,	 it	allows	gymnastic	 fans	 to	predict	 the	ac-
tions	of	Epke	Zonderland.	It	also	enables	observers	to	predict	actions	performed	
by	non-human	agents,	as	it,	for	instance,	might	allow	the	prediction	of	the	move-
ments	of	a	bird	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2014).
In	 sum,	 visual	 experience	 has	 several	 advantages	 over	motor	 experience	 for	
action	 prediction	 development:	 1)	 visual	 experience	 can and	does	 affect	 action	
prediction	earlier	 in	development	 than	motor	 experience	 can,	 2)	 visual	 experi-
ence	enables	 the	prediction	of	a	 large	range	of	actions	 that	are	not	necessarily	
part	of	the	observer’s	motor	repertoire.	But	can	the	empirical	data	of	the	current	
thesis	be	explained	by	a	‘vision	only’	account?
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Can visual experience alone explain the empirical data?
A	short	tour	through	the	empirical	chapters	of	this	thesis	 illustrates	that	visual	
experience	alone	cannot	fully	explain	action	prediction	development.	In	Chapter	
2,	 stronger	motor	 activation	was	 found	 during	 the	 observation	 and	 prediction	
of	 unusual	 compared	 to	 ordinary	 actions.	 Had	 the	 predictions	 been	 generated	
purely	 based	 on	 visual	 experience,	 then	 there	was	 no	 need	 for	 the	 observers’	
motor	systems	to	respond	differently	to	usual	or	unusual	actions.	In	Chapters	3	
and	4,	the	effect	of	the	presence	or	absence	of	action	constraints	on	action	predic-
tion	was	measured.	More	specifically,	the	participants	observed	an	actor	turning	
from	walking	to	crawling	because	the	spatial	location	of	the	target	object	was	not	
accessible	by	walking.	Predictions	were	found,	despite	the	fact	that	this	type	of	
action	is	rarely	encountered.	Because	these	actions	are	rarely	observed	in	others,	
it	is	unlikely	that	visual	experience	forms	the	basis	for	prediction	of	these	specific	
actions.	In	Chapter	5,	observers	were	to	predict	the	timing	of	walking	and	crawl-
ing	movements.	The	results	showed	that	not-yet-walking	infants	were	more	ac-
curate	in	predicting	the	timing	of	other	infants’	crawling	compared	to	walking.	If	
observational	experience	were	to	be	the	only	basis	for	action	prediction,	then	the	
opposite	pattern	of	results	could	have	been	expected,	as	walking	is	encountered	
more	frequently	than	crawling.	In	sum,	the	empirical	findings	show,	in	contrast	
to	what	theoretically	might	be	expected,	that	visual	experience	alone	cannot	fully	
explain	action	prediction	development.
Motor experience
As	visual	experience	alone	cannot	fully	account	for	the	present	data,	it	is	worth	
investigating	whether	inclusion	of	an	additional	factor,	namely	motor	experience	
can	lead	to	a	more	complete	account	of	action	prediction	development.	Can	a	mo-
tor	account	explain	the	empirical	data?
Can motor experience explain the empirical data?
The	present	set	of	experiments	is	line	with	a	motor	account	of	action	prediction	
and	action	prediction	development.	Chapter	2	showed	that	the	motor	system	of	
12-month-old	infants	was	activated	during	action	observation,	which	can	be	taken	
as	an	indication	that	the	observed	acts	were	simulated	within	the	motor	system.	
Moreover,	the	motor	system	was	more	strongly	activated	during	the	prediction	of	
unusual	compared	to	ordinary	actions,	suggesting	that	the	motor	system	responds	
differently	to	predictable	compared	to	less	predictable	actions.	Chapter	5	showed	
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that	participants	were	more	accurate	in	predicting	the	timing	of	actions	that	were	
in	their	motor	repertoire	compared	to	actions	that	were	not.	Chapter	6	showed	
that	only	infants	and	adults	who	were	capable	of	performing	the	observed	action	
were	also	capable	of	dissociating	which	would	be	the	target	of	the	observed	action.	
In	sum,	the	empirical	data	provided	in	this	thesis	show	that	motor	experience	and	
motor	processes	support	action	prediction	development.
The case for a ‘motor experience’ account: theoretical considerations
The	present	data	thus	suggest	that	motor	experience,	together	with	observational	
experience,	underlies	action	prediction	development.	However,	as	young	infants	
have	limited	action	capabilities,	predictive	processes	based	on	motor	experience	
may	come	available	 later	 than	processes	based	on	visual	experience.	What	can	
be	the	benefits	of	developing	a	second,	alternative	mechanism	to	predict	other’s	
actions?	Are	 there	benefits?	The	perception-action	 link,	which	provides	a	good	
explanation	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 motor	 experience	 on	 action	 prediction,	 may	 also	
just	be	a	byproduct	of	own	action	development	(Heyes,	2010).	The	current	thesis	
provides	empirical	support	for	the	notion	that	motor	experience	has	a	unique	and	
powerful	contribution	to	action	prediction	development.	There	are	at	least	three	
ways	in	which	motor	processes	are	of	added	value	for	action	prediction	beyond	
what	can	be	obtained	by	purely	visual	processing.
First,	motor	experience	may	 improve	motor	 simulations	 (Wilson	&	Knoblich,	
2005),	such	that	more	experience	leads	to	more	accurate	simulations,	which	may	
produce	predictions	 that	are	more	accurate	 than	 those	based	on	visual	experi-
ence.	Walking	and	crawling	were	equally	well	predicted	by	observers	capable	of	
both	 actions	 (Chapter	 5),	 although	 crawling	 is	 less	 often	observed	 in	daily	 life,	
which	implies	that	observers	had	less	visual	experience	with	this	action	than	with	
walking.	Moreover,	the	participating	infants	who	were	not	yet	capable	of	walking	
but	capable	of	crawling	were	more	accurate	in	their	predictions	of	crawling	than	
of	walking.	Thus,	motor	experience	enables	accurate	predictions	about	the	timing	
of	observed	actions.	
Second,	motor	experience	may	lead	to	simulations	that	can	help	to	disentangle	
what	will	be	the	target	of	the	observed	action	if	multiple	targets	are	present.	Data	
in	Chapter	6	illustrated	that	participants	were	more	accurate	in	predicting	what	
would	be	the	target	of	the	action	if	the	observed	action	was	within	their	motor	
repertoire.	 Thus,	 motor	 experience	 enables	 observers	 to	 make	 more	 accurate	
target	predictions.
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Third,	 motor	 experience	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 powerful	 tool	 to	 discover	 the	 possi-
bilities	 and	 impossibilities	 of	 the	motor	 system	and	 consequently	 the	 range	 of	
possible	actions	that	one	can	generate.	Similarly,	exploring	the	motor	capabilities	
also	may	lead	the	motor	system	to	learn	motor	laws	and	may	provide	the	actor	
with	information	about	how	to	deal	with	situational	constraints	(Blakemore	et	al.,	
1998).	The	acquired	‘motor	knowledge’	can	in	turn	be	used	for	action	prediction	
(Blakemore	et	 al.,	 1998).	This	 ‘knowledge’	may	also	be	acquired	 through	visual	
experience.	However,	if	visual	experience	is	the	basis	for	learning	motor	laws	for	
the	prediction	of	others’	actions,	then	more	instances	of	the	actions	are	needed	
compared	 to	 a	 situation	 in	which	 these	 laws	 are	 acquired	 through	 own	motor	
experience.	 The	 perceived	 instances	will	 namely	 stem	 from	multiple	 individu-
als	and	will	hence	contain	more	variance	 than	 the	 instances	of	own	actions,	as	
individuals	vary	 in	 their	movement	patterns	 (Cutting	&	Kozlowski,	 1977;	Loula,	
Prasad,	Harber,	&	 Shiffrar,	 2005).	 The	 other	 side	 of	 the	 coin	 is	 that	 own	motor	
experience	 offers	 less	 variability	 and	 therefore	 lower	 generalizability.	 Another	
advantage	of	relying	on	motor	experience	 is	 that	healthy	 individuals	 in	general	
have	 more	 opportunities	 to	 perform	 actions	 than	 to	 observe	 them	 in	 others,	
because	regardless	of	the	situation,	the	self	is	always	present,	the	availability	of	
observable	 others	may	 fluctuate.	Moreover,	 infants	 seem	 to	 have	 the	 tendency	
to	explore	their	capabilities	and	try	different	versions	of	the	same	action	rather	
than	to	stick	to	the	first	solution	that	works	for	them	(Adolph	et	al.,	2012;	Comalli,	
Abraham,	Keen,	&	Adolph,	in	prep.).	This	motor	exploration	behavior	gives	them	
ample	opportunity	to	acquire	robust	forward	models	that	can	be	applied	in	many	
situations.	Through	action	experience,	observers	might	thus	become	sensitive	to	
subtleties	of	movements	performed	by	others.	The	data	presented	in	Chapters	2,	
3,	5,	and	6	are	in	line	with	the	notion	that	observers	are	sensitive	to	the	details	
of	other’s	movements.	Chapters	5	and	6	show	that	motor	experience	enables	ob-
servers	to	base	their	predictions	on	the	movements	of	observed	actions.	Results	
reported	by	other	labs	point	in	the	same	direction.	For	instance,	expert	basketball	
players	were	found	to	be	more	accurate	compared	to	visual	experts	and	novices	
in	dissociating	whether	a	shot	would	be	in	or	out,	when	presented	with	the	first	
few	video	frames	of	a	basketball	shot	(Aglioti	et	al.,	2008).	In	a	similar	vein,	expert	
basketball	players	have	been	demonstrated	to	be	more	accurate	than	novices	at	
detecting	deceptive	basketball	moves	when	presented	with	only	kinematic	cues	
of	those	movements	(Sebanz	&	Shiffrar,	2009).	Our	studies	illustrate	that	the	same	
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principles	hold	 in	 early	development	 and	 that	 these	principles	 can	 explain	 the	
development	of	action	prediction.
Directions for future research
Although	a	motor	 simulation	 account	 can	 explain	 action	prediction	 and	 its	de-
velopment,	it	also	raises	some	questions.	These	questions	need	to	be	addressed	
to	come	to	a	better	understanding	of	processes	underlying	action	prediction	and	
action	prediction	development.
Predicting movements and predicting action targets
According	 to	motor	 simulation	accounts,	 action	 targets	are	predicted	based	on	
the	observed	movements,	and	simultaneously,	movements	are	predicted	based	on	
the	action	target	(Prinz,	2006;	Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Schubotz	&	von	Cramon,	2008).	
How	 can	 both	 of	 these	 statements	 hold?	 There	 are	 two	 potential	 explanations	
which	 are	 not	mutually	 exclusive.	 The	most	 commonly	mentioned	 explanation	
is	 that	both	 forward	and	 inverse	models	are	employed	by	observers	 to	predict	
movements	and	action	targets	(Wolpert	et	al.,	2003;	Kilner	et	al.,	2007;	Miall,	2003;	
Carr,	Iacoboni,	Dubeau,	Mazziotta,	&	Lenzi,	2003).	An	inverse	model	can	run	on	a	
part	of	the	observed	movements	to	detect	what	the	potential	action	target	could	
be	 given	 these	movements,	 and	 after	 a	 hypothesis	 has	 been	 formed	 about	 the	
potential	 target,	 forward	modeling	 can	be	used	 to	predict	how	 the	movements	
should	unfold	given	the	inferred	target	(Oztop	et	al.,	2005).
The	second	explanation	includes,	besides	motor	aspects,	higher-order	cognitive	
processing	to	explain	action	prediction	(Csibra,	2007;	Ansuini	et	al.,	2014).	Accord-
ing	 to	 this	explanation,	actions	can	be	segmented	 into	distinct	periods	of	 time.	
Before	movement	onset,	the	observer	might	identify	aspects	crucial	to	the	action,	
for	 instance	 the	 action	 context,	 and	 the	 posture	 of	 the	 actor.	 Basic	 perceptual	
processes	might	serve	to	identify	edges,	depth	cues,	surfaces,	and	might	lead	to	
the	 identification	 of	 objects	 (Spelke,	 1990;	 Gerlach	&	Marques,	 2014).	More	 ad-
vanced	processes,	probably	relying	on	previously	acquired	knowledge,	determine	
the	presence	of	potential	 actors,	 and	might,	 for	 instance	based	on	 the	distance	
between	the	actors	and	the	objects	present	in	the	scene,	start	selecting	objects	as	
potential	action	targets.	Potential	targets	may	need	to	be	within	reaching	distance	
of	the	actor	(Makin,	Holmes,	&	Ehrsson,	2008;	Caggiano,	Fogassi,	Rizzolatti,	Thier,	
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&	Casile,	2009)	and	should	afford	manipulation.	Implicit	action	knowledge	about	
these	affordances	(Gibson,	1977)	might	be	acquired	through	observational	or	ac-
tive	experience.	Once	the	movement	starts,	some	of	the	potential	targets	can	be	
ruled	out.	The	direction	of	 the	movement	might	serve	as	a	strong	cue	to	which	
of	the	many	objects	is	the	target.	From	that	point	onwards,	simulations	can	start	
based	on	how	the	observer	would	perform	the	movements	required	to	attain	the	
now	inferred	target.
Although	the	first	explanation	can	account	for	the	data	presented	in	Chapters	5	
and	6,	it	cannot	explain	the	findings	described	in	Chapters	2	and	3.	That	is,	previ-
ously	acquired	knowledge	about	objects	and	situational	constraints	affected	the	
observer’s	action	predictions,	which	can	well	be	explained	by	the	second	explana-
tion,	which	 includes	higher-order	cognitive	processing.	More	specifically,	 in	the	
study	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 infants	might	 initially	 have	made	 the	 prediction	
that	 a	phone	 goes	 to	 the	 ear	 (or	 that	 a	 cup	 goes	 to	 the	mouth)	based	on	 their	
prior	knowledge,	but	should	have	reconsidered	this	target	prediction	when	the	
movements	started	deviating	from	the	path	expected	from	the	motor	simulation.	
Additional	simulations	may	account	for	the	finding	that	the	infant’s	motor	system	
was	more	strongly	activated	during	the	observation	of	unusual	compared	to	or-
dinary	actions.	The	movements	during	the	action	are	thus	monitored	to	reassure	
that	the	initial	target	inference	is	compatible	with	the	new	situation	that	emerges	
during	the	movements.	In	the	study	described	in	Chapter	5,	identifying	the	poten-
tial	action	targets	before	action	onset	might	have	helped	the	observers	to	quickly	
disentangle	what	would	be	the	action	target	once	the	movements	started.	The	idea	
that	the	different	aspects	of	an	action	can	play	unique	roles	depending	on	which	
phase	the	action	is	in	deserves	more	attention	in	future	research.	Furthermore,	
how	easily	do	observers	reject	 the	 inference	they	previous	held	based	on	prior	
knowledge	and	make	a	new	target	 inference?	The	predictive	coding	framework	
as	postulated	by	Karl	Friston	(2010)	states	that	inferences	are	rejected	when	the	
prediction	error	exceeds	the	criterion	set	for	that	particular	prediction	task.	The	
prediction	error	is	dependent	on	the	generative	framework	or	the	world	model	
the	observer	has.	This	world	model	consists	of	priors,	built	through	experience.	
The	more	observations	gathered	by	the	observer,	the	less	noisy	the	prior	distribu-
tion	is.	Consequently,	the	more	experienced	observer	will	need	less	evidence	to	
reject	a	hypothesis	than	an	observer	with	a	noisier	prior.	According	to	this	logic,	
people	might	become	more	flexible	in	target	inferences	with	age	and	experience.	
Whether	this	theoretical	assumption	is	true,	requires	further	empirical	testing.
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Visuomotor versus motor experience
As	outlined	in	the	General	Introduction,	multiple	theories	have	been	proposed	on	
how	the	action-perception	 link	comes	 into	place	during	development.	The	cur-
rent	 findings	 indicate	 that	action	prediction	abilities	differ	 for	different	actions	
and	that	motor	experience	with	a	specific	skill	ameliorates	the	prediction	quality	
of	exactly	 that	action.	The	 findings	are	hence	congruent	with	the	 idea	that	mo-
tor	experience	plays	a	key	role	in	the	development	of	the	action-perception	link,	
which	 is	 consistent	with	 two	of	 the	 theoretical	 views	discussed	 in	 the	General	
Introduction.	The	first	and	most	widespread	view	is	advocated	by	Cecilia	Heyes	
and	colleagues,	who	have	provided	an	elegant	and	clear	explanation	of	how	ordi-
nary	motor	neurons	may	develop	into	sensorimotor	neurons	(also	called	mirror	
neurons;	Heyes,	2010;	Cook	et	al.,	2014).	Through	the	contiguous	and	contingent	
experience	of	acting	and	receiving	sensory	information	about	the	consequences	
of	 these	actions,	 associations	are	 formed	between	motor	and	sensory	neurons.	
Once	these	associations	are	formed,	perceiving	an	action	will	lead	not	only	to	the	
activation	of	 sensory	areas	of	 the	brain,	but	also	 to	 the	activation	of	 the	corre-
sponding	motor	areas.	According	to	Cook	and	colleagues	(2014),	this	association	
should	be	direct:	visual	information	of	an	action	can	only	evoke	a	motor	response	
if	visuomotor	associations	have	been	formed,	and	similarly,	auditory	action	infor-
mation	can	only	evoke	motor	responses	if	audiomotor	associations	are	present.	In	
this	way,	own	action	experience	can	alter	action	perception	processes.
Alternative	 to	a	sensorimotor	account	 including	only	direct	associations	with	
the	 motor	 system,	 a	 ‘motor	 only’	 account	 may	 also	 explain	 action	 perception	
development.	 That	 is,	 motor	 experience	 may	 also	 influence	 action	 perception	
development	in	the	absence	of	visual	experience.	It	occurs	only	sporadically	that	
one	cannot	see	the	consequences	of	one’s	own	action.	Nevertheless,	this	does	not	
imply	that	vision	is	a	necessary	component	in	the	development	of	action	percep-
tion	and	action	prediction.	In	an	adult	study,	participants	were	trained	in	a	novel	
motor	 skill	while	 being	 blind-folded.	 Their	 visual	 recognition	 of	 this	 novel	 act	
improved,	although	they	had	received	a	nonvisual	motor	training	(Casile	&	Giese,	
2006).	A	 further	challenge	 for	 the	 ‘direct	sensorimotor’	associative	 learning	ac-
count	are	facial	movements.	Sensorimotor	associations	for	facial	expressions	are	
thought	to	be	formed	because	of	being	imitated	by	others	(Heyes,	2010).	However,	
such	an	explanation	might	seem	a	bit	far-fetched.	An	infant’s	smile	might	trigger	
her	parent	to	smile	back,	but	other	facial	expressions,	such	as	crying	and	the	ex-
pression	of	anger	and	fear,	are	less	likely	to	be	imitated.	The	role	of	proprioception	
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in	action	perception	development	thus	deserves	more	attention	(see	also	Meltzoff	
&	Moore,	1997).	Actors	not	only	receive	visual	feedback	of	their	action,	but	also	
proprioceptive	feedback	(Scheidt,	Conditt,	Secco,	&	Mussa-Ivaldi,	2005).	As	vision	
has	 a	 higher	 spatial	 resolution	 than	proprioception	 (Driver	&	 Spence,	 1998),	 it	
would	be	interesting	to	investigate	whether	nonvisual	motor	training	leads	to	less	
accurate	action	prediction	than	visual	motor	training.
Both	the	‘direct	sensorimotor’	and	the	‘motor	only’	account	can	explain	the	data	
of	 the	current	set	of	experiments.	Manual	actions	such	as	 the	one	presented	 in	
Chapter	6	are	often	guided	by	vision	(Land,	2006;	Hayhoe,	2000),	whereas	actors	
have	 only	 limited	 visual	 access	 to	 their	 walking	 and	 crawling	 performance.	 A	
third	person	perspective	on	walking,	crawling,	and	bringing	a	cup	 to	 the	ear	 is	
strongly	different	from	the	first	person	perspective.	Therefore,	the	sensorimotor	
account	as	presented	here	needs	to	be	extended	in	order	to	fully	account	for	the	
data	presented	in	Chapters	2,	3	and	5.	More	specifically,	future	research	on	action	
perception	 development	 is	 needed	 to	 clarify	 how	 the	 first	 person	 perspective	
is	 translated	 into	 a	 third	person	perspective	 (Thomas,	 Press,	&	Haggard,	 2006;	
Shmuelof	&	Zohary,	 2008)	 and	how	 this	 translation	 is	 acquired	during	 infancy.	
A	 ‘motor	 only’	 account	 faces	 the	 same	 challenge	 of	 explaining	 the	 translation	
between	perspectives.	Potentially,	proprioception	mediates	the	translation	from	
body-centered	 into	 world-centered	 coordinates	 and	 vice	 versa	 (Carrozzo,	 Mc-
Intyre,	Zago,	&	Lacquaniti,	1999;	Crawford,	Medendorp,	&	Marotta,	2004).
Societal relevance
Beside	implications	for	action	perception	research,	the	current	research	is	of	rel-
evance	for	robotics.	The	demographic	transitions	resulting	from	a	prolonged	life	
expectancy	(Leon,	2011)	and	decreasing	birth	rates	after	the	babyboom	generation	
(Lutz,	O’Neill	&	Scherbov,	2004)	have	caused	policy	makers	in	Europe	to	speculate	
about	using	robots	to	make	up	for	the	lack	of	caretakers	for	elderly	people	(Butter	
et	al.,	 2008;	Gelderblom	&	Rensma,	 2010;	Bemelmans,	Gelderblom,	 Jonker,	&	de	
Witte,	2012).	Robots	that	would	be	required	to	smoothly	interact	with	humans	will	
need	similar	action	prediction	capabilities	as	humans	have.	As	mentioned	earlier,	
motor	experience	may	have	benefits	over	and	above	visual	 experience	when	 it	
comes	to	develop	accurate	action	prediction	skills.	As	motor	experience	can	be	
gained	by	the	robot	without	the	need	of	human	involvement,	motor	 learning	 is	
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an	 interesting	mechanism	from	an	economic	perspective	as	well.	However,	 this	
would	imply	that	robots	need	to	have	similar	bodily	constraints	as	humans	have,	
which	may	a	drawback	regarding	the	overall	functionality	of	the	robot.	
Testing	theories	about	the	development	of	human	action	prediction	in	robots	
is	 advantageous	 for	both	 research	 fields,	 robotics	 and	developmental	 cognitive	
neuroscience.	Robots	 (or	 computational	models)	 offer	 the	most	 explicit	 test	 of	
mechanisms	postulated	by	(developmental)	cognitive	neuroscientists	(Barsalou,	
2008;	Harvey	et	al.,	2005;	Asada,	MacDorman,	Ishiguro	&	Kuniyoshi,	2001),	because	
if	the	model	fails	to	function	in	the	reality	of	the	robot,	the	theory	can	be	rejected.	
Interaction	 between	 robotics	 and	 developmental	 cognitive	 science	 forces	 the	
developmental	cognitive	scientist	to	generate	testable	hypotheses	and	explicate	
in	detail	how	 they	 think	development	works.	 For	 instance,	 the	development	of	
gaze	following	has	been	captured	and	described	in	a	computational	model	which	
has	 integrated	multiple	 empirical	 findings	on	 infants’	 development	of	 gaze	 fol-
lowing	(Triesch,	Jasso,	&	Deák	2007).	Based	on	the	model,	new	hypotheses	about	
development	 can	be	derived.	Robotics	 on	 the	other	hand	profits	 from	 theories	
about	human	development,	as	humans	often	possess	capabilities	that	roboticists	
would	like	to	give	robots	as	well.	For	example,	Demiris	and	Dearden	(2005)	work	
on	a	robot	that	can	learn	from	others.	Their	work	on	the	HAMMER	model	illus-
trates	that	motor	babbling	and	motor	exploration	behavior	as	found	in	infants	are	
well-functional	mechanisms	to	provide	the	robot	 the	capacity	 to	 imitate	others	
(Demiris	&	Dearden,	2005).	Development	in	a	robot	is	sometimes	preferable	over	
programming	all	details	in	the	robot	in	advance,	because	it	offers	flexibility	and	
the	 potential	 to	 adapt	 to	 different	 environments	 and	 different	 situations	 (Dill-
mann,	2004).	Crossovers	between	both	fields	can	thus	be	expected	to	be	fruitful.
Conclusion
The	current	 thesis	presents	a	series	of	experiments	 in	which	action	perception	
and	 its	 early	 development	 was	 investigated.	 Infant	 and	 adult	 observers	 were	
shown	 to	base	 their	 action	predictions	 on	 the	 actor’s	movements	 and	on	 their	
previous	 knowledge.	 The	 developmental	 findings	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 idea	
that	 the	 capacity	 to	 predict	 others’	 actions	develops	 through	 visual	 and	motor	
experience.	Action	prediction	was	found	to	be	more	accurate	if	the	observer	had	
motor	experience	with	specifically	that	action.
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Motor	 or	 sensorimotor	 experience	 can	 at	 least	 have	 three	 advantages	 over	
observational	 experience:	 1)	 Prediction	 of	 the	 timing	 of	 actions	 becomes	more	
accurate	with	motor	experience,	2)	motor	experience	allows	observers	to	dissoci-
ate	which	will	be	the	target	of	an	observed	action,	3)	motor	experience	serves	as	
a	powerful	tool	to	acquire	motor	laws	and	information	about	action	constraints	
that	 can	be	used	 to	predict	 others’	 actions.	The	 results	 of	 the	 experiments	not	
only	provide	answers	but	also	make	clear	that	the	field	is	facing	several	interest-
ing	questions.	Unresolved	is	the	role	of	proprioception	in	active	experience	with	
actions:	Can	nonvisual	motor	experience	explain	action	prediction	development?	
How	can	first	person	experiences	be	applied	to	predict	actions	perceived	from	a	
third	person	perspective	relatively	quickly	after	this	first	person	experience	has	
been	 acquired?	Do	 the	 separate	 aspects	 of	 actions	 play	 a	 different	 role	 during	
distinct	phases	of	an	action?	Are	 there	situations	 in	which	movements	are	 less	
important	for	action	prediction	than	other	aspects	of	the	action?	More	research	is	
needed	to	further	demystify	the	processes	action	prediction	and	its	development.
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Informatiebronnen
Handelingen	bevatten	verschillende	soorten	 informatie	die	ofwel	onafhankelijk	
van	elkaar	danwel	in	combinatie	gebruikt	kunnen	worden	om	het	toekomstig	ver-
loop	van	een	geobserveerde	handeling	te	voorspellen.	Mogelijke	soorten	of	bron-
nen	van	informatie	bestudeerd	in	dit	proefschrift	zijn	objectkennis,	de	aanwezig-
heid	van	een	duidelijk	doelwit,	de	context	van	de	handeling	en	de	bewegingen	van	
de	actor.	Betreffende	objectkennis	heeft	een	eerdere	gedragsstudie	aangetoond	
dat	 de	 frequentie	waarmee	 de	 eindlocatie	 van	 een	 handeling	 voorspeld	wordt	
door	baby’s	en	volwassenen,	afhangt	van	het	gebruikte	object	(Hunnius	&	Bek-
kering,	2010).	Bijvoorbeeld,	men	verwacht	eerder	dat	een	telefoon	naar	het	oor	
gaat	dan	een	kopje,	en	men	verwacht	eerder	dat	een	kopje	naar	de	mond	gaat	dan	
een	telefoon.	Hoofdstuk	2	van	dit	proefschrift	toonde	dat	de	neurale	reacties	op	
het	 bekijken	 van	 deze	meer	 of	minder	 voorspelbare	 object-gerelateerde	 acties	
verschillend	zijn,	wat	verdere	evidentie	is	voor	de	stelling	dat	objectkennis	een	
rol	speelt	in	actiepredictie.
De	resultaten	gerapporteerd	in	de	hoofdstukken	2,	4,	5	en	6	illustreren	boven-
dien	dat	baby’s	en	volwassenen	in	staat	zijn	het	doelobject	of	de	eindlocatie	van	
een	handeling	te	voorspellen.	Objectgerichte	handelingen	bleken	voorspelbaar-
der	te	zijn	dan	niet-objectgerichte	handelingen	(hoofdstuk	3).	Vervolgexperimen-
ten	 zoals	 gepresenteerd	 in	 hoofdstuk	 3,	 benadrukten	 echter	 dat	 objectgerichte	
handelingen	 voorspelbaarder	 zouden	 kunnen	 zijn	 omdat	 actoren	 op	 een	meer	
voorspelbare	manier	bewegen	als	ze	naar	een	doelobject	bewegen	dan	als	ze	naar	
niet	naar	een	doelobject	bewegen.	Deze	bevinding	geldde	alleen	als	de	handeling	
beperkt	werd	door	de	context,	wat	suggereert	dat	de	combinatie	van	het	hebben	
van	een	ruimtelijk	gedefinieerd	einddoel	én	 rekening	moeten	houden	met	bar-
rières	onderweg	het	aantal	vrijheidsgraden	van	een	beweging	dusdanig	beperkt	
dat	de	handeling	duidelijk	voorspelbaarder	wordt.
De	rol	van	kinematica	voor	actievoorspellingen	was	diepgravender	bestudeerd	
in	de	experimenten	gepresenteerd	in	hoofdstuk	5.	Daar	werd	de	nauwkeurigheid	
van	de	voorspelling	van	de	 timing	van	bewegingen	vastgesteld.	Kijkers	werden	
geacht	hun	voorspellingen	te	baseren	op	verschillende	soorten	bewegingen,	zoals	
lopen	en	kruipen,	of	de	bewegingen	van	een	object.	Voorspellingen	waren	nauw-
keuriger	voor	de	menselijke	bewegingen	dan	voor	de	objectbewegingen.	Verder	
waren	de	jongste	baby’s	(14-maanden-ouden)	accurater	in	het	voorspellen	van	de	
timing	van	kruipen	dan	van	lopen,	wat	aangeeft	dat	het	soort	beweging	invloed	
heeft	op	actiepredictie.
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Het	effect	van	kinematica	op	actiepredictie	was	vanuit	een	andere	invalshoek	
bestudeerd	in	hoofdstuk	6.	Baby’s	en	volwassenen	bekeken	objectgerichte	hande-
lingen	die	verschilden	in	snelheid.	De	resultaten	toonden	dat	de	snelheid	van	een	
beweging	gebruikt	wordt	in	actiepredictie.
Ontwikkelingstijdslijn
De	 verschillende	 informatiebronnen	 die	 voor	 actiepredictie	 worden	 gebruikt,	
worden	mogelijkerwijs	niet	allemaal	tegelijk	geïntegreerd	in	de	actiepredictie	van	
baby’s.	Het	bestuderen	van	de	tijdslijn	waarin	actiepredictie	zich	ontwikkelt,	zou	
inzicht	kunnen	bieden	in	hoe	verschillende	competenties	op	elkaar	voortbouwen.	
Daarnaast	zou	een	ontwikkelingstijdslijn	indicaties	kunnen	verschaffen	over	de	
processen	die	leiden	tot	de	ontwikkeling	van	actiepredictie,	en	tegelijkertijd	zou	
een	tijdslijn	 inzicht	kunnen	geven	in	de	processen	die	ten	grondslag	 liggen	aan	
actiepredictie	in	zijn	algemeenheid.
Betreffende	 objectkennis	 had	 eerder	 werk	 laten	 zien	 dat	 baby’s	 reeds	 op	
een	 leeftijd	 van	6	maanden	doelvoorspellingen	kunnen	maken	op	basis	 van	de	
gebruikte	objecten	(Hunnius	&	Bekkering,	2010).	Op	die	 leeftijd	zijn	baby’s	nog	
niet	in	staat	alle	bestudeerde	acties	uit	te	voeren	(bijvoorbeeld,	het	brengen	van	
objecten	naar	hun	oor).	Het	 is	daarom	uitgesloten	dat	motorische	ervaring	 ten	
grondslag	 ligt	 aan	 deze	 voorspellingen.	 Daarnaast	 lijkt	 het	 niet	 waarschijnlijk	
dat	kennis	over	hoe	artefacten	normaal	gebruikt	worden,	aangeboren	is.	Aanne-
melijker	is	dat	deze	voorspellingen	verworven	worden	door	visuele	ervaringen.	
Ondanks	het	feit	dat	op	objectkennis	gebaseerde	voorspellingen	op	jonge	leeftijd	
waarschijnlijk	worden	gemaakt	op	basis	van	visuele	ervaring,	observeerden	we	
in	hoofdstuk	2	dat	op	een	leeftijd	van	12	maanden,	het	motorische	systeem	actief	
is	tijdens	objectkennis	gebaseerde	voorspellingen.	Op	deze	leeftijd	zijn	baby’s	in	
staat	de	geobserveerde	handelingen	zelf	uit	te	voeren,	want	de	verzorgers	van	de	
deelnemende	12-maanden-ouden	rapporteerden	dat	hun	baby	dit	soort	handelin-
gen	uitvoerde	in	het	dagelijks	leven.	Tezamen	suggeren	deze	studies	dat	hoewel	
voorspellingen	eerst	op	visuele	 ervaring	gestoeld	 zouden	kunnen	zijn,	het	mo-
torische	systeem	ook	gebruikt	kan	worden	in	actiepredictie,	zodra	de	relevante	
motorische	ervaring	verworven	is.
Voorspellingen	 van	 de	 timing	 van	 kruiphandelingen	 bleken	 nauwkeurig	 te	
zijn	 vanaf	 de	 leeftijd	 van	 tenminste	 14	maanden;	 jongere	baby’s	werden	 in	het	
betreffende	 onderzoek	 niet	 getest	 (hoofdstuk	 5).	 Baby’s	worden	 nauwkeuriger	
in	 het	 voorspellen	 van	 de	 timing	 van	 loophandelingen	 die	 ze	 zien	 tussen	 een	
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leeftijd	van	14	en	20	maanden	(hoofdstuk	5).	De	20-maanden-ouden	hadden	meer	
loopervaring	 dan	 de	 14-maanden-ouden,	 aldus	 hun	 verzorgers.	 Voorspellingen	
van	 reiken-naar-en-indrukken-van	knoppen	volgden	 een	 ander	 tijdsbestek	qua	
ontwikkeling:	Vijftien-maanden-oude	maar	niet	12-maanden-oude	baby’s	bleken	
in	staat	op	basis	van	de	snelheid	van	de	gebruikte	hand	het	doel	te	voorspellen	
van	een	knop-indruk-handeling	(hoofdstuk	6).
Processen die ten grondslag liggen aan actiepredictie en de ontwikkeling 
van actiepredictie
Welke	 processen	 liggen	 ten	 grondslag	 aan	 actiepredictie	 en	 de	 ontwikkeling	
daarvan?	 Deze	 vraag	 komt	 terug	 in	 bijna	 ieder	 hoofdstuk	 van	 dit	 proefschrift.	
Mijn	kernhypothese	was	dat	eigen	actie-ervaring	de	precisie	van	actiepredictie	
verbetert.	De	resultaten	suggereren	inderdaad	dat	actie-ervaring	een	belangrijke	
rol	speelt	in	de	ontwikkeling	van	actiepredictie.	Voorspellingen	waren	nauwkeu-
riger	voor	handelingen	die	de	kijkers	in	hun	motor	repertoire	hadden	dan	voor	
handelingen	die	ze	nog	niet	in	staat	waren	uit	te	voeren	(hoofdstukken	5	en	6).	
Het	voorspellen	van	knop-indruk-handelingen	bleek	te	ontwikkelen	tussen	de	12	
en	de	15	maanden,	wat	correspondeert	met	de	tijdslijn	van	het	ontwikkelen	van	de	
vaardigheid	zelf	knoppen	in	te	drukken	(hoofdstuk	6).	Veertien-maanden-ouden,	
vaardig	in	kruipen,	bleken	een	volwassenniveau	van	nauwkeurigheid	te	hebben	
bereikt	 in	 het	 voorspellen	 van	 kruipen	 (hoofdstuk	 5).	 Twintig-maanden-oude	
peuters,	in	staat	tot	zowel	kruipen	als	lopen,	toonden	even	accuraat	te	zijn	in	hun	
voorspellingen	van	lopen	als	van	kruipen,	terwijl	14-maanden-ouden	minder	ac-
curaat	waren	in	hun	voorspellingen	van	lopen	dan	van	kruipen.	Deze	bevindingen	
ondersteunen	het	idee	dat	motorische	processen	cruciaal	zijn	voor	actiepredictie	
(zie	ook	hoofdstuk	2),	in	baby’s	als	ook	in	volwassenen.	Ten	slotte	stemmen	deze	
bevindingen	overeen	met	het	idee	dat	motorische	ervaring	fundamenteel	is	voor	
de	ontwikkeling	van	actiepredictie.
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